Month: April 2013
I’m with April 6
I’m not a youth movement, but I confess to sympathy with this appeal from Egypt’s April 6. While I disagreed with them on voting for Morsi, who has announced that he is ending prosecutions of journalists, the time has come to do likewise for nonviolent activists (I’ve made only the most obvious editorial changes in this appeal):
An appeal to all youth movements and defenders of freedom, dignity, justice and human rights around the world.
April 6 Youth Movement, which began its activities and struggle against Mubarak in 2008 and sparked the revolution on January 25, 2011, after suffering with the military council after Mubarak the movement decided to support President Morsi in the presidential elections in order to get rid of the military rule in mid-2012, its members are getting tortured and oppressed again by the same old aggressive ways that we used to suffer from and revolt against, by the regime of President Morsi and his Ministry of Interior
President Morsi didn’t keep any of the promises that he made, so the movement starting opposing him as this is our role, and during one of our peaceful events in the street 3 of its leaders got arrested in late March 2013 during demonstrating in a peaceful manner against the violations of the Ministry of Interior, they were also tortured and treated with a very aggressive and violent way inside the prison, and their place of detention was hidden in contravention of the Constitution and the law and international norms, and when the lawyers knew the place of detention in Tora prison and tried to deliver clothes and food for them, they were beaten and tortured again inside the prison and transferred to another heavily guarded prison specially made for criminals and were put every one of them in solitary confinement in a very narrow, dark place underground in a filthy place full
of insects and they are also not allowed to talk with anyone inside the prison,
And prevents them contact and they are also given dirty food and put in a place not fit for a human life where there is no light or ventilation or clean water or sewage, in addition to ill-treatment by the prison administration and psychological torture throughout the day.
April 6 Youth Movement ‘s members are students and young intellectuals who came out to demand freedom, justice and dignity, and helped President Morsi in the presidential elections, hoping to end the military rule after the departure of Mubarak, so why are they treated with tougher treatment than criminals, and why does the same tragic situation in Egyptian prisons which is incompatible with the principle of dignity continue until now, and which came April 6 youth in the revolution of January 25, 2011 to demand it.
And how is the opposition of President Morsi getting tortured in this way after making the revolution which brought him out of the prisons of Mubarak and supporting him in the last presidential elections.
April 6 Youth Movement appeals to all those concerned with democratic issues around the world and all international organizations defending human rights and all the youth movements defending freedom and democracy, dignity and justice for solidarity with them and to stress on the release of the members of the movement who did not commit any offense and only objected in a peaceful manner against the way of the Interior with the citizens and killing of the demonstrators.
We demand your solidarity with April 6 movement in every way you can and by all means for the values that you are defending and which April 6 youth paid a lot of blood for, as many members of the movement paid their lives for the sake of these values and many others got injured.
The freedom, dignity and justice which April 6 youth came out in the revolution in 2011 to ask for, are the values defended by April 6 Youth which has shown solidarity with all youth movements around the world.
Be with us, in order to defend those values around the world.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Nothing is really dead until buried
Yesterday’s first-rate Middle East Institute/SAIS event on the Palestine/Israel peace process during the second Obama term offered two big takehomes:
- To be successful, an American president will have to treat making Middle East peace a top American national security priority;
- The Arab peace initiative, dead but not yet buried, should be revived.
These were the bottom lines of a discussion featuring the all-star cast of former Ambassador to Egypt and Israel. Dan Kurtzer, University of Maryland Professor Shibley Telhami and former Florida Congressman Robert Wexler. Geoffrey Aronson of the Foundation for Middle East Peace moderated. I introduced, but that was truly the least remarkable part of the event.
First-term President Obama did, Ambassdor Kurtzer thought, give the Middle East peace process priority, but without the needed strategy and policy follow-through. He is now giving Secretary Kerry an opportunity to make it work and wants to see progress. The key to success lies more in the parties’ relationships with the United States than with each other. Also important is the “Arab street,” whose weight is more strongly felt now than before the Arab awakenings.
