Month: May 2013
Islamists in the political vortex
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace launched its most recent report this week with a panel on Islam and Politics in the New Egypt. Author Nathan Brown focused primarily on the long term outlook for religion and politics in Egypt, purposefully avoiding entanglement in the day-to-day political chaos of Egypt. Jocelyne Cesari of Harvard University and Jonathon Brown of Georgetown joined him in analyzing the motivations and interactions of the three major Islamic forces in Egypt: the Muslims Brotherhood, the Salafis and al-Azhar University.
The current power holder, the Muslim Brotherhood, defines itself as a reform movement, built on an Islamic foundation. Before the 2011 revolution the Brotherhood saw itself as representing a silent majority with only distant aspirations to govern. Their rise to power was so rapid that their political calculations have been reduced to day-to-day reactions with no time for long-term reflection. Cesari commented that the Brotherhood has been successful at the new political game, but that does not mean that it actually has the capacity to govern. One of its biggest blunders was to pose as winners after the election. This behavior polarized the opposition, thwarted dialogue and stunted the pluralism necessary for democracy.
The Salafi movement has also enjoyed substantial electoral success. It claims to stand for religious truth and proper practice of Islam in Egypt and internationally. But like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis have to think politically for the first time: ‘what does it mean to be a political party?’ and ‘how should we vote and what should we ally ourselves with?’ The political competition has been much more intense than the Salafis anticipated. This has led to recruitment of much needed political experts, who do not necessarily identify with Salafism. Adjusting to competitive politics, the Salafis are going to have to endure an unprecedented amount of criticism and even ridicule in Egypt’s post-revolutionary, relatively open society.
Al-Azhar, Egypt’s center of Sunni learning, has always striven to understand and interpret Islam in a scholarly way. The institution has never been fundamentally political, but sees itself as a moral voice of Islamic interpretation caught up in political games. The university wants to emerge as the central voice in all religious political debates. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movement latch onto al-Azhar as a source of Muslim understanding and national pride. This gives al-Azhar the opportunity to mediate. Al-Azhar’s centrality is critical right now, but in the long term it could become a political football once other parties become more polarized. Nathan Brown writes in the introduction of his report “al-Azhar in particular may find that every step towards increased centrality moves it further away from autonomy.”
None of these three entities were ever entirely about politics, but the revolution sucked each into the vortex of governing and power. They were given an unprecedented opportunity to achieve a more valuable place in Egyptian society. If they allow themselves to be too tempted by power, then they are going to have to face the consequences down the road. Jonathan Brown thought the ideological leanings of each group not entirely distinct and decreasingly important. Increasingly, international funding has turned internal Egyptian politics into a contest among various Gulf states, which have aligned either with the Brotherhood or the Salafists.
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Covering CIA’s rear
Yesterday’s hearing on the Benghazi attack that killed four Americans last September 11/12 failed to live up to hyped expectations. Republicans are trying to demonstrate higher-level culpability for not foreseeing the attack, for its consequences, and for Susan Rice’s television appearances claiming it grew out of a demonstration and was not necessarily a terrorist attack.
Let me make clear from the start: as soon as I heard Ambassador Rice’s account, I knew it was wrong. So did the President, as he demonstrated in the third debate with Mitt Romney. He had already referred to it several days before Ambassador Rice’s appearances as a terrorist attack. And I disagree with Hillary Clinton, who asked “what difference does it make?” when testifying in Congress. Of course it makes a difference whether the attack was a demonstration that went bad or a concerted terrorist act.
The higher-level culpability for the inadequate physical security at the Benghazi facility has already been established in the report of the Accountability and Review Board. Diplomatic Security, the responsible part of the State Department, has moved several people as a result. That may not be sufficient, but it is hard to imagine that culpability for the height of the perimeter wall or the strength of the exterior gate extends to the Secretary of State. There are few American diplomatic facilities anywhere in the world that could withstand an attack like the one that occurred in Benghazi. But in most other places we can rely on the host government security forces to respond.
