The fracturing Levant

As events in Syria continue to unfold, it is essential to understand the nature of the conflict.  On Tuesday, Emile Hokayem, a Senior Fellow for Regional Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, delivered a presentation based on his recent book, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant.  Based on repeated visits to Syria after the uprising, the book relies on a range of primary sources such as fieldwork and interviews with all sides of the conflict.  Steven Simon, the executive director of IISS-US, moderated the event.

Before the uprising, analysts had often exaggerated the power of the Syrian state, Hokayem proclaimed.  While the Syrian state was not particularly weak, its resources, industrial base, alliances, and human capital pale in comparison to regional countries that had similar ambitions, namely Iraq and Egypt.  However, Hafez al-Assad’s genius lay in his statecraft.  While this made Syria a stronger state, the uprising has brought Syria down.  It is now a weak state marked by divisions and internal rivalries.

The difference in ideologies between Syria and Iran led many to view their alliance as a mere marriage of convenience.  Hokayem argued against this view.  He claimed that their alliance may have been an arranged marriage, but it is one where “the two partners fell in love,”  with Assad over time becoming the junior partner in this alliance.

Many described the Syrian regime as secular before the uprising, and as Alawite sectarian afterwards.  This is yet another misunderstanding of the regime.  Hokayem used the Arabic word, ‘Asabeyah, or group solidarity, to characterize the Syrian state.  According to this view, the regime combines both secular and sectarian elements.

Hokayem illustrated the key asymmetries between the Syrian regime and rebel groups.  The regime’s main goal is to survive in key places within Syria.  This goal has allowed Assad to focus on defense in those areas.  The rebels need to control key cities in order to be taken seriously as potential rulers.  In recent months, the Assad regime has done a better job at achieving its goal.

There is also a difference in narratives between the regime and rebel groups.  The Assad regime has followed a segmented narrative—it offered a different story to each group.  For example, the regime warned Syrian minorities about the “sea of Sunnis,” who constitute a majority, should Assad fall.  For urbanites, who include many Sunnis, the narrative has emphasized the regime’s irreplaceable role in ensuring continuity of the state.  These differentiated messages have served the regime well.  By contrast, the rebels need to deliver a unifying message for Syrians in order to succeed.  They have been doing a poor job so far.

In terms of military power, Assad’s ability to adapt has given him an advantage.  Before the uprising, the Syrian army and intelligence were not designed to deal for a large-scale domestic uprising.  Nevertheless, the regime shifted its forces from being able to fight a mainly conventional war into militia-type troops.  The fragmented rebel groups lag behind.  Hokayem proclaimed that many cannot distinguish between a tactical and a strategic victory.

Foreign and regional support also matters.  Hokayem illustrated his point by positing the question: who would you prefer to follow in a battle, Qassem Suleimani, the battle-hardened commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or a Gulf prince who supports the rebels?  Iran’s assistance to the regime is not limited to funding, but extends to skilled personnel, expertise, and strategy.  Hezbollah’s support is more valuable than many of the undisciplined foreign fighters on the rebel side.  While Russia has been “in the trenches” with Assad, Hokayem characterized the US support of the rebels as “pulling from behind,” at least until recently.

Hokayem also extrapolated on further asymmetries between the rebels and the regime.  Such asymmetries included mobilization, organization, local administration, and diplomacy.

Jabhat al-Nusra, the Al-Qaeda affiliated group, is less important now than many seem to think.  Al-Nusra’s early achievements, which encouraged many fighters to join it, have brought the group down.  Al-Nusra includes fighters with many competing ideological stances.  Some are motivated by religion while others have more nationalistic beliefs.  Internal division has further weakened Al-Nusra.  Many of the group’s hardcore fighters split from Al-Nusra to support Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq

Ahrar al-Sham is more relevant now.  This group is more homogeneous than Jabhat al-Nusra, and maintains stronger relations with the local community in Syria.  While the group includes many hardliner Islamists, it does not hold a messianic view of the conflict.  Instead, nationalism plays a significant role in its ideology.