Month: May 2013
No exoneration
I won’t pretend to have read the gigantesque judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) acquitting Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, respectively head of the Serbian security service (DB) and one of its employees. They were accused of committing crimes between 1991 and 1995 against non-Serb civilians in Croatia and Bosnia. The crimes included persecution, murder, deportation, and forcible transfer, committed as participants in a joint criminal enterprise. Volumes 1 and 2 run to 888 pages.
But I couldn’t miss this:
The Trial Chamber notes that in many instances the evidence suggested a conclusion which seemed to be very likely. However, in keeping with the applicable standard of proof the Trial Chamber strictly examined whether such conclusion was the only reasonable one.
This is directly relevant to the judgment, which found that the standard of proof had not been met.
Some will see this as exonerating not only the two individuals but also the Serbian state and its security services.
Nothing could be further from the truth. As noted in the summary of the judgment, the Chamber found beyond a reasonable doubt, for example, that deportation as a crime against humanity had been committed by Yugoslav National Army forces, in cooperation with other security forces in Croatia and Bosnia that the accused directed and organized. The court also found that the accused were in “direct and frequent contact” with the Serb organizers (including with Slobodan Milosevic) of a joint criminal enterprise that aimed to forcibly and permanently remove the majority of non-Serbs from large areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
But it did not find that the accused provided channels of communication among the organizers of the joint criminal enterprise (who also talked directly with each other) and found insufficient evidence to demonstrate that they shared the intent of the joint criminal enterprise.
This is not what I call exoneration, either of the individuals or of the institutions involved.
The judgment can be appealed, and I suppose will be. But whatever the eventual outcome for Stanisic and Simatovic, it is starkly clear what was going on: the Belgrade authorities in the early 1990s planned and carried out an effort by the Yugoslav National Army and other security forces, including some it organized locally in Bosnia and Croatia, to violently and criminally remove people from their homes based on ethnic criteria. I repeat what I said when ICTY acquitted two Albanians six months ago:
“Not guilty” does not exonerate. It only finds that adequate evidence was not presented to prove the case.
Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt tweeted yesterday:
It is becoming increasingly difficult to see the consistency or logic in the different judgements by the ICTY war crimes tribunal.
Those who would look for consistency and logic in convictions and acquittals are bound to be disappointed. Each case is decided on its own merits, not based on what was found in another case. The standards of proof are supposed to be the same, but the witnesses and other evidence vary. The system is designed to protect the rights of the accused, even at the risk of finding them not guilty in error. Justice doesn’t always mean convictions.
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Not promising
With the strategically placed town of Qusayr about to fall to Syrian army and Lebanese Hizbollah forces, the Syrian opposition coalition (SOC) is saying it won’t attend “Geneva II” peace talks without an end to the siege of Qusayr and a guarantee that any political settlement will ensure Bashar al Asad steps down. Even if those things were to happen magically, it is unclear who would represent the opposition at peace talks, as the SOC has been meeting in Istanbul and struggling painfully to broaden its base even as revolutionaries inside Syria complain loudly about its ineffectiveness.
The regime, emboldened by success on the battlefield and Russia’s decision to provide advanced air defenses, will not agree to either SOC condition.
Where does this leave the US?
We are left holding the diplomatic bag, trying to deliver a political solution in conditions that are not ripe for a settlement. Moscow and Tehran, while claiming to want a political solution and criticizing the West and its Gulf allies (Saudi Arabia and Qatar) for support to the revolutionaries, have been busily bolstering the Asad regime on the battlefield. President Obama is said to have ordered up plans for a no-fly zone, but there is no sign he is serious about implementing them in the face of continued Russian and Chinese vetoes at the UN Security Council.
There is also no sign as yet that the regime can reassert its authority over all of Syria. Large parts of both the north and the south are in revolutionary hands. But the regime has a good chance of securing the route from Damascus to the Alawite heartland in the west and the port at Tartus. Homs is likely the next big battlefield. Government forces there have been making slow progress against rebels in the city center. It may well fall with a whimper rather than a bang.