Obama should have started with the progress that Palestinian President Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Olmert had made at the end of the second Bush Administration. Now the best place to start is with the Arab peace initiative, which needs to be deepened beyond the promise of Arab recognition once a deal is reached between Israel and the Palestinians. The Israelis need to be talking with the Arabs about climate change, economic development and other substantial issues beyond those traditionally part of the peace process.
Professor Telhami also underlined that the peace process has to be important for the United States, something of which President Carter but not President Clinton was convinced. Carter was therefore much more forceful than Clinton and put forward a detailed US proposal. 9/11 and the Iraq war shifted the priorities in the Bush Administration away from the Israel/Palestine, as war with Iran would do now. Even without that, Obama has to have his doubts. The Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially Saudi Arabia, are much more important now than in the past, because the Arab awakenings have sidelined Egypt. The Arab peace initiative is the place to start.
Congressman Wexler emphasized the importance of political leadership and strength in determining a president’s effectiveness in an enterprise like the Middle East peace process. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian President Abbas have so far stiffed the President. If Obama can succeed at two of the three main issues he faces at the moment (immigration, guns and the Federal budget), he will be much stronger than in the past. There will be an opportunity, after the Iran nuclear issue is resolved, provided Obama is able to deliver on prevention rather than deterrence. He would then be able to prevail even if there is resistance to an Israel/Palestine deal in Congress. Jewish Americans will in any case not be an obstacle to a serious deal.
Audience members challenged the panel on two main points: whether the Arab peace initiative was in fact promising from an Israeli point of view, as it called for the right of return, and whether Israel can expect withdrawal from the West Bank to ensure peace, as that is not what happened with Gaza and Lebanon. Wexler responded that the Arab peace initiative clearly implied a negotiated solution to the right of return. Kurtzer reminded that Israeli withdrawals from Jordan and Egypt had led to peace, because they were negotiated and there was a good faith partner on the other end, whereas the unilateral withdrawals from Gaza and Lebanon left a vacuum.
Nothing, the panel suggested, is dead in the Middle East until it is buried. The peace process and the Arab peace initiative are not yet buried.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
There is still time
Yesterday was a big day for Serbian diplomacy. President Nikolic spent 40 minutes this morning at the UN denouncing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Former Foreign Minister and now President of the General Assembly Jeremic claimed Serbia is committed to peace based on rule of law while continuing to disagree with the International Court of Justice on whether Kosovo’s declaration of independence breached international law (the result of a question Jeremic himself posed while foreign minister). The Prime Minister took himself off to Moscow, where Prime Minister Medvedev pledged to back whatever Serbia wants on Kosovo.
This trifecta tells us something about where Serbia is headed: it intends to maintain its claim to sovereignty over all of Kosovo, backed by Moscow. It will defy and criticize decisions of international tribunals whenever they do not accord with Belgrade’s own views. Its interest in EU membership is relative. It will not compromise even over the northwestern 11% of Kosovo, where fewer than half the Serbs in Kosovo live.
I imagine all of this defiance plays well for the domestic Serbian audience, where Nikolic, Jeremic and Dacic may all be campaigning sooner rather than later. Deputy Prime Minister Vucic, who increasingly is the real power in Serbia because of the popularity of his (once also Nikolic’s) “Progressive” Party, is widely thought to be contemplating early elections. Vucic’s anti-corruption campaign has garnered him a lot of support.
There is every reason to believe that nationalists will emerge from new elections even stronger than they are today. This is a Serbia pointed in the wrong direction: it is choosing a retrograde and quixotic claim to Kosovo over the EU and continuing to deny its role in the wars of the 1990s, or seeking to balance out that role by reference to the misdeeds of others. I share Belgrade’s unhappiness that more non-Serbs have not been convicted for crimes against Serbs, but that in no way relieves Serbia of responsibility for acts committed on its behalf.