If you want to hold someone responsible for not foreseeing the attack, best to focus on the Ambassador himself. He met with a Libyan political science professor that morning who had given me a few months before a thorough account of the radical groups in the Cyrenaica region (in which Benghazi is the principal metropolis). I have no doubt the professor would have been at least as forthcoming with Chris Stevens, who will have spoken to him in Arabic, than he was to me in English. But knowing that there are extremists in the region and anticipating an attack on a particular day are of course two different things.
The understandably emotional testimony of the deputy chief of mission (DCM) revealed little. Yes, he had asked for military support, but it was not available in a time frame that would have been meaningful. I dread to think what would have happened had the four special forces people available arrived from Tripoli in time to confront the dozens of attackers in Benghazi. The death toll might have been higher. But there was no way to get them there in time. The DCM may have assumed it was a terrorist attack, but he knew little about it and only found out the Ambassador was dead when the Libyan prime minister told him so. The embassy had thought him alive in a hospital.
The Republicans’ best shot at higher level responsibility arises from Susan Rice’s press appearances. She used cleared talking points. Why would she be given talking points that denied terrorist involvement, or at least offered a different explanation?
I don’t of course know. But the Weekly Standard has published what I take to be an accurate account, with various drafts of the talking points. In this, it is clear that CIA made the changes, the Weekly Standard would have you believe in response to State Department pressure. But that is an interpretation. It would be unusual. If State wants changes, it usually suggests them itself.
CIA had its own reasons to reduce the references to extremists in the talking points. The Benghazi facility was mainly a CIA station, not a consulate. The State Department presence there was mid-level and minimal. Fig leaf is the phrase that comes to mind. The former prime minister of Libya (the same one who called the ambassador’s deputy that night) told me a couple of months ago that the Libyans had no idea how many people were at the facility, which was known to the Libyan government but undeclared. They were astonished to discover that it was dozens.
CIA would not want it known publicly that terrorists had without warning attacked a place that housed dozens of its personnel. What are they supposed to be doing if not detecting such efforts? CIA stations are nominally secret. No one would want to acknowledge this one (and to my knowledge no one explicitly has).
So what we’ve got here may include still unproven high-level distortion of the facts, but it likely also includes bureaucratic tail-covering. I’ll know Congress is conducting serious oversight when it calls responsible CIA officials who made the changes and cleared Susan Rice’s talking points to testify. Chairman Issa has said there is more to come. Let it be that.
One more thing: The DCM thinks he was punished with a desk officer job. Considering the current over-staffing of state, someone coming home “off cycle,” as he did, is lucky to do that well. I have no doubt the powers that be snubbed him–that’s what happens at State to people who aren’t regarded as being with the program. He was not, and he is entitled not to be. But an off-cycle desk officer job hardly constitutes serious retaliation.
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Syria: conference time
Secretary Kerry’s visit to Moscow has yielded a proposal for a Syria “peace conference,” to be held as early as the end of this month. This is significant in at least two ways:
- the Russians and Americans both still prefer a negotiated transition (often misleadingly referred to in the press as a “peaceful” one);
- any dramatic increase in US assistance to the Syrian opposition will likely have to wait until the conference is held, or proves to be a mirage.
What are the prospects for success of this initiative? Not good unless Moscow and Washington are prepared not only to convene the event but also strongarm their respective friends (the regime and the opposition) into attending and settling. I am reminded of the interminable series of conferences on Yugoslavia that the European Community, as it was then known, convened in the early 1990s. The warring parties all showed up, if I remember correctly. But little was accomplished on the main issues until the Americans twisted President Izetbegovic’s arm at Dayton, compelling him to accept a peace agreement he thought unjust.
The main issue in the Syria conflict is power: who will control the government in Damascus? Russia and the United States a year ago agreed to a transition in which power would be delegated to a government with representation of both the Asad regime and the opposition. The American view is that this means Bashar al Asad would give up all power (and presumably opt to leave the country). The Russian view is that Bashar can stay and maybe even run in an election.
