Day: May 23, 2013
No idyll
The Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission has finally reported on its five-year effort. While some of its findings will be contested, the overall picture is all to clear. Anyone still thinking of Kenya as idyllic should peruse the executive summary:
The Commission finds that between 1895 and 1963, the British Colonial administration in Kenya was responsible for unspeakable and horrific gross violations of human rights. In order to establish its authority in Kenya, the colonial government employed violence on the population on an unprecedented scale. Such violence included massacres, torture and ill-treatment and various forms of sexual violence. The Commission also finds that the British Colonial administration adopted a divide and rule approach to the local population that created a negative dynamic of ethnicity, the consequences of which are still being felt today. At the same time the Colonial administration stole large amounts of highly productive land from the local population, and removed communities from their ancestral lands.
The Commission finds that between 1963 and 1978, President Jomo Kenyatta presided over a government that was responsible for numerous gross violations of human rights. These violations included:
- in the context of Shifta War, killings, torture, collective punishment and denial of basic needs (food, water and health care);
- political assassinations of Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya and J.M. Kariuki;
- arbitrary detention of political opponents and activists; and
- illegal and irregular acquisition of land by the highest government officials and their political allies
The Commission finds that between 1978 and 2002, President Daniel Arap Moi presided over a government that was responsible for numerous gross violations of human rights. These violations include:
- Massacres;
- unlawful detentions, and systematic and widespread torture and ill-treatment of political and human rights activists;
- Assassinations, including of Dr. Robert Ouko;
- Illegal and irregular allocations of land; and
- economic crimes and grand corruption.
The Commission finds that between 2002 and 2008, President Mwai Kibaki presided over a government that was responsible for numerous gross violations of human rights:
- unlawful detentions, torture and ill-treatment;
- assassinations and extra judicial killings; and
- economic crimes and grand corruption
The Commission finds that state security agencies, particularly the Kenya Police and the Kenya Army, have been the main perpetrators of bodily integrity violations of human rights in Kenya including massacres, enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment, and sexual violence.
The Commission finds that Northern Kenya (comprising formerly of North Eastern Province, Upper Eastern and North Rift) has been the epicenter of gross violations of human rights by state security agencies. Almost without exception, security operations in Northern Kenya has [sic] been accompanied by massacres of largely innocent citizens, systematic and widespread torture, rape and sexual violence of girls and women, looting and burning of property and the killing and confiscation of cattle.
The Commission finds that state security agencies have as a matter of course in dealing with banditry and maintaining peace and order employed collective punishment against communities regardless of the guilt or innocence of individual members of such communities.
The Commission finds that during the mandate period the state adopted economic and other policies that resulted in the economic marginalization of five key regions in the country: North Eastern and Upper Eastern; Coast; Nyanza; Western; and North Rift.
The Commission finds that historical grievances over land constitute the single most important driver of conflicts and ethnic tension in Kenya. Close to 50 percent of statements and memorandum received by the Commission related to or touched on claims over land.
The Commission finds that women and girls have been the subject of state sanctioned systematic discrimination in all spheres of their life. Although discrimination against women and girls is rooted in patriarchal cultural practices, the state has traditionally failed to curb harmful traditional practices that affect women’s enjoyment of human rights.
The Commission finds that despite the special status accorded to children in Kenyan society, they have been subjected to untold and unspeakable atrocities including killings, physical assault and sexual violence.
The Commission finds that minority groups and indigenous people suffered state sanctioned systematic discrimination during the mandate period (1963-2008). In particular, minority groups have suffered discrimination in relation to political participation and access to national identity cards. Other violations that minority groups and indigenous people have suffered include: collective punishment; and violation of land rights and the right to development.
180 miles from disaster
Yesterday’s Friends of Syria meeting occurred in Amman, just 180 miles from the battle for Qusayr, a Syrian town located just off the road from Damascus through Homs to Alawite-populated areas of the west. If the opposition can hold Qusayr and Homs, it will split Damascus from the west. If it can’t, Bashar al Asad will have what he needs to maintain a regime axis that splits the liberated areas of the south from the liberated areas of the north. Either way, the outcome is likely to be a disaster for someone.
The Qusayr fighting involves Lebanese Hizbollah fighting with the Syrian army against mostly Sunni rebels, including Jabhat al Nusra. It naturally has echoes inside Lebanon, where Alawites and Sunnis have clashed in Tripoli. There is a real risk of spillover. While some in Washington may wonder why we should worry about Hizbollah and Sunni extremists associated with Jabhat al Nusra kill each other, it is important to widen the aperture a bit: state structures in Levant are at risk. Were they to collapse, the chaos could be widespread. Syria never has been comfortable with Lebanon as a separate state and established diplomatic relations with it only in the last few years.
It is hard to be optimistic about the preparations for next month’s Syria peace conference. Apart from the parlous military situation in Qusayr, Moscow is insisting not only that Iran be present but that the Syrian opposition come to the table without preconditions (in particular that Bashar al Asad step aside before any political transition). Then and only then is Moscow willing to set a date for the conference.
