Done deal, now the hard part

Belgrade and Pristina have both confirmed their agreement to the 15-point “First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations.”  As a result, the European Commission has recommended that the EU open accession negotiations with Serbia and negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Kosovo.  The Kosovo parliament has already voted in favor of the agreement.  The Serbian parliament will consider it this week.

Hooah!  as the Marines shout.  Congratulations are due especially to Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative, for sticking with this and using the leverage Chancellor Merkel’s insistence on abolition of “parallel structures” in northern Kosovo provided.  In a period when Europe is on the ropes, this small victory in its (very) near abroad is particularly welcome.  Kudos also to the US government, which played a vital supporting role.  This was not “leading from behind” but rather supporting from the wings.  It was the right role and well played.

Now comes the hard part.  Implementation is never automatic in the Balkans, though the European Commission’s report includes a positive picture of how the previous “technical” agreements are being implemented.  The problem now is that the current leadership of the population in northern Kosovo is opposed to integration into Pristina’s police, judicial and electoral frameworks, which is the heart of the new agreement.

Pristina should of course do its best to make integration attractive.  It can do this by making funding available for the north and moving with “all deliberated speed” on implementation.  Provoking the northerners will do Pristina no good.  Provocative language and actions should be avoided.  At the same time, the agreement is admirably clear and requires concrete steps be taken.  Transparency is important:  people need to know what to expect.  There will be resistance.  Pristina needs to be patient, but firm.

Belgrade has an even greater, if less visible, role.  Northern resistance is financed with funding from Belgrade security institutions and from smuggling.  Both need to shut down.  Some northerners will not want to stay in Kosovo.  Their entirely voluntary movement needs to be welcomed in Serbia.  Belgrade and Pristina need to collaborate in blocking the illicit trade in goods that are brought into northern Kosovo tax-free from Serbia only to be returned to Serbia or sold south of the Ibar in Kosovo.  The political economy is no less important than the politics.

While relieved that an agreement has been reached, I am still concerned about the future.  The Belgrade/Pristina dialogue is a classic case of elite pact-making without a broader peacebuilding process.  The underlying drivers of conflict have not been addressed.  Kosovo Albanians and Serbs,  both in Serbia and in Kosovo, still think badly of each other and rank themselves as victims.  There has been little mutual acknowledgement of harm in the public sphere.  Few Albanians and Serbs have renewed personal ties with the other.  It is becoming increasingly difficult to do so as many younger people literally lack a common language (other than English).

It is almost 14 years since the end of the NATO/Yugoslavia war.  Europe, which played a supporting role in that conflict, has now played the lead.  But it needs Belgrade and Pristina to continue to play their parts.  Leverage from the negotiations–respectively for accession and for Stabilization and Association–will be important.  But to be self-sustaining, this peace process is going to need to go deeper and involve many more citizens on both sides.