American and European Union efforts to persuade Serbia to moderate its views on Kosovo have so far failed. Western policy has essentially been all carrot, no stick. Washington agreed to disagree on Kosovo while fully supporting Serbia’s efforts to gain access to EU benefits. The EU, until Angela Merkel’s tough stand against Serbia’s parallel institutions in northern Kosovo, was holding the door wide open to Serbia, hoping that its entry into the accession process would be sufficiently attractive to end its claim to sovereignty over Kosovo, or at least allow it to disband the Serbian institutions in the north.
Serbia prides itself on “non-alignment,” even after the end of the Cold War. It now risks condemning itself to a future aligned with Putin’s Russia, which has already tied Serbia tight with energy deals of dubious merit.
There is still time to choose the EU–Catherine Ashton won’t submit her report on efforts to normalize relations between Pristina and Belgrade until April 16. Vucic is burning up the telephone lines. My understanding is that Pristina and Belgrade delegations are expected to reappear in Brussels before then. Both capitals will be better off if Serbia finds a way to declare victory and reverse its stand on an agreement that will protect most Serbs in Kosovo better than if the negotiations fail.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Lessons from Iraq
A decade of military involvement in Iraq has imparted precious lessons regarding stabilization and reconstruction. A United States Institute of Peace (USIP) event this week drew on the seven main lessons enumerated in Learning from Iraq: A Final Report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. The panel featured:
–Jim Marshall, President of USIP
– William B. Taylor Jr, former director of the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office in Baghdad (2004-5)
– Manal Omar, the Director of Iraq, Iran and North Africa Programs, USIP
–Quil Lawrence, NPR Baghdad Bureau Chief
–John Nagl, Senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security; Minerva Research Fellow at the US Naval Academy
Lesson 1: Establish who’s in charge
“Create an integrated civilian-military office to plan, execute and be accountable for contingency rebuilding activities during stabilization and reconstruction operations”
The Iraq reconstruction effort suffered from a dual handicap: disjointed command and poor coordination of efforts. According to the SIGIR report Defense, State, and USAID failed to integrate their operations. No one entity was tasked with planning and executing the reconstruction activities.
Lesson 2: Stability before reconstruction
“Begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient security, and focus first on small programs and projects”
State and Defense made the mistake of investing on large infrastructure programs before establishing a safe and secure environment to spur Iraq’s recovery. According to William B. Taylor, Jr, his office found itself repeatedly rebuilding sabotaged projects or entirely reallocating funds from an $18.4 billion bill list of national projects designed for a secure environment. The take-away: the greater the instability, the smaller the infrastructure projects should be. In an unstable environment, smaller, local projects have a greater impact than large, easily targetable infrastructure projects.
Lesson 3: Make sure investments are both productive and sustainable
“Ensure full host-country engagement in program and project selection, securing commitments to share costs (possibly through loans) and agreements to sustain completed projects after their transfer”
The Iraqi leaders interviewed in the SIGIR report complained of the US’s failure to consult with them on what construction projects Iraqis wanted and needed. The botched consultations resulted in the construction of unwanted, underutilized, and often dysfunctional projects—including a $40 million prison sitting empty in the Iraqi desert north of Baghdad. Lawrence argued that to this day, Iraqis can point to few tangible constructions iconic of the US contribution to the Iraqi people. In order to distinguish between a need and a want, the US should have fully engaged the Iraqi leadership and deferred to its judgment. Better consultation would have forced the US not to build above Iraq’s capacity and to secure cost-sharing commitments.
Lesson 4: Standardize the management system
“Establish uniform contracting, personnel, and information management systems that all SRO participants use”
Good coordination among agencies was the exception, not the rule. Systematic planning was completely lacking. Poorly coordinated personnel assignments caused team members of the various participating agencies to deploy and depart on diverging schedules, hampering coordination and aggravating tensions. There was no shared database listing the contracting, personnel and information management systems between agencies, so it was impossible to know what infrastructure was complete, and which was under construction.