Iran’s presence is certainly necessary if the conference is going to produce anything like a political solution. The Russians are not wrong about that. Its fighters, and Hizbollah fighters it supports, are very much engaged in Syria. As for Moscow’s pre-condition that there not be pre-conditions, I suppose George Sabra–the current, interim head of the Syrian Opposition Coalition–will figure out a way to fudge that, perhaps by noting the Coalition’s acceptance of the formula already accepted last year at the Geneva conference: a transitional governing body that would exercise full executive powers “formed on the basis of mutual consent.”
More problematic is the Russian transfer of major new weapons systems to Syria and its deployment of warships off the coast. Russian thinktankers claim
non-intervention is now a basic Russian principle…
but that is neither true nor new. Russia is certainly intervening in the Syria conflict on the side of the regime it considers the legitimate sovereign. And it intervened on behalf of rebel forces in Georgia, when that suited its preferences. Russian policy might better be stated as preventing Western intervention in areas it regards as within its sphere of influence. We would no doubt return the favor if they were to muck in the Gulf.
The most sensible comment yesterday comes from Salim Idris, titular head of the Free Syrian Army. He is quoted as saying in a letter to Secretary Kerry:
For the negotiations to be of any substance, we must reach a strategic military balance, without which the regime will feel empowered to dictate … while fully sustained logistically and militarily by Russia and Iran…Such untenable situation requires that the Unites States, as the leader of the free world, provide the Free Syrian Army forces under the Supreme Military Council with the requisite advanced weapons to sustain defensive military capabilities in the face of the Assad forces.
He is said to be seeking anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. He is correct that a mutually hurting stalemate, which the opposition has not so far been able to reach, is needed before the Syrian regime will negotiate seriously. If Bashar thinks he can do better by continuing the fighting, he will.
Secretary Kerry has limited himself so far to feints: he said yesterday Friends of Syria would consider arming the opposition and supported an effort to lift the European Union arms embargo. He is a man used to the niceties of the US Senate, where sparring is a verbal activity. The Russians, Iranians and Syrians certainly understand what he is threatening, but they doubt he is willing to do it or that his doing it will be effective in the time frame available.
President Obama is fond of saying he doesn’t bluff. It is time for him to play a stronger hand, one way or another.
Opinion matters
Shibley Telhami presented his new book, The World Through Arab Eyes; Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East, at Brookings this week. BBC’s Kim Ghattas was quick to offer an alternative title: “Everything you want to know about the Middle East but aren’t getting from the headlines.”
Telhami explained that Arab public opinion is now the source of real insight into the layers of conflict spread across the Middle East. The Arab uprisings have increased its importance. The essential theme emerging after the first uprisings of 2011 was Arab identity. Understanding identity is central to understanding public opinion.
While domestic issues and authoritarian abuses may have triggered the Arab uprisings, foreign policy was also important. The years leading up to the Arab uprising were not inherently different from decades past in regards to domestic and economic woes. But Arabs are angry about the collapse of Israeli/Palestinian negotiations in 2000, the war in Afghanistan, the Iraq war and the Gaza wars. It was a strikingly violent decade (and more) in international relations.
Arab populations are angry because their leaders and governments were powerless to stand up to foreign invasions and defend the wishes of their citizens. Arab identity and sovereignty were compromised. Arab leaders played no role in stopping it.
Arab public option polls during this period were striking. One question, “who is the leader you admire most in the world?” is a crucial lens for seeing how Arabs judged and chose leaders at that time. Jacques Chirac, Hassan Nasrallah, Hugo Chaves and even Saddam Hussein were the most common answers. Telhami attributes these responses to each leader’s strong and defiant role in foreign affairs. Post Arab spring polls show Turkey’s Prime Minister, Erdogan, as one of the most popular leaders for his assertive stance in foreign policy and his ability to stand up for Turkey’s identity.
Telhami observes that identification with the state has declined while identification with Islam has increased. The adage, “you are what you have to defend” applies here, as Muslims see Islam as under assault. Increased identification as ‘Muslim’ or ‘Arab’ is also correlated with the rise in transnational media in the Middle East. Arabs are associating with others outside their national borders. This has important implications for the relationship between people and their governments, which have to take into account public opinion that extends beyond their borders.
The discussion of transnational Arab identity naturally led to a discussion of Israel and Palestine. For Arabs, the Palestinian issue reflects decades of painful defeats and remains a humiliating reminder of their powerlessness. It as an open wound.
Kim Ghattas disagreed that the Palestinian issue was central to Arab identity. She thought the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has taken a back seat now that people finally have a chance to change their domestic situation. In the past, Palestinian issues were used as a rallying cry for Arab autocrats trying to suppress and distract their own people. Finally, Arabs have a say within their own country, and they are going to speak.
There is no going back. Public opinion has been empowered.