Month: April 2013
What Serbs get
I am struck in rereading the Serbia/Kosovo agreement that it is called “First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations.” I assume this reflects mainly Pristina’s view, since the agreement does not go as far as it would like in recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign state. In practice though, this is a moment of strong leverage for Pristina, as the EU is insisting on a settlement of the north as a condition for a starting date for Serbia’s EU accession negotiations. With a date comes money, which Belgrade needs. It is also negotiating a standby arrangement with the International Monetary Fund, but in practice that too may depend on acceptance of the Serbia/Kosovo agreement.
So what else is there in the agreement for Serbia and Serbs?
First and foremost, they get an “Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo.” Established under Kosovo law, the association will “have full overview of the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning” as well as other areas delegated by the Kosovo authorities. It will also represent the Serb municipalities to the Pristina authorities, including in the council of communities. None of this is new. It is foreseen in the Ahtisaari plan, which Belgrade rejected. It looks to me consistent with the Kosovo constitution.
Belgrade has been particularly concerned to get something on police and justice. Here the agreement is unequivocal in providing for integration of the Serb police into the Kosovo police, with salaries paid only by Pristina. What Serbia got on police was a regional police commander for the north chosen by Pristina from a list of four nominated by the northern Kosovo municipalities. This seems eminently reasonable and hopefully workable.
The agreement is also unequivocal in providing for integration of the justice system in the north under Pristina’s legal framework, but with “a panel composed of a majority of K[osovo]/S[erb] judges to deal with all Kosovo Serb majority municipalities” established by the Appellate Court in Pristina to sit permanently in Mitrovica. This too seems to me consistent with the Ahtisaari plan, though not explicitly provided for in it.
Belgrade has also agreed to elections in the north conducted under Pristina’s legal framework.
The picture is clear: Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo will have wide-ranging authority over their own affairs, as provided for in the Ahtisaari plan. But the parallel police, judicial and electoral structures are to be integrated into the Kosovo constitutional and legal framework. This is precisely what German chancellor Angela Merkel has been asking for: an end to the parallel structures and acceptance by Serbia of Kosovo’s territorial integrity, with wide-ranging self-governance for the Serb community.
I might have liked the EU to go further, and in a back-handed way it did. The final point of the agreement is this:
It is agreed that neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU path.
Belgrade is saying that this provision originally asked that neither side block or encourage others to block entry into international organizations. Certainly it is less expansive than that in the final version. But the implicit meaning here is clear: Kosovo is an independent and sovereign state that will progress towards the EU at its own pace and enter without Serbia exercising a veto. This provision is ample basis for EU non-recognizers to proceed with recognition of Kosovo, if they are so inclined with Belgrade standing down from its campaign against.
What Serbs get then is this: Ahtisaari-style arrangements for the governance of Serbs in Kosovo with some modest additional details of implementation, unequivocally within Pristina’s constitutional and legal framework. It is not a bad deal at all, but one they might have had six years ago.
Belgrade is still claiming it will not recognize Kosovo, but for many practical purposes it already has. If Kosovo governs, polices, administers justice, holds elections and also applies for EU membership like a state on a well-defined territory, it is one, independent and sovereign. This agreement confirms it.
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Credit is due
As the Pristina Gazeta Express has published the Kosovo/Serbia agreement in English and Albanian, I did some quick answers to Shpend Limoni’s questions, which naturally come from the Pristina perspective:
1. Is this agreement in collision with Kosovo’s Constitution ?
A: I don’t see any contradictions with the constitution, but I’ll be interested to hear what others say on this subject. It clearly provides for the police and courts in the north to be part of the Kosovo police and courts, which was a critical issue.
2. Does this agreement mean that Kosovo finally is establishing its own authority in the North ?
A: I think it means the north can now be integrated into the Kosovo constitutional framework, which provides for a good deal of municipal authority as well as cooperation among municipalities.
3. Many in Kosovo are saying this means practically autonomy for Kosovo Serbs? Do you agree with this ?
A: No. The Ahtisaari plan provides for a great deal of self-governance for Serbs throughout Kosovo. It was unrealistic to expect it to be less for the northern municipalities. The association is in the Ahtisaari plan. It is not new.