Sharp as this contrast is, the Americans and Russians have some common interests. Neither wants to see a victory for Sunni extremists. Both would want any opposition representation in a transition government to be predominantly moderate. Moscow and Washington will be particularly keen to emarginate Jabhat al Nusra, the Al Qaeda in Iraq affiliate that has established itself as a leader in the opposition fight against the Asad regime. Neither the Americans nor the Russians will want to see a post-Asad massacre of Syria’s Alawites and Christians, some of whom have been mainstays of the Asad regime. The Russians will want to maintain their port access in Syria. The Americans should be able to live with that. The Americans will want a more or less democratic outcome. The Russians will be able to live with that, so long as it does not open the door to haven for extremists who mount insurgencies in Russia’s Muslim-populated territories.
What would cause the regime and the opposition to agree to a negotiated settlement?
The opposition is having serious difficulties on the battlefield. Its fragmented forces are able to “clear” some countryside areas and parts of towns, but they are unable to “hold” and “build.” With 6.8 million Syrians now in need of humanitarian relief according to the UN, the opposition is simply overwhelmed. Air and artillery attacks on “liberated” areas make it impossible to meet the needs of non-fighting citizens. The regime intentionally targets hospitals, schools and bakeries, in an effort to demoralize people and get them to expel the rebel fighters. All the (necessarily non-extremist) opposition Syrians I’ve met from inside Syria support the idea of negotiating with the regime. In the parlance of conflict management, the secularists and moderate Islamists perceive the situation as “a mutually hurting stalemate” in which neither side can gain from continued fighting. The situation is therefore “ripe.”
The regime is less inclined to see things that way. It still has ample Russian and Iranian support. It is able to deliver humanitarian assistance to much of the territory it still controls. Valerie Amos, the UN’s humanitarian chief, noted yesterday at a Middle East Institute event that some opposition family members move to government-controlled areas when their (mostly) men go off to fight against the regime, because they are safer and food is more available. The Syrian army is exhausted, but the elite forces that do most of the fighting are not flagging, as they are mostly Alawite and view this struggle as an existential one.
So we do not have here a “mutually hurting stalemate,” even if some on one side perceive the situation as ripe (and likely many citizens sitting on the fence would too). Nor do we have a sense on both sides of a “way out.” Much of the opposition may be willing to talk, but they don’t want a negotiated solution that leaves Bashar al Assad in place. The regime stalwarts see no negotiated solution without him.
If you want a negotiated solution, which Moscow and Washington both prefer because it will give them more control over who gains power, what you’ve got to do is get the regime to perceive it cannot gain from continuing the fighting while not giving the opposition so much encouragement that it decides to continue. There are many ways Washington and Moscow can do this. But we’ll save the options for another day. We’ll also need to discuss who speaks for the opposition and for the regime, which is a non-trivial issue that will need to be resolved before any conference has a chance of success.
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What happens in Syria doesn’t stay in Syria
These are the speaking notes I used yesterday at USIP’s event on “Amidst Iraq’s Turmoil: What Can We Do?” The Q and A afterwards focused on whether Iraq really is a constitutional democracy (former Ambassador James Jeffrey made that claim, not me), how Prime Minister Maliki might be constrained from his worst instincts, the impact of his recent agreement with Kurdistan President Barzani, Maliki’s capacity to conduct dialogue and the significance of non-military cooperation in US relations with Iraq.
I’ve been asked to look at Syria and what it means for Iraq. What I see is not a single picture, but at least a triple one: Maliki’s, which is widely shared in the Shia community, Barzani’s view from Erbil and a Sunni perspective. There is an important common thread: all see Syria and Iraq as a single theater of political and military operations and are prepared to act accordingly. What happens in Syria doesn’t stay in Syria!
1. Maliki sees in Syria an extremist-led Sunni rebellion that could be a serious threat to Iraq if it succeeds in Syria. Even if he had not spent years in Damascus as an exile, Maliki would see in Bashar al Assad someone with whom he shares an interest in beating back Sunni challengers. It therefore is not surprising that Baghdad allows Iranian overflights, but it is also not all that important, as the survival of the Assad regime does not depend on materiel delivered by air.
Maliki’s main concern is with what comes after Assad. He imagines that the most likely outcome is a Sunni Islamist-led government that views Iraq’s Shia as enemies and is prepared to support the Sunni protests and insurgency against it. This concern with the “after Assad” puts him in good company: Washington and Moscow, each in its own way, is also concerned.
