Hezbollah in Syria is at risk
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria has captured media attention and expert analysis around the world. On Tuesday, the Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) at Johns Hopkins SAIS and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) organized Hezbollah After Assad, featuring Bilal Saab, executive director and head of research at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) North America and Jean-Luc Marret, a Senior Fellow at FRS and CTR and associate professor and senior lecturer in multiple French universities. Ambassador Andras Simonyi, the Managing Director of CTR, facilitated the discussion.
Bilal Saab reminded that a conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East is something that Hezbollah has warned against since its own founding. Such a conflict would not only distract Hezbollah from fighting Israel, but could also alienate the Shiite support base for the organization. Despite knowing this, Hezbollah has acted in a way that increases the likelihood of such a conflict. What explains Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria?
Hezbollah may be involved in Syria for several reasons. The organization might view the conflict as a preventive war to eliminate the Salafist jihadist threat before it materializes in Lebanon. Hezbollah might also be trying to assist the Syrian government because the latter is part of the resistance axis against Israel, the US, and Al-Qaeda (which Hezbollah mentions whenever it talks about the US and Israel nowadays). Another reason for the intervention might be the lack of full autonomy of Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s strategic decisions are largely influenced by Iran. The Syrian war is no exception.
He added that those who study Hezbollah are still confused by the organization’s goals and means. While the ultimate goal of the organization is the struggle against Israel, a strong relationship with Iran is another goal. Hezbollah is a “pet project” of Iran.
The alliance with Syria is a means, not an end, to Hezbollah. It is a marriage of convenience, and it is replaceable. Relations between the two parties have stalled at times, such as when Hezbollah leader Imad Mughniyah was assassinated in Damascus.
Maintaining a strong relationship with the Shiite support base constitutes another means for Hezbollah. The organization cannot survive without it. Nevertheless, it is not a goal because Hezbollah was not born merely to protect Lebanon’s Shiites. Hezbollah could try to work with a different community (though its attempts to recruit from other communities have not been too successful).
Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria has endangered its relationship with the Lebanese Shiite community, which does not want a conflict with the Sunnis, who constitute the majority of Middle East and world Muslims. More and more Lebanese Shiites are questioning Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, putting the organization at grave risk.
This does not mean the end of Hezbollah. Above all, it is not clear that Assad will in fact lose power. In addition, while there are signs of a potentially larger conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East that has not fully broken out yet. Should this conflict become a reality, the sky would fall on Hezbollah, proclaimed Saab.
Jean-Luc Marret spoke about the findings of a program he directed over the past 15 months. The program examined external networks and support for Hezbollah among the Shiite Diaspora. After clarifying that being Shiite does not mean one supports Hezbollah, Marret added that the organization has significant support among Shiites living abroad. But it is very difficult to specify the type of support, as it can be difficult to distinguish humanitarian and military aid to the organization. This gets even more complicated when some groups send money to Lebanon, say, to build a school, which Hezbollah often does.
Nevertheless, Marret’s group was able to track some support for Hezbollah. The Khoms, one fifth of a Shiite’s profit that is given to somebody with theological standing, is one source of support for Hezbollah. Some traders in foreign countries also provide funding for the organization. This is aided by Lebanon’s banking regulations, which Marret compared to Switzerland’s. He mentioned that there is an over representation of Senegalese-Lebanese banks in the country. Senegal has a significant number of Shiites.
Support for Hezbollah is also apparent in other African countries. The Ivory Coast and Nigeria have some of the organization’s sympathizers. Countries ranging from Latin America to South Asia, such as Venezuela and Pakistan, have copycats of Hezbollah. The large number of Hezbollah sympathizers means that foreign countries should be ready for attacks at any point.
Marret was asked about the possibility of an alternative ally to Syria, perhaps the Sadrrists in Iraq. While it is possible, an alliance with Iraqi Shiites is not likely, due to tensions between Iraq’s Muqtada Sadr and Hezbollah leaders.
Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria has brought much attention to the organization. Analysts should keep an eye on how the civil war impacts the organization. Should Assad fall, Hezbollah could be in serious trouble.
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