4. Do you expect swift implementation process ?
A: Anyone who expects swift and easy implementation has not worked long in the Balkans. But there is a good chance of implementation over the next year or so.
5. Part of agreement is about EU integration process. Both sides agreed that won’t block each other ?
A: Yes, that seems to me a good thing and should open up several possibilities for Kosovo: negotiations of a Stabilization and Association Agreement, movement towards a Schengen visa waiver, possibly recognition by at least some of the EU non-recognizers.
6. How all this would reflect in international stage. Could we expect more recognitions ?
A: I hope so. Kosovo has in this negotiation demonstrated a good deal of statesmanship. Consider: a Kosovo prime minister negotiating with a Serbia prime minister extension of Kosovo police and court structures into a territory that Serbia has dominated for 14 years. That does not make anything happen automatically, but I do hope to see some more countries recognize. Credit is due.
PS: Credit is also due to Lady Ashton!
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Priceless
The initialing of the much-negotiated agreement between Kosovo and Serbia is certainly a source for celebration, though of course for Americans it is overshadowed by the capture in Watertown, Massachusetts of a suspect in the Boston marathon bombings. The Tanjug photo of Catherine Ashton looking like a stern schoolteacher with her two unruly but subdued pupils, Prime Ministers Dacic and Thaci, is priceless.
It is impossible to give even a preliminary assessment of the agreement without a text. For the moment, journalistic commentary focuses on who got who to change what. That’s not very interesting to me, though I understand why it interests politicians who have to face the voters. The key questions are the balance in the agreement and the extent to which it can be implemented in a straightforward way. I can’t respond on either issue without a complete text.
Nor is the deal quite done, yet. Initialing froze the text, but as I understand the process Ashton still expects the two sides to confirm their agreement. They will. It is not clear to me whether there is to be a formal signing or not. I imagine Thaci would want one and Dacic not, since it would represent one more step on the way to Serbia acknowledging Kosovo’s statehood.
Serbia is already well down that path. Every time the parties meet, or reach an agreement, Belgrade is implicitly acknowledging that Thaci is the legitimate representative of democratically validated institutions. What Serbia has not acknowledged is Kosovo’s sovereignty, even if the integrated border management inches in that direction. Serbian President Nikolic says it’s the best that could be done and reiterates that Serbia will not allow Kosovo into the UN or recognize it. A close examination of the agreement text is needed to see if there has been any further movement in that direction.
I’ve got colleagues who hail from Kosovo and Serbia working on blogposts about the domestic implications in each of the agreement. Thaci, who has been criticized in Kosovo for knuckling under to American and European pressure, will likely still gain a bit if Kosovars like the substance of the agreement. Dacic has to hope that whatever he gave is more than compensated for by getting a date for EU accession negotiations. That is not a hard test to pass so far as I am concerned, but I am not a typical Serbian voter.
One thing should be clear: Kosovo should likewise move ahead on the path to the EU, albeit several steps behind Serbia. That means a date for negotiation of a Stabilization and Association Agreement as well as expeditious movement on the Schengen visa waiver.
I assume none of these important side deals is written in the agreement, which is meant to bind Belgrade and Pristina, not Brussels. But let’s not kid ourselves: what Brussels had on offer is vital to getting this done and cannot be reneged on.
The text please. Then we’ll really have something to write about.
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What Syrians want
Here’s what I learned recently from non-Islamist, anti-regime Syrians concerned about transitional justice issues. The discussion was convened with support from the Public International Law and Policy Group by the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, with a view to developing a network of Syrian organizations concerned with transitional justice. The views were not of course unanimous, but I think most would agree with these propositions, which I formulated:
1. If they are ever caught, Bashar al Asad and other senior regime figures will have to stand trial in Syria, where the death penalty is in force.
Even Syrians who don’t like the death penalty acknowledge that it has to be available in any trial of senior Syrian leaders. This rules out an international tribunal for the actual trial. Some would like to see Bashar indicted now inside Syria by a court in a liberated area; others would like to see an international indictment. Either one would be a warning to senior military commanders that they risk being held accountable for attacks on civilians.