2. The Iraqi Kurds, especially President Barzani, see in Syria an opportunity and a risk. The opportunity is to get for the Syrian Kurds something like the federal arrangement that the Iraqi Kurds achieved after the fall of Saddam Hussein. This is difficult, because the Syrian Kurds are much less concentrated geographically than the Iraqi Kurds. But that may change with the massive population movements now occurring inside Syria.
The risk is that Iraqi Kurdish support for the Syrian Kurds may offend the Turks. They are fine with a federal arrangement that lines their border with a secular Kurdish buffer zone against the Shia world, but will not want things to go further in the direction of independence for either Iraqi Kurdistan, a future Syrian Kurdistan or some combination of the two.
3. Sunnis inside Iraq are hoping for a clear opposition victory in Syria. Some would see that as a counterbalance to the Shia-led regime in Iraq. Others might hope that a Sunni Islamist regime in Syria will support Sunni protests and even rebellion in Iraq.
Sunni jihadis have as a goal restoration of the caliphate. If this means anything, it means the destruction of the state structures in the Levant, whose borders were drawn by European colonialists. The border between Iraq and Syria is already dissolving, with arms and people flowing in both directions.
There are real risks in the Levant of maelstrom: a powerful downward vortex that ends in chaos. Avoiding this will require far more and better communication among Iraqis and between Iraqis and the surrounding countries than we have seen so far.
Some believe The United States should play a leading role in making this happen. Ryan Crocker, for example. I don’t. The primary responsibility lies with the Iraqis, along with Syrians, Turks, Lebanese and Jordanians. But I do believe we should play a strong supporting role. It is time for all concerned to look into the abyss, as they did in 2006/7, and take a step backwards.
The single most important factor in holding Iraq together is oil. My informants tell me northern Iraq could today be bringing in another $40 billion in oil revenue. The existing pipeline to Turkey could export an additional 1.2 million barrels per day. But to do this Kurds, Shia and Sunni have to sit down and decide to enlarge the pie.
That doesn’t seem so hard to me. But it is definitely hard for them. That’s where the Americans can play a role: in improving communications and helping the Iraqis to see the better future they can forge by focusing on getting their natural resources out of the ground and out of Iraq, especially to the north and west. That would tie Iraq closer to Europe and the West. As goes oil, so goes Iraq.
PS: Here is the video of the event:
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A former rebel leader comes to Washington
Ali Ahmeti, former leader of the National Liberation Army (NLA) that fought the Macedonian state in 2001, is visiting Washington for the first time this week. The Ohrid agreement of 2001 ended the NLA insurgency. Ahmeti is now the leader of the largest Albanian party in Macedonia. With colleague Mike Haltzel presiding, I commented on Ahmeti’s presentation yesterday at the Center for Translatlantic Relations of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
The softspoken Ahmeti opened by underlining the big difference the Ohrid agreement made. Before 2001, Albanians were not included in decisionmaking in the Macedonian state, to which they did not feel close. The state, in order to gain the loyalty of its citizens, needs to be loyal to them.
The Ohrid agreement changed this situation. It raised the political and juridical status of the Albanians in Macedonia, making them not just “renters” but “owners.” Macedonia, Ahmeti said, is now my state. It is committed to treating everyone equally, even if that promise has not been entirely fulfilled. Albanian higher education has improved, their presence in the public administration is greater and they are entitled to use their “national” symbols. Albanian is an official language of the state, but there are still some differences on when it can be used. Such differences can now be solved through dialogue, with international community assistance. Stability in Macedonia depends on interethnic relations, which have improved.
The major issue now is the dispute with Greece over the country’s name. Albanians are the one group in the Balkans who have never challenged the identity of the Macedonians, with whom they share an unhappy history. The Albanians of Macedonia want the “name” issue resolved, so that Macedonia can enter NATO and the European Union. Those memberships are the ultimate guarantees of security for the citizens of Macedonia.
Compromise is necessary and possible. If France and Germany can settle their differences after horrible wars and atrocities, Macedonia and Greece can as well, without recourse to force. There are no deep differences between the governing coalition parties (which include Ahmeti’s) in Macedonia on the name issue, but solving it will require difficult decisions.