Meanwhile sectarian conflict is spreading to Lebanon and Iraq, even as both those countries export fighters into Syria. The involvement of Lebanese Hizbollah has important military implications not only within Syria but also in Lebanon and vis-a-vis Israel. Turkey has long harbored the Syrian opposition forces and has suffered a number of military and terrorist attacks from Syria. The sad fact is that only a quick (and unlikely) end to the civil war in Syria will save its neighbors from refugee flows, terrorist bombs, sectarian conflict,and the risk that they too may end up embroiled in a regional Levantine war.
So what is to be done?
If, like me, you are of the school that says diplomacy is getting other people to do what you want them to do, you’ve got to have doubts whether convening peace talks at this point is going to produce a settlement, however much you might like that to happen. They could be useful in clarifying positions, unifying the opposition, establishing some principles, making some contacts and defining better what is at issue, but it is highly unlikely that you are going to get a settlement when both sides think, however unrealistically, they may gain from more fighting and worry that an agreement to lay down arms could lead to slaughter when the other side fails to abide.
There is no trust at this point between the Asad regime and the revolutionaries. Neither side believes the other is serious about negotiating or about implementing a negotiated agreement. Unless one side or the other manages a military breakout that today seems unlikely, we are a long way from the end in Syria, which means the region will be under serious strain for a long time to come.
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Schizoeurope
Britain and France have collaborated in getting the European Union to lift its arms embargo on Syria, opening the possibility of shipping arms to the opposition starting in July. But key European thinktanks are very much opposed to the idea: Julien Barnes-Dacey and Daniel Levy of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) wants de-escalation and Christopher Phillips of Chatham House criticizes what he regards as Britain’s flawed logic.
I have a hard time understanding their objections. Why would Syria’s arms suppliers (Russia and Iran principally) reduce the flow unless they see the real possibility that escalation will favor the opposition? Opening the possibility of future arms shipments will do more to give the Asad regime something to worry about than it will do to harden the opposition’s resistance to negotiation. It is far more likely that offering weapons conditional on their unified participation in negotiations (and being prepared to shut off the flow if they fail to participate seriously) will work.
Nor am I all that worried about weapons ending up in the wrong hands, so long as they are used to counter the regime. The neat distinction between jihadists and moderates is at least in part a figment of Western imaginations. However hard we try, some weapons will end up in the wrong places. Given the current political atmosphere in the US, better that happen to the Europeans than to us. We don’t need “fast and furious” on steroids.
Then there is the question of the Russia’s decision to export a new generation of air defenses to Syria, apparently decided in response to the European Union ending the embargo. If the Russians go ahead and if the Israelis fail to attack them before they are operational, they would presumably make it more difficult to impose a no-fly zone, if that were President Obama’s intention. But despite news reports, there is no real indication that the Americans are willing to patrol a no-fly zone, and the Israelis have good reasons to prevent the new air defenses from becoming operational, something that would take months if not years in the best of conditions. It is amusing to see people who oppose a no-fly zone worrying about the Russian move and premature to worry too much about an Israeli-Russian war, though the Israelis should certainly be concerned about how far Russia is prepared to go in arming Syria and Iran.
While in my view wrong about the impact of arming the revolutionaries, or more accurately opening up the future possibility of arming them, the ECFR offers a “strategy for de-escalation” worth looking at:
- a set of guiding principles
- a wide enough coalition committed to de-escalation, and
- a diplomatic strategy to get Geneva II off the ground.
The principles they draw from the Geneva I communique:
- All parties must recommit to a sustained cessation of armed violence
- No further further militarization of the conflict
- The sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic must be respected
- The establishment of a transitional governing body that can establish a neutral environment in which the transition can take place, with the transitional governing bodyexercising full executive powers. It could include membersof the present Government and the opposition and othergroups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent
- The Government must allow immediate and full humanitarian access by humanitarian organizations to all areas affected by the fighting
The most controversial is that fourth point, as it implies to the opposition and its supporters that Bashar al Asad will step aside while the regime and its supporters oppose that. Squaring that circle will be worth a Nobel Prize. But the Geneva I communique was not agreed by either the opposition or the regime, so getting them to sign up to something like these five points would be an important step forward.