A special tribunal may be needed for the actual trial. Syrian law lacks provisions on crimes against humanity and war crimes. This will be a real problem that needs to be fixed. It is vital that regime files be preserved and not destroyed during the revolution. The opposition needs to develop a prosecutorial strategy and collect evidence to support it.
For regime perpetrators who escape, some expect arrests and trials in other countries, which could set a good standard for trials inside Syria.
The prosecution of high level officials has to be done in a way that is accepted as legitimate by the entire population, which will require media outreach and perhaps televising of the trials, as was done in Iraq. There will be a need to protect witnesses, judges and lawyers. The trials will have to be fair, providing due process and kept insulated from politics.
2. Syrians do not seek collective responsibility for the crimes committed. They want the state to continue to function.
They are uninterested in lustration (disqualification of a particular class of people from office or other privilege) even for Ba’ath party higher ups. They do not intend to make the Ba’ath party illegal, though they expect it to lose its privileges and return state property.
Vetting of individuals officials will need to be done, but Syrians want to preserve the state and reform it rather than collapse it and try to rebuild. They want local officials to continue to provide essential services like water and electricity, to the extent possible in the midst of the fighting.
3. Syrians expect reparations.
They are particularly concerned with more immediate humanitarian cases in which a breadwinner has been lost, but they want the society to make people whole, either by monetary compensation for losses or social assistance of other sorts. Reparation should not only be for the last two years of fighting but also (in nonmonetary as well as monetary forms) for oppression from the start of the Asad regime, which has repressed Kurdish identity and place names, for example. The place names should be restored and Kurds freed to use their own language.
Reparations should be made available on a nonsectarian and gender-neutral basis. Funds should come in part from recovery of Asad’s assets but international grants should also be sought.
4. The revolution has to start setting a good example.
It should begin to administer liberated areas through unique local councils recognized by the interim government, which should provide them with finances to pay salaries and continue to provide services. These councils should be elected wherever possible, for example in Raqaa.
The local councils should seek, in cooperation with the local armed groups, to reconstitute the police and move the armed groups to the periphery of towns. This will reduce the incentive for the regime to shell populated areas. Armed groups in liberated areas should be controlled and financed by the interim ministry of defense. Summary executions and other abuses need to stop.
Safe zones for defectors from the regime should be created. Sectarian and ethnic discrimination should end. Identity based on Syrian citizenship should be emphasized. Civil society should monitor the performance of the interim government, its local councils and the armed groups.
5. While they oppose retaliation, Syrians are not so interested in reconciliation.
While revenge is not appetizing, resentment of the regime and its Alawite supporters is widespread. Many would like to see more Alawites distance themselves from the regime, even if they don’t join the revolution. Syrians are puzzled that Westerners are so concerned with what happens to the Alawites when so many non-Alawites are already suffering grievous harm now. They find it hard to imagine a reconciliation process, though they are willing to consider establishing a truth commission to investigate abuses and give voice to victims. They want everyone to be equal before the law. No groups should be privileged above others. The society is basically a tolerant one. Individual rights and equality before the law are the ideals.
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Sweeten the pot
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS) and the Iran Project this week presented a joint report on the strategic options available for dealing with Iran, compiled with input from former senior national security officials and experts on Iran. The event featured:
–Carla Hills: Chairman and chief executive officer of Hills & Company, International Consultants
–Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering: Career Ambassador; former ambassador to Israel, Russia, India, El Salvador, Nigeria and Jordan
–Dr. Jim Walsh: Research Associate as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program (SSP)
–Ambassador James Dobbins: Director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center
This is what they think needs to happen:
1. Time to recalibrate
The time has come for Washington to recalibrate its policy of simultaneously putting pressure on and engaging with Iran. The US should emphasize direct diplomatic engagement with Iran with the same fervor it has pursued its international alienation. Time is running out. The more time passes, the less satisfactory a potential nuclear deal will be for both parties. The sooner a nuclear deal is reached the sooner the US and Iran can engage in a broader dialogue on regional issues. Use of military force would entail serious difficulties and implications, while upping the ante on negotiations carries new promise.
