You break it, you buy it
I spent a frustrating half hour on Warren Olney’s fine show “To the Point” yesterday. Frustrating largely because my phone connection was bad, which meant I had to switch lines, limiting the time I had to intervene. But the show was a good one, with Danielle Pletka, Steve Simon and Amr al Azam.
The main point I wanted to make is that the Administration’s decision on arming the revolutionaries is part of an effort to gain a political settlement. Obama not only wants Asad out but also Sunni extremists blocked from taking over. The Americans also want to limit their engagement to the minimum necessary. Continuing escalation will not serve the purpose of a political settlement or allow them to get off cheaply.
The Administration has chosen to be frustratingly ambiguous about what it is actually prepared to do. There is method in that madness: they wanted the news of willingness to arm the rebels in the public domain before the G8 Summit in Northern Ireland yesterday and today, but they will calibrate what they actually do depending on Obama’s conversation with Putin, which lasted two hours. Putin has leverage on Obama if he wants to use it: he could slow the American withdrawal from Afghanistan through the” northern distribution network” and he could make life hard for the P5+1 in nuclear talks with Iran.
Yesterday’s conversation did not go well. Putin no doubt reiterated that he favors a political settlement in Syria, but he is at the same time giving full military, political and likely economic support to Asad. So too are Iran and Hizbollah.
Washington will need to escalate further if it wants to change the negotiating equation by enabling rebel gains on the ground. Small arms won’t suffice. The rebels need anti-aircraft and anti-tank capabilities. Obama does not want to provide them, not the least because domestic political support is lacking. Bennett Ramberg argues the right way to intervene in Syria is with Congressional approval. Despite the loud noises from Senator McCain and a few others, it is highly unlikely that Congress would declare war unless something I can’t imagine happens.
Some will argue that President Obama should exercise leadership, show resolve, and establish a no-fly zone in Syria (or destroy Syria’s air force and Scuds on the ground) disregarding the views of Congress and most Americans. My view is that destroying Asad’s air capabilities would dramatically affect Asad’s calculus. Obama does not want to do that, because he does not want to own Syria and its difficult post-war reconstruction. Syria is more like Iraq and Afghanistan than Libya, Bosnia or Kosovo. The post-war effort will be massive and the conditions challenging. You can say we won’t put boots on the ground, but that just means conditions will be even less permissive.
I’ll be moderating a DC World Affairs Council discussion of these issues this evening (6:30 pm) at the University of California center at 1608 Rhode Island NW, in a program that features Ted Kattouf and Stuart Bowen. Ted, a former deputy chief of mission in Damascus, will argue that conditions post-Asad will be chaotic and warlord-dominated. Stuart, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, knows the pitfalls of post-war reconstruction and what it would take to get it right. I expect the bottom line to be clear: post-war Syria will be an enormous challenge.
Obama has some tough choices to make. You break it, you buy it.
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