Lesson 5: Oversight and accountability
“Require robust oversight of SRO activities from the operations’ inception”
Congress established SIGIR in 2003 to oversee the reconstruction effort and it’s challenges. In this respect, the Iraq reconstruction operation proved successful.
Lesson 6: Learn from the successes
“Preserve and refine programs developed in Iraq, like the Commander’s Emergency Response Program and the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program, that produced successes when used judiciously”
Omar complemented this point with what might represent a pre-requisite to lesson six: the importance of recognizing and highlighting successes to the population, the host country leadership, and the international community. Iraq is far from stable, but the country has experienced some successes: Iraqi police man checkpoints and the Iraqi civil society engagement is stronger than ever.
Lesson 7: Plan ahead
“Plan in advance, plan comprehensively and in an integrated fashion, have backup plans ready to go”
The abrupt shift from a liberation mission to a state building and reconstruction mission points to the lack of foresight in planning the Iraq program. The absence of a defined mission led to perennial re-evaluation and re-organization of the reconstruction program.
The panelists’ comments all converged on the final point. The absence of an “exit strategy” led to two major mistakes: poor consultation and weak engagement of Iraqis. Nagl argued that the military’s ignorance of Iraq’s culture and environment left the US unable to contextualize the little consultation it was receiving. The decisions to disband the army and de-Baathification– often touted as the poorest decisions taken during the reconstruction period—were based on hasty US consultations with aggrieved members of the Iraqi population. These early blunders destroyed Iraqi expectations, shattering the small window of opportunity offered directly after the fall of the regime.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Syria isn’t going away
I couldn’t agree more with Fred Hof’s bottom line in his and Alex Simon’s paper prepared for the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Sectarian Violence in Syria’s Civil War: Causes, Consequences, and Recommendations for Mitigation:
Left on its current trajectory, Syria is on the path to state failure and sustained sectarian violence, featuring mass atrocities and cleansing that could amount to genocide in some areas.
That is a clear and compelling alarm, one the Holocaust Museum is uniquely qualified to sound.
As Fred and Alex painstakingly elaborate, all of the likely scenarios, including an opposition victory, will produce serious risks. This is due in no small measure to the history and context of the Syrian war. Syrian society is riddled with cleavages: sectarian, ethnic, regional, urban/rural and ideological. The Asad regime papered over them a thin veneer of secularism but quickly ripped that off when the Sunni majority rebelled. The regime has intentionally sectarianized the war, ensuring itself Alawite and other minority support by making the fight an existential one. As Hof and Simon put it:
Thus, while preaching and promoting secularism, Assad built a system implicitly featuring the sectarian poison pill: any attempt by non-Alawites to bring down the regime would run the risk of taking the country down with it via a bitter sectarian struggle.
- regime victory
- managed transition
- rebel victory
- stalemate, descent into further sectarian violence, possible state failure
They quite rightly conclude that each is worse than the last when it comes to the risks of mass atrocity and even genocide in some areas.
Check: possible future developments foreseen. Check: alarm bell rung. What is to be done?
That’s where the Holocaust Museum paper is less satisfying, but not for lack of good policy proposals. Hof and Simon want an inclusive, tolerant opposition government committed to rule of law on Syrian territory. They want a negotiated settlement that creates a transition regime. They want trust funds to back the transition. They want supply of training and weapons to good guys, while funding to bad guys is blocked. They want a UN-authorized, NATO-led stabilization force, to accompany unarmed observers. They want US support for a democratically oriented, non-sectarian outcome.