The US should pursue bilateral relations with Iran beyond the context of the multi-lateral P5+1 negotiations. Ambassador Pickering insisted on the importance of establishing respect and mutual trust between the two parties: Iran needs to stop perceiving all US policy as a ploy for regime change, while the US needs to stop viewing Iranian intentions solely through the lens of nuclear weapons. To reach a deal the Iranians should accept a peaceful and civil nuclear program monitored by the IAEA, while the US will have to relax the sanctions and allow Iran to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.
2. Towards a nuclear deal
The report does not propose a magic formula for the resolution of the nuclear problem. It eschews tactical considerations in favor of addressing the broader issue: a lack of emphasis on diplomacy. Walsh argued the overemphasis on details encourages incrementalism, stating the P5+1 “play small ball” when they negotiate (unsuccessfully) on 20% enrichment. The difficulty the parties are encountering in overcoming small issues suggests progress cannot be made without greater trust and respect.
But how do two conflicting countries earn each other’s trust and respect?
Walsh suggests breaking the “cycle of expectations.” As a Bostonian, he had empathy on his mind. He felt Iran’s recent earthquakes offer an opportunity for more than just expressions of sympathy. Donating relief aid in an unexpected demonstration of empathy could help melt away some of the mistrust.
3. Pursuing the diplomatic track
Ambassador Pickering believes the time for negotiations is ripe even for the Iranians. If Iran truly opposed negotiating on the nuclear issue, they would have stopped agreeing to P5+1 talks. But for real progress, Ambassador Dobbins suggested the US sweeten the offer on sanctions relief. The sanctions regime would be difficult to reinstate should Iran not comply with a deal. However, offering a temporary suspension of (some, or all) sanctions would allow the US to easily and unilaterally reinstate them.
Although difficult, cooperation with Iran is possible. As Bruce Laingen, US Chargé d’affaires during the 1979 hostage crisis put it during Q&A: “if we can negotiate with Pyongyang, we can negotiate with Iran.”
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“I don’t bluff”
Secretary Kerry told the American Chamber of Commerce in Seoul last week, apropos of “denuclearizing” North Korea:
We are prepared, as we have said, and the President – if there’s one phrase that sticks out in me that the President has used with me a number of times, beginning with when I was talking to him about this job and taking it on and I wanted to be certain that I wasn’t misrepresenting him anywhere in the world about his position with respect to Iran or elsewhere, he said to me very simply, “I don’t bluff.” And I think that those who have seen him execute on his promise that if he had actionable information he would do what he needed to do with it, even if it meant crossing another country’s border and taking action, we saw with respect to Usama bin Ladin that the President doesn’t bluff.
This is pretty dramatic stuff. No wonder the intelligence community gets spun up about the reliability of varying estimates. While the American press gets agitated about a missile test, Kerry is telling us the Americans will go to war if they have to to prevent North Korea from weaponizing its nukes or Iran from obtaining them.
That’s at least how I interpret what Kerry said. The two situations differ however in important ways. America’s South Korean allies are discouraging the Americans from acting. The risks to Seoul from a North Korean artillery attack are serious. Some of America’s Israeli allies are contentiously urging them on in private, even while kissing and making up in public.
The common denominator, no matter who urges what, is that diplomatic solutions would be far better than military ones, but getting satisfactory diplomatic solutions depends on a credible threat of military force. The two situations are not entirely independent of each other. North Koreans are certainly watching what the US does with Iran. And the Iranians are watching what the US does with North Korea.
This puts President Obama on the spot. The international success of his presidency depends on blocking Iran from getting nuclear weapons and preventing North Korea from weaponizing the ones it already has. Either development would be a serious threat to the United States and its allies, leading to nuclear arms races in East Asia and the Middle East. I’m not at all convinced that there is necessarily a diplomatic solution either with Iran or North Korea. But I’m sure the President is correct to try to exhaust the diplomatic options before resorting to uses of force that predictably would have unpredictable consequences.
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