Hezbollah has a Syria problem

Hezbollah has long been esteemed within many circles of the Arab world. The militant group, officially designated as a terrorist organization by the US, comprises one of the best organized and strongest fighting forces in the region. They have grown into a significant political actor within Lebanese politics, and they are one of the main providers of social services for many in the Shi’a community in Southern Lebanon. Add to that their achievements versus Israel – accelerating the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the month-long war stalemate in 2006 – Hezbollah has acquired a mystique that few other non-state actors (or governments, for that matter) can rival.

Yet, Randa Slim, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and a leading expert on Hezbollah, believes all of that has changed due to Hezbollah’s growing and more visible presence in the ongoing conflict in Syria. According to her, Hezbollah’s participation in Syria has evolved over the past two years: initially Hezbollah leaders denied the groups’ existence in Syria, then some began speaking of protecting the Shi’a community, to finally framing the conflict as part of their resistance narrative against takfirs (non-believers), Zionists, and corrupt Arab and Muslim regimes.

For Ms. Slim, July 18, 2012 was the turning point for Hezbollah. On that day, a suicide bomber successfully penetrated Damascus and killed several members of Assad’s inner circle, including the president’s brother-in-law. This escalation required the militant group to re-evaluate their strategy in Syria and forced Hezbollah to shift from intelligence gathering and advisory roles to active combatants.

So why is Hezbollah in Syria? Put simply, they are protecting their own agenda. While the group’s relationship with its patron Iran may be more nuanced now than it was in the past, a genuine sense of loyalty permeates within Hezbollah leadership. Social links have grown between Hezbollah and Iran, economic and military support is equally strong, and one cannot forget the shared geo-political interests of opposing the Western and Saudi-led sphere of influence in the Middle East.

Throughout the conflict Hezbollah has tried to position itself as preventing a wider Sunni versus Shi’a conflict. Yet, according to Ms. Slim, Hezbollah has become increasingly sectarian in its rhetoric and regional outlook. They have failed to build bridges with Sunni elites inside Lebanon and remain committed to extending their influence over the Shi’a community. By participating in the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah has clearly chosen its side based on its own sectarian interests. Meanwhile, critics both within Lebanon and beyond have begun to question Hezbollah’s motives. Many believe that the group is getting distracted from its main goals: combating Israel and protecting Shi’a communities. Others believe that they are needlessly provoking Sunni groups.

Worst of all Hezbollah is now being viewed as nothing more than a Shi’a militia – an image it has worked tirelessly to reject. Its continued presence in Syria tarnishes the goodwill it has generated in the Arab world and its commitment to the Assad regime seriously threatens its credibility to those beyond its inner-circle.

According to Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches, he is aware of these risks but also believes Hezbollah’s commitment in Syria will be long-term.  The group feels threatened that it might be the next target if Sunni forces in Syria are victorious.   Nasrallah believes that getting involved in Syria may prevent the conflict from fully seeping into Lebanon. Yet support for Hezbollah’s presence in Syria continues to wane and public condemnation and calls for its withdrawal continue to grow.

Hezbollah has put itself in a lose-lose situation.  The deciding factor for how long it stays in Syria may be how long Hezbollah fighters are willing to risk their lives in a conflict that few in the wider Shi’a community see as central to their mission.