I can’t quarrel with wanting these things. But it is not at all clear how to get to them, or even how some of them would help to prevent mass atrocity. In my view, what is needed is a less global set of options targeted on the specific issue of protecting civilians. More than 70,000 Syrians are now dead due to a war that started only a bit more than two years ago. This is a colossal failure of the responsibility to protect, which lies first and foremost with the Syrian government. The options may be quite different in each scenario, but the moral imperative is the same: something needs to be done to save lives.
It is looking very much as if the fourth scenario is the most likely one (stalemate, descent into further sectarian violence, possible state failure). Preventing that or mitigating its consequences is going to require more international political will than has been forthcoming so far. Even if there is an opposition victory, the transition will be a long and painful one. With the withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has dismantled much of its civilian capacity to handle cases of state failure. We need to be thinking about how to fill the gap, either with our own personnel and resources or other peoples’. UN? Arab League? Turkey? One way or another, Syria is going to be with us for a long time. It isn’t going away just because Washington ignores it.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Failure has its consequences
With Belgrade taking on the responsibility of blocking a positive outcome to the dialogue with Pristina, Kosovo Prime Minister Thaci is now enjoying the best of all possible worlds: he doesn’t have to implement an agreement that surely included some things he did not like, and blame for failure is falling on Serbia. He is even signaling willingness to return to Brussels for new talks, ensuring that he cannot be blamed for a breakdown of the dialogue. Not a bad show of statecraft for a newcomer.
That said, he still faces some difficult issues. Serbia may yet come to its senses and accept what is on offer, or some modified version. A definitive written text has not yet surfaced to my knowledge, making it easier to jiggle. We are not quite at the very last moment, as Catherine Ashton does not have to publish her report on progress in the dialogue, which is what determines whether Serbia gets a date to begin EU accession negotiations, until April 16. She does not present it to foreign ministers until April 22. Serbia could still decide to cave, claiming to have gotten satisfactory adjustments.
If that does not happen, Pristina still faces the reality of its northwestern 11%, which will remain in Serbia’s less than complete control. I hope everyone in Pristina will remain calm, cool and collected, realizing that time and financial shortages will erode Serb resistance in the north and enable gradual reintegration. Any violence or disorder could deprive Kosovo of the advantages its statecraft has brought it.
There are two problems with that approach. The smuggling and other criminal activities with roots in the north (but tentacles south of the Ibar river) really should be stopped, if only to regain lost revenue and reduce the staying power of the northern resistance to integration with the rest of Kosovo. The northern Serbs will portray any crackdown as an ethnic attack. To prevent this, Pristina really needs to begin with a crackdown south of the Ibar, where the northern traffickers sell many of their wares, leaving the northerners to the EU rule of law mission and Serbia’s own need to demonstrate to the EU that it can control its own border.
The other problem lies in domestic Kosovo politics. While Thaci has wisely broadened his base of support by inviting one of the opposition political parties to participate in the dialogue process, failure of the talks on reintegrating northern Kosovo will redound to the benefit of those Kosovars who see the future of their state not in “good neighborly relations” with Serbia but in becoming a province of Albania. This unlikely and anti-constitutional proposition (union with a neighboring state or part of one is prohibited in the Kosovo constitution) has some support, especially among younger voters.
The EU can counter the Albanian nationalist reaction by moving expeditiously on the visa waiver for Kosovo and opening negotiations on a Stability and Association Agreement, which were the carrots on offer in the dialogue process. It is clear enough that Pristina has not caused its failure. While Kosovo should have to meet the technical requirements, the political door to these goodies should now swing wide open.
What about Belgrade? It already has the visa waiver and a Stabilization and Association Agreement. It is also a candidate for EU accession. All it lacks is that date to begin negotiations, which brings with it a bundle of money. It has been clearly understood from the first that a successful conclusion of the dialogue on northern Kosovo was a precondition for getting the date. In fact, the precondition was broader: normalization of relations, which might not include diplomatic recognition but should certainly include an end to Serbia’s campaign against recognition and UN General Assembly membership for Kosovo. Failure has its consequences.
RSS - Posts