The ECFR description of a possible de-escalation coalition is reasonable. The diplomatic strategy beyond that is brief and vague, basically proposing that Russia and the US bring the rest of the P5 on board for a non-Chapter 7 UN Security Council resolution.
The ECFR paper offers one particularly interesting idea on cessation of armed violence: this might be done in specific geographic areas, “rolling and expanding pockets in which ceasefires hold.” This of course would enable both sides to concentrate their forces in areas where there are no such ceasefires, intensifying the conflict in some areas even while de-escalating in others. The idea could have the great virtue of opening up more of the country to humanitarian relief and beginning the re-introduction of international monitors, assuming there is someone out there ready to take on that role.
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Fight and talk
The date hasn’t even been set yet for next month’s “Geneva II” conference, but we are in full pre-negotiation mode in Syria. This means instensification of the fighting, ratcheting up of the assistance flowing from outside, and anxious efforts to get the opposition to hang together, lest they hang separately (in the immortal words of Benjamin Franklin).
For the moment, the fighting is still focused on the ill-fated town of Qusayr, which is one of the keys to controlling the highway that links Damascus to Tartus and Latakia on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. But the big news came Saturday from nearby Lebanon, where Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah announced publically his group’s undying commitment to keeping the Asad regime in power in Syria and fighting the Sunni “takfiris” there. A Shia neighborhood in Beirut was ineffectively rocketed in response.
Then Monday the European Union decided to let its self-imposed arms embargo on Syria lapse at the end of the month, opening the possibility of Britain and France deciding to arm the opposition. While Secretary Kerry seems to think this will help rebalance the military situation, it is far more likely the delayed prospect of European arms for the opposition will cause the Asad regime to accelerate its efforts to consolidate as much control as it can over the Damascus/Mediterranean corridor, which is vital both to the regime’s survival. The port at Tartus is where the Russians deliver their heavier arms to the regime, and the coastal area has a substantial concentration of Alawite supporters of the regime.
Meanwhile the opposition has been meeting in Istanbul. It needs to sort out its leadership mess. Moaz al Khatib, who has resigned as the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) president chaired at least part of the meeting, George Sabra is supposedly the temporary leader, and Michel Kilo is supposed to take over but was apparently blocked from doing so at a meeting that is continuing in Istanbul. The SOC also needs to broaden its base to include more people from inside Syria as well as representatives of Free Syrian Army units. It would help of course if the Saudis and Qataris, presumably the main suppliers of money and arms to the opposition, would sing from the same songsheet.
The regime, meanwhile, is making happy noises about participating in a dialogue that its Moscow patrons likely see as a way keeping Asad in power even if the Americans would like it to be the first step on the way to his removal. Moscow is using the time to beef up Syria’s air defenses, having already moved to strengthen its shore defenses and deploy the Russian navy to Syria’s coast. Those still arguing for “safe corridors” and the like need to take note. The Americans are uninterested in fighting a war in Syria, especially one that might show Russian military hardware off to good advantage and provide the Iranians with up-to-date data on American aerial performance.
None of this bodes well for Geneva II. There is no “mutually hurting stalemate” in Syria. Both sides are still willing to fight. The catastrophe they fear most would come from stopping the fighting, not continuing it. The regime figures that would expose the Alawites to mass murder. The opposition, while struggling for the moment, figures the setbacks are temporary and the right response is to redouble its efforts. Anyone who has seen what Asad is capable of would fear losing this war. If Geneva II happens, it is likely to happen in the context of heightened conflict, not the kind of mutual exhaustion that lends itself to political settlement.
That does not however mean that talking is a bad idea. “Ripeness” for a settlement sometimes happens suddenly. Best to be ready when it does. Being ready can mean many things: making the needed contacts between opposing forces, testing propositions, developing principles that can be applied when the situation warrants, gaining intelligence on the warring parties and their leadership structures, cultivating constituencies for peace on both sides.
