Same name, different challenges

Earlier this week news broke that the US and the Taliban had agreed to meet for direct peace talks. While President Karzai’s administration has protested these negotiations and delayed them, it appears likely the parties will meet in coming weeks. The outcome of these talks could significantly affect the future of US-Afghan relations and might help determine the nature and timeline of the US military withdrawal.

Some argue that Pakistan’s role in helping the US pursue the Afghan Taliban has driven their willingness to negotiate. Yet, Pakistan is simultaneously dealing with its own version of Islamic extremism, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or the Pakistani Taliban. Aqab Malik, a scholar at Pakistan’s National Defense University provided insight into the planned negotiations during a presentation this past Thursday at Johns Hopkins SAIS, where he is a visiting professor. Representing his own views (and not the official stance of the Pakistani government) Malik, an expert on both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, gave an overview of security concerns and discussed the implications of including the Taliban in the future Afghan state.Malik sought to clarify the stark contrasts between what he terms entirely “different entities,” the Afghan Taliban and the TTP.  Beginning his presentation with a visceral clip of Pakistani Taliban brutally murdering Pakistani soldiers captured in a cross-border raid, Malik highlighted the differing value systems and lack of “appreciation for life” by much of the TTP. He argues that the distinctions made between “good” and “bad” Taliban in the Afghan context are largely non-existent in Pakistan – those labeled moderate TTP are outside the mainstream of the organization and do not hold genuine political, military, or religious clout. By contrast, influential “moderates” may exist in Afghanistan, insofar as they are willing to negotiate with the West in order to attain their own aspirations.

The Pakistani Taliban fundamentally reject the current political system in Pakistan, are opposed to any semblance of pluralism, and refuse to compromise the Islamic nature of the state. In their understanding, there can be no regression to democracy, even if democratic mechanisms helped establish the current Pakistani state.

The TTP poses an existential threat to the future of Pakistan. Will Pakistan continue to develop into a democracy based on liberal values or will the country devolve into a theocratic oligarchy? This struggle, complicated by a lack of consensus among Pakistani elites, is leading to mixed messages in the public arena and fueling the full-fledged TTP insurgency within Pakistan. The TTP and the Pakistani government are in an all-out war for control over the state’s psyche and the support of the Pakistani people. The inability to reign in political corruption and to raise the standard of living for the average Pakistani has enabled groups such as the TTP to co-opt legitimate popular grievances. Alarmingly, Pakistan is “ripe for a revolution.” The TTP continues to pursue devastating tactics: indiscriminate mass-killings, attacking Pakistani economic centers of gravity, and targeting tribal elders in order to erode traditional power structures.

For nearly ten years, Pakistani governments have tried to negotiate with the TTP. Since 2004, a series of agreements have been reached, only to have been violated each time within months of their signing. In accordance with traditional guerrilla warfare doctrine, the TTP has successfully used these cessations in violence to regroup, consolidate their bases of power, and resupply.

What then, if anything, can the US hope to gain from negotiating with the Afghan Taliban?

Malik answers this question by highlighting certain key differences between the two groups. While the two organizations have a history of mutual assistance, share similar Deobandi ideology and are largely comprised of ethnic Pashtuns, their political orientations appear divergent. The TTP has global ambitions – the establishment of an Islamic state under strict Shari’a law that crosses modern state borders.  The Afghan Taliban appears limited to a national agenda, one that accepts the Afghan state but requires significant reforms consistent with their fundamentalist beliefs. By some accounts, the Taliban now controls or has significant influence in as much as 70% of Afghanistan. Excluding such a power-broker could jeopardize the legitimacy of the Afghan government and limit achievement of US goals.

A stable Afghanistan requires a simultaneous two-track diplomatic peace process: reconciliation from within coupled with regional and international non-interference agreements. This formula has obvious risks:  Taliban inclusion in the Afghan government and a complicated web of regional rivalries including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and India. Nevertheless, pursuing a substantive agreement with the Afghan Taliban may succeed where similar, arrangements with the TTP have failed. The Pakistanis must bolster their counterinsurgency strategies and supplement them with good governance and domestic capacity building. The Afghans need to determine how they can live peacefully with one another once the US military presence draws down. The Afghan and Pakistani Taliban may share the same name, but they are different entities and they pose entirely different challenges.