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Credit is due

As the Pristina Gazeta Express has  published the Kosovo/Serbia agreement in English and Albanian, I did some quick answers to Shpend Limoni’s questions, which naturally come from the Pristina perspective:

1.    Is this agreement in collision with Kosovo’s Constitution ?

A:  I don’t see any contradictions with the constitution, but I’ll be interested to hear what others say on this subject.  It clearly provides for the police and courts in the north to be part of the Kosovo police and courts, which was a critical issue.

2.    Does this agreement mean that Kosovo finally is establishing its own authority in the  North ?

A:  I think it means the north can now be integrated into the Kosovo constitutional framework, which provides for a good deal of municipal authority as well as cooperation among municipalities. 

3.    Many in Kosovo are saying this means practically autonomy for Kosovo  Serbs? Do you agree with this ?

A:  No.  The Ahtisaari plan provides for a great deal of self-governance for Serbs throughout Kosovo.  It was unrealistic to expect it to be less for the northern municipalities.  The association is in the Ahtisaari plan.  It is not new. 

4.    Do you expect swift implementation process ?

A:  Anyone who expects swift and easy implementation has not worked long in the Balkans.  But there is a good chance of implementation over the next year or so.

5.    Part of agreement is about EU integration process. Both sides agreed that won’t block each other ?

A:  Yes, that seems to me a good thing and should open up several possibilities for Kosovo:  negotiations of a Stabilization and Association Agreement, movement towards a Schengen visa waiver, possibly recognition by at least some of the EU non-recognizers. 

6. How all this would reflect in international stage. Could we expect more recognitions ?

A:  I hope so.  Kosovo has in this negotiation demonstrated a good deal of statesmanship.  Consider:  a Kosovo prime minister negotiating with a Serbia prime minister extension of Kosovo police and court structures into a territory that Serbia has dominated for 14 years.  That does not make anything happen automatically, but I do hope to see some more countries recognize. Credit is due. 

PS:  Credit is also due to Lady Ashton!

Priceless

The initialing of the much-negotiated agreement between Kosovo and Serbia is certainly a source for celebration, though of course for Americans it is overshadowed by the capture in Watertown, Massachusetts of a suspect in the Boston marathon bombings.  The Tanjug photo of Catherine Ashton looking like a stern schoolteacher with her two unruly but subdued pupils, Prime Ministers Dacic and Thaci, is priceless.

It is impossible to give even a preliminary assessment of the agreement without a text.  For the moment, journalistic commentary focuses on who got who to change what.  That’s not very interesting to me, though I understand why it interests politicians who have to face the voters.  The key questions are the balance in the agreement and the extent to which it can be implemented in a straightforward way.  I can’t respond on either issue without a complete text.

Nor is the deal quite done, yet.  Initialing froze the text, but as I understand the process Ashton still expects the two sides to confirm their agreement.  They will.  It is not clear to me whether there is to be a formal signing or not.  I imagine Thaci would want one and Dacic not, since it would represent one more step on the way to Serbia acknowledging Kosovo’s statehood.

Serbia is already well down that path.  Every time the parties meet, or reach an agreement, Belgrade is implicitly acknowledging that Thaci is the legitimate representative of democratically validated institutions.  What Serbia has not acknowledged is Kosovo’s sovereignty, even if the integrated border management inches in that direction.  Serbian President Nikolic says it’s the best that could be done and reiterates that Serbia will not allow Kosovo into the UN or recognize it.  A close examination of the agreement text is needed to see if there has been any further movement in that direction.

I’ve got colleagues who hail from Kosovo and Serbia working on blogposts about the domestic implications in each of the agreement.  Thaci, who has been criticized in Kosovo for knuckling under to American and European pressure, will likely still gain a bit if Kosovars like the substance of the agreement.  Dacic has to hope that whatever he gave is more than compensated for by getting a date for EU accession negotiations.  That is not a hard test to pass so far as I am concerned, but I am not a typical Serbian voter.

One thing should be clear:  Kosovo should likewise move ahead on the path to the EU, albeit several steps behind Serbia.  That means a date for negotiation of a Stabilization and Association Agreement as well as expeditious movement on the Schengen visa waiver.

I assume none of these important side deals is written in the agreement, which is meant to bind Belgrade and Pristina, not Brussels.  But let’s not kid ourselves:  what Brussels had on offer is vital to getting this done and cannot be reneged on.

The text please.  Then we’ll really have something to write about.