“Fight and talk” is not new. The European Community (as it was then) convened many conferences on the wars in former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, when war was in raging in Croatia and Bosnia and repression in Kosovo. The meetings never produced a peace agreement, or even a ceasefire that held. That was left to the Americans at Dayton. But they did produce the Community’s criteria for recognition of the separate republics as independent states as well as the state succession plans, both of which were used to what I would call good effect.
In the best of all possible worlds, we are heading for fight and talk in Syria. Wisdom lies in using the opportunity well and trying to end a war that is clearly threatening state structures in the Levant and may collapse them in chaos.
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Memorial Day for all, again and again
I have little to add to what I said the past two years on Memorial Day, so I am republishing what I wrote originally in 2011 with slight updates and a short additional paragraph:
I spent my high school years marching in the Memorial Day parade in New Rochelle, New York and have never lost respect for those who serve and make sacrifices in uniform. Even as an anti-war protester in the Vietnam era, I thought denigration of those in uniform heinous, not to mention counterproductive.
It is impossible to feel anything but pride and gratitude to those who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention Kosovo, Bosnia, Panama and Somalia during the previous decade. Nor will I forget my Memorial Day visit to the American cemetery in Nettuno accompanying Defense Secretary Les Aspin in the early 1990s, or my visit to the Florence cemetery the next year. These extraordinarily manicured places are the ultimate in peaceful. It is unimaginable what their inhabitants endured. No matter what we say during the speechifying on Memorial Day, there is little glory in what the troops do and a whole lot of hard work, dedication, professionalism and horror.
That said, it is a mistake to forget those who serve out of uniform, as we habitually do. Numbers are hard to come by, but a quick internet search suggests that at at least 2000 U.S. civilians have died in Iraq and Afghanistan, plus quite a few “third country” nationals. They come in many different varieties: journalists, policemen, judges, private security guards, agriculturalists, local government experts, computer geeks, engineers, relief and development workers, trainers, spies, diplomats and who knows what else. I think of these people as our “pinstripe soldiers,” even if most of them don’t in fact wear pinstripes. But they are a key component of building the states that we hope will some day redeem the sacrifices they and their uniformed comrades have endured.
Iraqi and Afghan civilians killed number at least 100 times the number of American civilians killed. Numbers this large become unfathomable. Of course some–and maybe more–would have died under Saddam Hussein or the Taliban, but that is not what happened. They died fighting American or Coalition forces, or by accident, or caught in a crossfire, or trying to defend themselves, or in internecine violence, or because a soldier got nervous or went beserk, or….Memorial Day in this age of “war among the people” should be about the people, civilian as well as military, non-American as well as American, not only about the uniform, the flag or the cause.
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Peace Picks, May 28 to May 31
DC will be dark today for Memorial Day, but the rest of the week has ample and varied events:
1. Institutional Reform in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia, Tuesday, May 28 / 1:00pm – 3:00pm , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Marwan Muasher, Frederic Wehrey, Ellen Lust, Jakob Wichmann
As Arab political transitions stumble and parties clash over the pace and direction of reforms, analysts are largely focused on the differences between political actors-Islamists, Salafis, liberals, and others-and the implications for political development. But critics argue that this distracts attention from trying to understand the critical institutional changes underway in these countries.
Register for the event here:
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/28/institutional-reform-in-libya-egypt-and-tunisia/g5xy
2. Nuclear Terrorism: What’s at Stake? Wednesday, May 29 / 8:00am – 9:30am , American Security Project
Venue: American Security Project, 1100 New York Avenue, NW · Suite 710W, Washington, DC
Speakers: Jay M. Cohen, David Waller, Stephen E. Flynn, Stanton D. Sloane, Stephen A. Cheney
The U.S. is a leader in global nonproliferation efforts, from preventing new nuclear states to securing nuclear materials and technology. However, preventing nuclear terror also requires efforts on a domestic front. U.S. ports present a potential vulnerability and securing these ports requires improvement in the capacity to detect and secure nuclear materials that could arrive in shipping containers.
