Ed replies to Shpend

In a third salvo of an exchange that started last week, Ed Joseph of SAIS responds to Vetvendosje’s Shpend Ahmeti’s response to Ed’s initial memo.  It is my hope Shpend will respond once again, but then we’ll declare a truce!

Dear Shpend, thank you for taking the time to respond to my five-point memo.  Let me try to refine a few points in the hope of narrowing our differences:

First, the aim of the memo was to explain where I believe there is a disconnect between your party and some (or many) in the US who believe your party’s policies are hurting, not helping, Kosovo’s progress.  I speak only for myself, however.  If you want the official US perspective, you will have to meet with US officials.

Second, on the rights of the Serb community:

As someone who in 1999 co-managed the highest profile refugee camp (Stenkovec-I in Macedonia) for Albanians expelled en masse by Serb forces under Milosevic, you don’t need to teach me about state-sponsored, Serbian cruelty.  Expelling 800,000 Albanians, after years of systematic oppression including beatings, killings, imprisonment and forcing many Albanians out of their jobs, was a heinous crime that no thinking person should ever forget.  When Serbs complain about Kosovo policy, they would benefit by being reminded – or even better, reflecting on their own – about this disgraceful history.

It is missing the point to suggest, falsely, that Albanians and Serbs are in a state of ‘moral equivalence.’  The point, rather, is that Albanians have their own dubious record towards the Serbs – irrespective of Milosevic, the intransigence in the north or the unwillingness of Belgrade to confront the past.  The goal of “normalcy” is advanced by embracing this responsibility, not qualifying or diminishing it. 

To its credit, Kosovo’s record towards the Serb community has improved substantially.  And Vetevendosje deserves credit as well, going from assaulting trucks with Serbian license plates last year to, this year, condemning the desecration of Serbian Orthodox cemeteries.  Continuing in this vein can only help Kosovo advance.  But pointing the finger at Belgrade – when Pristina still has a lot of work to do in so many areas – does not send the right signal.  What’s more, it is unnecessary; Serbia’s human rights record is among the most reviled the world over.  The trials of Karadzic and Mladic are continuing testament to the world’s interest in accountability for Serb crimes.  And though they may be a minority, true Serbian patriots like Natasa Kandaic have risked their lives to provide visual evidence of some of the worst Serb crimes, in so doing, proving that many Serbs, too, want their country to “be normal.”  Have Serbs fully confronted their past?  Of course not.  But it is highly unlikely that having Albanians (who are not known for their kindness towards Serbs) take the lead in pointing this out will encourage them to do so.

Third, on unification with Albania:

I fail to see any connection between the fight against corruption or unemployment, and the misguided cause of unification with Albania.  To the contrary, this seems like naked pursuit of populist nationalism, dressed up with pseudo-economic arguments like ‘economies of scale.’  There is simply no proof that small European countries need to merge into large ones in order to become economically viable.  (If this were the case, Albin and you should propose reconstituting Yugoslavia, which would be a far more formidable competitor in a range of fields, including sports, than a joined-up Albania and Kosovo.  You could begin by urging tiny Montenegro, with its significant Albanian minority, to join back up with Serbia.)

Even without its blatant destabilizing potential for the region that unification holds, you overlook the fact that it would be enormously complex, becoming a near-total distraction from the far more important struggle to develop transparent, accountable institutions and rule of law in both countries.

It is true that the people of Kosovo showed indomitable will and sacrifice in order to achieve independence, no more impressively than during the peaceful struggle for dignity led by the late Ibrahim Rugova, as well as by the courage of Albanians like Albin and Kosovo Ombudsperson Sami Kurteshi who suffered in prison for their beliefs.  

At the same time, it is equally true that Kosovo owes its independence to the United States and its NATO allies who defeated Serbian forces and caused their withdrawal from Kosovo in 1999; Washington, with select European allies, also led the way to Kosovo’s independence in 2008 against firm opposition by Serbia, Russia, China and other countries including five EU members.  All the sacrifices of the Albanian people could not have achieved independence without American and NATO backing.  It is NATO — not Kosovo and not Albania or any other country — which guarantees to this day Kosovo’s security and territorial integrity.  You can dispute this if you want; but you should then explain why there are more American flags per capita in Kosovo then in any other country including probably than in the United States.

