Day: June 13, 2013
At last
In a statement this evening, deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes said:
Following a deliberative review, our intelligence community assesses that the Assad regime has used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year. Our intelligence community has high confidence in that assessment given multiple, independent streams of information. The intelligence community estimates that 100 to 150 people have died from detected chemical weapons attacks in Syria to date; however, casualty data is likely incomplete. While the lethality of these attacks make up only a small portion of the catastrophic loss of life in Syria, which now stands at more than 90,000 deaths, the use of chemical weapons violates international norms and crosses clear red lines that have existed within the international community for decades. We believe that the Assad regime maintains control of these weapons. We have no reliable, corroborated reporting to indicate that the opposition in Syria has acquired or used chemical weapons.
The consequences that follow from this are, however, not yet clear. Ben said this much:
Put simply, the Assad regime should know that its actions have led us to increase the scope and scale of assistance that we provide to the opposition, including direct support to the [opposition] Supreme Military Council. These efforts will increase going forward.
The rest is left vague:
The United States and the international community have a number of other legal, financial, diplomatic, and military responses available. We are prepared for all contingencies, and we will make decisions on our own timeline. Any future action we take will be consistent with our national interest, and must advance our objectives, which include achieving a negotiated political settlement to establish an authority that can provide basic stability and administer state institutions; protecting the rights of all Syrians; securing unconventional and advanced conventional weapons; and countering terrorist activity.
That last bit in governmentese is the “end-state” we seek. It is important, as courses of action are designed with the end-state as their target.
Rumint (or maybe I should call it pressint, but I’m not providing a link because I despise the Wall Street Journal pay wall) has it that Washington is contemplating both arming the opposition and establishing a no-fly zone in northern Syria, along the Turkish border. These are the two options least likely to provoke the Russians and Chinese. Certainly maintaining their participation in the P5+1 talks with Iran is an unstated part of the end-state Obama seeks.
I’m not sure what to make of this statement being put out by Ben, who is close to the President but a couple of steps down in the White House pecking order. I imagine someone higher up didn’t want the privilege, since the steps to be taken are still not fully defined. Certainly the president could not have put out a statement of this sort without being ridiculed for indecisiveness, lack of resolve and being behind the curve. It may well be that Ben pushed for something to be said and ended up with the not entirely edifying responsibility.
The reluctance to act is palpable. But we are on what some think of as a slippery slope. The question is how far we will go. Only time will tell.
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Syria options
With Washington still undecided what to do about Syria, it is time to look again at military options. The regime is doing well enough on the battlefield that it won’t be much interested in a serious negotiated solution. The opposition won’t want one on the terms the regime would accept.
I see three basic military options at this point:
- Arm the rebels. It takes time. It will kill more people. The arms may fall into the wrong hands and be used for the wrong purposes. But it makes the Syrians responsible for their own fate and may strengthen relative moderates, if we can get weapons into the right hands. Some might prefer it be done covertly, though it is unlikely to stay secret for long. Nothing does these days.
- Safe haven/humanitarian corridor/no-fly zone. These are all to a first approximation the same thing. If successfully instituted, they would presumably save lives and enable the opposition to begin governing, as the Kurds did in northern Iraq under Saddam Hussein. But they require patrolling by US (or allied) aircraft, which means the Syrian air defenses have to be taken down first. That is an act of war that would provide invaluable intelligence to the Syrians (and therefore also the Iranians) on our operating capabilities and signatures. Safe havens did not work well in Bosnia–it was their failure that led to the bombing that turned the tide of war, not their success.
- Nail the Syrian air force, Scuds and communication nodes. This too would be an act of war, but one that does not require continued patrolling. It might even be possible without taking down the Syrian air defenses (the Israelis don’t seem to have bothered with that in nailing missile shipments to Hizbollah or Syria’s clandestine nuclear reactor). But we won’t get everything. The Syrians will bunker their more precious items under ground and park their tanks and artillery next to schools and mosques, fearing they will be the next targets. If the Bosnian war is to be taken as a guide, it would be best also to go after military communication nodes. The regime’s ability to coordinate its forces, which depends on communications, is a big advantage over the fragmented opposition.
Options 2 and 3 require the use of US forces, which needs to be justified on the basis of vital American interests. Two are most in evidence right now:
- A regime victory in Syria would be a major regional triumph for Iran, ensuring its link to Hizbollah in Lebanon, putting pressure on Iraq to toe ever more Tehran’s line, and endangering Israel.
- Continued fighting will weaken state structures in the Levant, including Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey. The resulting chaos could create a breeding ground for Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists.
The use of force, presumably without UN Security Council approval, would infuriate Russia and China. Their cooperation is still important to the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. Russia’s cooperation in maintaining the Northern Distribution Network is important to the drawdown of American troops from Afghanistan.
Then there are the American people. War weary and budget fatigued, they are not anxious for another Middle East war, especially since domestic oil production is up dramatically and dependence on Middle Eastern producers declining.
Not a pretty set of options, but if we do nothing at this point we’ll have to live not only with our consciences but also with the results.
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To Albin and Shpend from Ed
Ed Joseph, my colleague here at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, offers this open memo to our recent visitors from Kosovo, Albin Kurti and Shpend Ahmeti. They lead the “Self-Determination” Movement, which advocates a referendum on union with Albania and opposed the April agreement on normalization of relations with Belgrade. I will of course be prepared to publish their reply, should one be received:
MEMO
To: Albin Kurti; Shpend Ahmeti
From: Edward P. Joseph; Washington, DC
Date: 6 June, 2013
Subject: Five takeaways for Vetevendosje from the Visit to Washington
I’m sure you both have gotten a lot out of your visit. It was good to see you at the event at SAIS; I noted your diligent note-taking and was pleased to see that you saw this public event as a real exchange — both an opportunity for you to voice your views, including to a member of the Serbian Embassy, and as well to listen. Permit me to share five points that I hope you will consider further:
1. Speech may be free; but positions have their costs.
While you are free to voice your opinion on most anything — Serbia’s failure to change; unification with Albania, for example — you should note that free speech has its costs. Harping about Serbia’s internal failures opens the door wider for others to harp about organ or drug trafficking in Kosovo. You may not see an equivalence, and there may not be one; but the more you stray into comments about neighboring countries, the more it will seem to justify unflattering charges about Kosovo. It is your right to complain about unfair Serbian treatment of Kosovo; but it is foolish to wail about all that Serbia needs to change. Let others judge Serbia’s fitness; stick to commenting about the fitness of Kosovo. Read more
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