Syria options

With Washington still undecided what to do about Syria, it is time to look again at military options.  The regime is doing well enough on the battlefield that it won’t be much interested in a serious negotiated solution.  The opposition won’t want one on the terms the regime would accept.

I see three basic military options at this point:

1. Arm the rebels.  It takes time.  It will kill more people.  The arms may fall into the wrong hands and be used for the wrong purposes.  But it makes the Syrians responsible for their own fate and may strengthen relative moderates, if we can get weapons into the right hands.  Some might prefer it be done covertly, though it is unlikely to stay secret for long.  Nothing does these days.
2. Safe haven/humanitarian corridor/no-fly zone.  These are all to a first approximation the same thing.  If successfully instituted, they would presumably save lives and enable the opposition to begin governing, as the Kurds did in northern Iraq under Saddam Hussein.  But they require patrolling by US (or allied) aircraft, which means the Syrian air defenses have to be taken down first.  That is an act of war that would provide invaluable intelligence to the Syrians (and therefore also the Iranians) on our operating capabilities and signatures.  Safe havens did not work well in Bosnia–it was their failure that led to the bombing that turned the tide of war, not their success.
3. Nail the Syrian air force, Scuds and communication nodes.  This too would be an act of war, but one that does not require continued patrolling.  It might even be possible without taking down the Syrian air defenses (the Israelis don’t seem to have bothered with that in nailing missile shipments to Hizbollah or Syria’s clandestine nuclear reactor).  But we won’t get everything.  The Syrians will bunker their more precious items under ground and park their tanks and artillery next to schools and mosques, fearing they will be the next targets.  If the Bosnian war is to be taken as a guide, it would be best also to  go after military communication nodes.  The regime’s ability to coordinate its forces, which depends on communications, is a big advantage over the fragmented opposition.

Options 2 and 3 require the use of US forces, which needs to be justified on the basis of vital American interests.  Two are most in evidence right now:

• A regime victory in Syria would be a major regional triumph for Iran, ensuring its link to Hizbollah in Lebanon, putting pressure on Iraq to toe ever more Tehran’s line, and endangering Israel.
• Continued fighting will weaken state structures in the Levant, including Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey.  The resulting chaos could create a breeding ground for Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists.

The use of force, presumably without UN Security Council approval, would infuriate Russia and China.  Their cooperation is still important to the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran.  Russia’s cooperation in maintaining the Northern Distribution Network is important to the drawdown of American troops from Afghanistan.

Then there are the American people.  War weary and budget fatigued, they are not anxious for another Middle East war, especially since domestic oil production is up dramatically and dependence on Middle Eastern producers declining.

Not a pretty set of options, but if we do nothing at this point we’ll have to live not only with our consciences but also with the results.