The point here is not that Albanians ‘owe’ the US; the US has demonstrated its friendship to the Albanian people for over a century, and its intensified commitment to the people of Kosovo for some fifteen years.  Rather, the point is that the Republic of Kosovo is dependent on others — both for its hard-won independence and for its continuing security.  If this makes Kosovo ‘abnormal’ in your eyes, well, that is simply unfortunate because nothing is likely to change this fundamental fact.  Responsible leaders accept facts and understand their nation’s geo-political position before making policy.  Ali Ahmeti, the leader of Macedonia’s DUI political party and former leader of the Albanian NLA is one such leader; he understood the reality of the Albanian position in Macedonia when he backed the Ohrid Agreement in 2001.  Macedonia’s leaders likewise have generally understood their geopolitical position in their relations with their neighbors.  Unfortunately, Albin and you are not being similarly responsible in your insistence on pushing for unification with Albania.  It is an unrealistic, irresponsible position that if actually pursued could succeed only in bringing Kosovo into difficulty with its most important friend, the United States of America.

Finally, there is no analogy to changing US policy towards Kosovo’s independence in the late 1990s.  Unlike Washington’s shift in Kosovo policy then, there is — today, tomorrow, or on the horizon – simply no compelling logic for such a dramatic shift in policy (like the rise of an armed KLA and ensuing crackdown by the MUP in 1997.)   You can dream whatever you like; but you are not being honest with the citizens of Kosovo if you deny this reality.

Fourth, on ‘social integration’ of Serbs and others in Kosovo.

It is wonderful to see your commitment to full rights for all citizens of Kosovo.  But why should you and I debate what is best for Serbs (and others) in Kosovo when neither of us is Serb?  Instead, why don’t we ask Serbs in the south of Kosovo if they wish to give up the carefully crafted institutional protections of the Ahtisaari Agreement (that are now enshrined in Kosovo’s Constitution) in favor of an undefined, ‘social integration’?  My discussions with Serbs in the south of Kosovo evinced keen interest in realizing these special rights – not in giving them away in the hope that they will be absorbed as individual citizens who don’t even speak the language of the majority that surrounds them.

After canvassing Serb opinion, it would interesting to see how Albanians in Macedonia feel about giving up group rights that they fought for, that are now enshrined in the Ohrid Agreement, and Macedonia’s Constitution and related laws.  I know how much Albanians in Macedonia value having the right to speak Albanian in Parliament, to have an Albanian as chief of police in Tetovo, and to be able to fly the Albanian flag among many other privileged rights that they have (and no other minority in Macedonia has.)

The truth is that group rights and individual rights both matter; in the Balkans, group rights matter most.  It is always a struggle to get the balance right, but countries that have suffered through conflict and deep inter-ethnic mistrust, like Kosovo and Macedonia, need clearly established regimes and institutions for ensuring both group and individual rights.  In time, with movement towards EU and NATO membership, we can hope that trust will grow and citizens will become less reliant on devices like ‘positive discrimination.’  But some form of group protection in post-conflict situations is essential to lay the groundwork for trust.

Fifth, on the 19 April Agreement:

The point here is that this Agreement (with details still being worked out) is reality.  You may despise it, but this Agreement, agreed to by the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia, and completely supported by the US and EU, now represents fully agreed policy.  If you want to oppose it, no one can stop you; but your opposition will help the Serbs in in the north who likewise reject this agreement and see it as betrayal of their trust.  (That is why they say that one often finds ‘strange bedfellows’ at the extreme.)

A more responsible and productive course would be to recognize this reality and focus on ensuring that the agreement is implemented in a way that strengthens Kosovo’s democracy and its unity.  I believe that successful integration of this agreement will do far more to make Kosovo a “normal country” than pushing for unification for Albania which can only bring Kosovo into conflict with neighbors — and into difficulty with the US. 

Thanks for considering these points.  Best wishes from Washington, Ed