Please RSVP to:
events@americansecurityproject.org
For more information see:
http://americansecurityproject.org/events/2013/event-nuclear-terrorism-whats-at-stake/
3. A Syrian No Fly Zone: Options and Constraints, Wednesday, May 29 / 10:00am – 12:00pm, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, D.C.
Speakers: Steven Heydemann, Frederic C. Hof, David A. Deptula, Jon Alterman, Joseph Holliday
Now in its third year, with no end in sight, the Syrian uprising against the authoritarian government of Bashar al-Assad has brought devastation, death, and displacement to the country. Today, more than a quarter of Syrians have fled their homes. Some 250,000 Syrians have been killed, wounded, or are missing. By the end of 2013, half of all Syrians, more than 11 million people, could need assistance in what the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, has called the worst humanitarian crisis the U.N. has ever faced.
As violence deepens, with the Assad regime using ballistic missiles and, reportedly, nerve gas, against civilians, the U.S. and its allies continue to search for viable options to shorten the conflict, bring the regime and the opposition to the negotiating table, and place Syria on the path of political transition.
Few options have received as much attention as the idea of creating a no fly zone (NFZ) over part or all of Syria. The Syrian opposition has appealed to the international community to create a NFZ. Members of Congress have called on the Obama administration to embrace an NFZ as the most effective way to protect Syrian civilians and achieve a political solution.
While debate around the NFZ option intensifies, there has been far less attention to the military, diplomatic, and regional complexities that such a move would entail. To inform and deepen the debate over an NFZ for Syria, the U.S. Institute of Peace is convening a panel of distinguished experts to discuss the diplomatic, strategic, tactical, and political implications involved.
Webcast: This event will be webcast live beginning at 10:00am EST on May 29, 2013 at www.usip.org/webcast. Join the conversation and submit questions for the panel on Twitter with #SyriaNFZ.
RSVP for the event here:
http://www.usip.org/events/syrian-no-fly-zone-options-and-constraints
4. Serbia’s Challenges on Its Path to EU Accession, Wednesday, May 29 / 1:00pm – 2:00pm , Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speaker: Ljubica Vasic
Assistant Foreign Minister of Serbia Ljubica Vasic will discuss the challenges and opportunities that the Republic of Serbia faces on its path to European integration. Vasic will address key reforms that the country has introduced so far to advance its EU accession bid, and will explain why the European integration process is important for the overall development of the country. She will outline the steps that Serbia has taken to achieve one of its main foreign policy goals; EU membership.
Ljubica Vasic was appointed Assistant Foreign Minister of Serbia in January 2013. Previously, she served as a special adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and headed the Serb Parliamentary Delegation to the Council of Europe. Vasic began her political career in 2008, and has served as an adviser on European integration policies, and has been a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Serb National Assembly. Vasic holds two graduate degrees – in European Integration and in English Philology – from the University of Belgrade and the Unviersity of Kragujevac respectively, and is currently working on a doctoral degree at the University of Kragujevac. She is fluent in English, French, Italian, and Serb.
Register for the event here:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/serbias-challenges-its-path-to-eu-accession
5. Protecting People with Technology: Modernizing U.N. Peacekeeping , Wednesday, May 29 / 2:00pm – 3:30pm, Stimson Center
Venue: Stimson Center, 1111 19th Street Northwest, 12th Floor, Washington D.C., DC 20036
Speakers: Walter Dorn, Sarah Williamson
Protect the People, the Stimson Center, the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping and the Better World Campaign present: Protecting People with Technology: Modernizing U.N. Peacekeeping
A conversation with Dr. Walter Dorn, author of ‘Keeping Watch: Monitoring, Technology & Innovation in UN Peace Operations’
As U.N. peace operations are asked and expected to do more in increasingly complex and dangerous environments, this discussion with Dr. Dorn will explore the challenges and opportunities of leveraging a broad spectrum of technologies to enable U.N. peace operations to more effectively and safely protect civilians.