In the Q and A, Ahmeti was at pains to make some additional points:
- Macedonia has no claims on Greek territory,
- the idea of Greater Albania is not one the Albanians of Macedonia adhere to,
- the Albanians of Macedonia display the Albanian flag because of its ethnic significance but have no problem with the state flag of Macedonia,
- the Macedonian government’s use of police force in December against the parliamentary opposition was not wise and is being investigated by a commission of inquiry.
This was a fine performance. Some of my correspondents wonder why Ahmeti, who was once excluded from obtaining a visa, was able to enter the US. The answer is clear.
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Still the beginning
A lot of the news today about Syria is not only about Syria. Keeping your eye on Syria means watching:
- Russia: Secretary Kerry will be in Moscow this week trying to close the gap with the Russians, who have not wanted a political solution that begins by requiring Bashar al Asad to step down. It would be hard to do better for Russia experts than Michelle Kelemen’s piece this morning on NPR, but I confess they did not hit hard on what I think is the best bet for Kerry. Russia and the United States share an interest in preventing an extremist Sunni takeover of Syria. The longer the violence persists, the more likely that outcome is. A concerted, UN Security Council push for a political settlement that moves definitively to a post-Asad regime would not only help the Russians save face but also provide the best chance of blocking extremists.
- Israel: The Israelis have conducted more air raids into Syria, ostensibly to stop war materiel from shipment to Hizbollah. The Syrian government, which in the past has not acknowledged Israeli attacks, denounced them on Sunday, thus providing an opportunity to claim Israel is in cahoots with Syria’s revolutionaries and also raising the odds on retaliation. It would appear the air strikes did not trigger Syria’s much-vaunted, Russian-supplied air defense system. Some say that is because the Israelis entered Syria from Lebanon. Whatever. It still suggests that Syria’s air defense capabilities are over-rated. The US should be able to do at least as well as the Israelis.
- Jordan: The Syrian border with Jordan is now largely in revolutionary hands and refugees are pouring across into a country that was already under severe internal strain from political protests and economic downturn. The UN is projecting a million Syrian refugees in Jordan by the end of the year. Many wonder whether Jordan’s monarchy can meet the challenges.
- Lebanon: Israeli entry into Syria from Lebanese airspace gives Beirut something all parties can denounce, but at the same time it illustrates all to starkly the parlous state of Lebanese sovereignty. Lebanese Hizbollah and Sunni fighters are already killing each other inside Syria. They also clash occasionally inside Lebanon. Hizbollah has made it absolutely clear that it regards preservation of the Asad regime as vital to its own existence.
- Turkey: There are already something like half a million Syrian refugees inside Turkey, which is now blocking them at the border. The Turks have wisely reached a ceasefire agreement with their own Kurdish (PKK) rebellion, thus limiting the damage Damascus can do by supporting Kurdish militants. NATO exercises at Incirlik, close to the Syrian border, were presumably scheduled some time ago, but they occurring now and signal that Turkey has backing in preventing spillover from Syria. But Turkey still faces dissent from its anti-Asad posture from its own Turkish-speaking Alevi population (second cousins to the Arabic-speaking Alawites of Syria).
- United Nations: Carla Del Ponte, a Swiss member of a UN inquiry commission into human rights violations, suggested yesterday that it was the rebels, not the government, that had used sarin gas in Syria. The former prosecutor of The Hague Tribunal concerned with war crimes in former Yugoslavia, she has a previous record of making controversial statements that are difficult to confirm or deny. Best to wait for the UN chemical weapons experts to pronounce on the subject.
I’ll be posting later today on how the Syria crisis affects different political forces inside Iraq. Suffice it to say: the news is not good there either.
Inside Syria, the regime has been ethnically cleansing western parts of the country, presumably in preparation for making them an Alawite stronghold.
What we are seeing are developments–refugees, military exercises and operations, political maneuvering, ethnic cleansing, chemical weapons allegations–that challenge the state structures in the Levant and put many of them under severe strain. The strain is likely to get much worse, as there is little evidence of anything that would prevent a further slide. We are still at the beginning of this tragic story, not near its end.
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