Tabler and Lynch go ten rounds

The Obama administration’s decision to arm the Syrian rebels is controversial in Washington.  While some support the decision, others consider it “probably [Obama’s] worst foreign policy decision since taking office.”  Last week, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy hosted a debate on Arming the Syrian Rebels: Sliding Toward Iraq or Inching Toward Stability.  Andrew Tabler, a senior fellow in the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute, argued for arming the rebels.  On the other side stood Marc Lynch, associate professor at George Washington University and editor of Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel.  Robert Satloff, executive director and Howard P. Berkowitz Chair in U.S. Middle East Policy at the Washington Institute, moderated the discussion.

Tabler’s presentation was based on his recent Foreign Affairs article, Syria’s Collapse and How Washington Can Stop It.  Syria is currently “chernobyling,” that is melting down.  Given the possible trajectories, the question is not whether the US gets involved, but when, how, and at what cost intervention will occur.  While acknowledging that US intervention may not end the Syria crisis, Tabler asserted that Washington could shape the outcome of the conflict.

Both humanitarian and national interests require US involvement.  The total number of deaths in Syria, approximated at 100,000, is comparable to the number in Bosnia in the 1990s, but they occurred in half the time.  Syria is “Bosnia on steroids.” The outflow of refugees into Syria’s neighbors is beyond the ability of hosting countries to handle.  Added to that is the use of chemical weapons, which directly threatens US interests.

After noting that most Americans do not support intervention, Tabler laid out the argument for why they should. Syria is strategically important for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict and for dealing with Iran.  “Location, location, location”:  Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, and Israel, are all of vital interest to the US.  Syria is “not like Vegas.” What happens in Syria will not remain within its borders.  The flow of refugees constitutes only one manifestation of the ongoing spillover.  Other manifestations include the involvement of foreign organizations such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda.  The conflict threatens the whole security infrastructure established since Sikes-Picot.

Tabler then proposed four components of a US response:

1. the US should enforce the chemical weapons red line in Syria.  This is important for US credibility.  If not properly enforced, President Assad may escalate.
2. the U.S. needs to set up safe havens in border regions near Turkey and Jordan.  To do so, the US could either use Patriot missiles or aircraft.
3. the US needs to increase collaboration with the opposition in order to depose Assad and open up the possibility of serious reform, without which Syria’s rapidly growing population will be left destitute.
4. The Obama administration should continue to pursue a diplomatic solution to the conflict, focusing on the UN Security Council.

Syria, Tabler claimed, is likely to end up divided in three:  the regime, the Sunni majority, and the Kurdish-held areas.  The US should aim to keep those pieces together.

Marc Lynch agreed that Syria is collapsing, and with many of Tabler’s recommendations.  However, Lynch added, the Syrian conflict is well beyond Washington’s ability to control, shape, or end.  Even with boots on the ground, Iraq-style, the US might not be able to control a post-Assad state.

The Obama administration’s policy may not have helped Syria, but Lynch doubted that any of the alternatives would have been better.  Critics like Senator McCain claim that everything skeptics of intervention have predicted has already occurred.  Lynch asks: would you want US troops in the middle of all this?  Before proposals for air strikes and safe havens are implemented, there needs to be a clear concept for how the conflict would end.  Otherwise the US risks continuing escalation.  The intervention in Libya provides such an example.  “Once you’re in it, you gotta win it,” emphasized Lynch.

The main arguments for arming the rebels include:

• preventing them from losing;
• improving their bargaining position;
• strengthening moderates relative to jihadists;
• increasing US leverage over post-Assad Syria.

These arguments are based on incorrect premises, claimed Lynch.  The rebels can get weapons elsewhere. The US is just one player in a crowded field of potential weapons suppliers.  It would not have a monopoly or a clear supply chain through which it could direct weapons to a unified, moderate opposition force.   The Qataris and Saudis have been spending more time disagreeing with each other than working on a unified strategy, claimed Lynch.  Moreover, money flowing from many different sources into various rebel groups has fragmented the opposition. Instead of simply arming Syrian rebels, the US should focus on centralizing aid, concluded Lynch.

It is wrong to assume that Assad’s foreign backers have given everything they could already, and would provide little support for the regime in the future.  Iran and Russia could respond to US weapons supplies by increasing their support to Assad, making the conflict even bloodier.

The argument that arming moderate rebels would drive away extremist groups is also incorrect, Lynch said.  Wherever the US is present, jihadists get involved.  Some claim that the CIA has identified moderate groups by now.  According to Lynch, this is a ridiculous idea.  It is difficult and complicated to keep a record during an ongoing insurgency.

Others claim that many fighters with Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliated group, are opportunists who joined the group because of its better weapons.  Lynch responded by saying that even if this were true, how do we know that once the winds shift and jihadists get better weapons again, those opportunists would not go back to their extremist groups?  As there is no centralized opposition in Syria, arming fragmented rebels would be risky.

Arming the rebels could also escalate the conflict.  A population does not usually become more moderate as violence increases and states collapse. While some are more optimistic because Saudi Arabia seems to be taking the lead on arming the rebels instead of the Qataris, Lynch responded: “If you’re counting on Saudi Arabia to deliver a liberal democratic, anti-sectarian, and non-Islamist opposition, I’m sorry but I can’t help you.”

The US cannot maintain leverage on the rebels by arming them.  If the U.S. tries to influence rebels it supports to do things they don’t want to do , they could simply say: “OK, we’ll get our weapons from somewhere else now.”

Lynch acknowledged that arming the rebels would deflect political pressure from Washington and the Gulf countries.  It could also give John Kerry some bargaining chips, and might temporarily strengthen US proxies.  But pressure for further action will return, and grow.

The situation is not hopeless.  The US can and should take steps to build a more unified political opposition that channels all aid to Syria as well as collaborate more with Saudi and Qatari allies.  But doing so will not provide a magic solution to end the Syrian conflict.