Dr. Walter Dorn has also taught at the Pearson Centre and as a visiting professional in the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. He has served with the United Nations Mission in East Timor, the United Nations in Ethiopia, at U.N. headquarters as a training adviser and as a consultant with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. His book ‘Keeping Watch: Monitoring, Technology, and Innovation in UN Peace Operations’ was published in 2011 by U.N. University Press. Copies of his book will be available for purchase and signing.
Register for the event here:
http://www.stimson.org/events/protecting-people-with-technology-modernizing-un-peacekeeping/
6. Editing (Out) the Occupation, Thursday, May 30 / 9:00am – 10:00am , New America Foundation
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L St., N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Linoy Bar-Geffen, Uri Misgav, Sarah Wildman
After nearly forty-six years of military occupation, two intifadas, a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and a stalled political process, the Israeli public seems to have lost whatever interest it had in the Palestinian issue. Public attention has turned inwards — looking at economic and social concerns. However a critical examination of these concerns, by necessity, requires an equally critical examination of the ongoing occupation.
New America Foundation’s Middle East Task Force will host visiting Israeli journalists Uri Misgav and Linoy Bar-Geffen on May 30 for a conversation examining why the occupation is edited out of mainstream Israeli media and exploring how mainstream and alternative media can bring the occupation more forcefully into the Israeli national conversation.
Register for the event here:
http://www.newamerica.net/events/2013/editing_out_the_occupation
7. The Water-Security Nexus in Pakistan, Thursday, May 30 / 10:00am – 11:30am , US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, D.C.
Speakers: Majed Akhter, Daanish Mustafa, Winston Yu
Because of overuse and misuse, Pakistan is headed toward a serious water crisis. The U.N. is expected to downgrade Pakistan from ‘water stressed’ to ‘water scarce’ by 2030. While issues between India and Pakistan often garner the most attention, water conflicts within Pakistan’s borders have the explosive potential to poison inter-ethnic and inter-provincial relations and turn simmering tension into violence. In a country where livelihoods depend heavily on reliable access to water, effectively managing water resources can transform a common lightning rod for conflict into an opportunity for building intra-communal cooperation and trust.
Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace on May 30, 2013 from 10:00 am until 11:30 am, for a panel discussion on USIP’s new PeaceWorks, ‘Understanding Pakistan’s Water-Security Nexus’, and the opportunities and pitfalls of peacebuilding through environmental policy in South Asia.
Register for the event here:
http://www.usip.org/events/pakistanwater
8. The Kaleidoscope Turns Again in a Crisis-Challenged Iran, Thursday, May 30 / 12:00pm – 1:30pm, Atlantic Council
Venue: Atlantic Council of the United States, 1101 15th Street, NW, 11th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005
Speakers: Yasmin Alem, Suzanne Maloney, Barbara Slavin
Please join the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center for the release of a new issue brief, “The Kaleidoscope Turns Again in a Crisis-Challenged Iran,” a discussion of Iran’s upcoming presidential elections. While the elections will not be free, fair, or competitive in a Western sense, they will be a barometer of the stability and durability of the Islamic Republic at a time of unprecedented external pressures and rising domestic discontent. Political factions will break down and regroup as a shrinking elite competes for diminishing spoils. The outcome of the elections and the manner in which they are conducted could also have important implications for Iranian policy going forward, including on the nuclear issue.
The Iran Task Force seeks to perform a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s internal political landscape, its role in the region and globally, and any basis for an improved relationship with the West.
RSVP with name and affiliation to:
southasia@acus.org.
9. Reviving U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case for Putting America‘s House in Order, Thursday, May 30 / 3:30pm – 5:00pm , Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution,1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Martin S. Indyk, Richard N. Haass, Robert Kagan
A rising China, climate change, terrorism, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, a tumultuous Middle East, and a defiant North Korea all present serious challenges for U.S. foreign policy, but could internal factors actually pose the biggest threat to the United States, its security, and its position as a global leader? In his new book, Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America’s House in Order (Basic Books, 2013), Richard Haass argues that U.S. national security depends on the United States addressing significant internal issues: repairing its crumbling infrastructure, improving education, reforming its immigration policies and reducing its burgeoning debt. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, contends that these shortcomings directly threaten America’s ability to project power and exert influence overseas; to compete in the global marketplace; to generate the resources needed to promote the full range of U.S. interests abroad; and to set a compelling example that can influence the thinking and behavior of other nations.
On May 30, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host Haass for a discussion on the challenging issues facing the United States at home and their impact on the successful pursuit of U.S. foreign and security policies abroad. Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Kagan will join the discussion. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the conversation.
After the program, the speakers will take audience questions.
Register for the event here:
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/05/30-us-foreign-policy-haass?rssid=UpcomingEvents&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+BrookingsRSS%2Ftopfeeds%2FUpcomingEvents+%28Brookings+Upcoming+Events%29
10. Varieties of Democracy: Global Standards, Local Knowledge, Thursday, May 30 / 4:00pm – 5:45pm, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Michael Coppedge, Staffan Lindberg, Massimo Tommasoli, Richard Youngs
The global diversity of democracy continues to grow, providing practical and analytic challenges to national policymakers and the international community. Varieties of Democracy, a new collaborative of fifteen social scientists, seeks to provide the first comprehensive approach to the conceptualization and measurement of democracy. Two of the principal investigators, Michael Coppedge and Staffan Lindberg, from the Varieties of Democracy Project, will demonstrate how innovative, freely available data make new kinds of democracy research and project assessment possible for the first time. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s Massimo Tommasoli will comment, and Richard Youngs will moderate.
Register for the event here:
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/30/varieties-of-democracy-global-standards-local-knowledge/g46e
11. Tunisia’s Democratic Future: An Address by Rached Ghannouchi, Friday, May 31 / 10:00am – 11:30am, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Martin S. Indyk, Tamara Cofman Wittes, Rached Ghannouchi
In Tunisia, where the Arab awakening began, the move toward a more open society is experiencing growing pains. Economic pressures exacerbated by the revolution and the war next door in Libya, extremist violence, and the country’s deep divisions over drafting its new constitution all present pressing challenges to Tunisia’s democratic transition. Will the country that kicked off the Arab revolutions continue to inspire the region’s drive toward democracy? What can Tunisian approaches to resolving political conflicts and reconciling Islamism and democracy teach us about the prospects for successful transitions elsewhere in the Arab world?
On May 31, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host Rached Ghannouchi, co-founder and president of Tunisia’s Nahda Party, for a special address on the future of Tunisian democracy. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, will provide introductory remarks. Following Ghannouchi’s remarks, Saban Center Director and Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes will moderate the discussion and include audience questions.
Join the conversation on Twitter using #FPTunisia.
Register for the event here:
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/05/31-tunisia-democracy-ghannouchi?rssid=UpcomingEvents&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+BrookingsRSS%2Ftopfeeds%2FUpcomingEvents+%28Brookings+Upcoming+Events%29
12. The Good Muslim and Religious Freedom, Friday, May 31 / 12:00pm – 2:00pm , Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs
Venue: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, 3307 M Street, Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20007, 3rd Floor Conference Room
Speaker: Mona Siddiqui
The complexities and challenges of religious freedom in contemporary Islam find many of their roots in the development of Islamic law and theology during the Middle Ages, a fact largely unknown to the general public. In a new book, The Good Muslim: Reflections on Classical Islamic Law and Theology, Mona Siddiqui, professor of Islamic and Interreligious Studies at the University of Edinburgh and associate scholar at the Religious Freedom Project, attempts to fill this void. The book explores a wide range of topics from divorce, slavery, and perspectives on evil, to virtue and friendship within both Shari’a and medieval Islamic philosophy.
Siddiqui will discuss these themes with Charles Butterworth, renowned Islamic Studies scholar and professor emeritus of Political Philosophy at the University of Maryland. Karen Rupprecht, Religious
Freedom Project program assistant, will moderate.
Register for the event here:
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/events/rsvp?id=the-good-muslim-and-religious-freedom
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