Leahy and democracy in Egypt
Senator Leahy said yesterday:
U.S. aid is cut off when a democratically elected government is deposed by military coup or decree.
This explains why even otherwise reasonable people are bending over backwards to claim that what happened in Egypt yesterday is not a coup, despite the obvious. It also explains President Obama’s deep concern about a coup that removed an unfriendly Muslim Brotherhood and put a friendly army in charge. It may even explain why the Egyptian army chose to turn over governing authority quickly to the chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court, who was sworn in as President today (despite suspension of the constitution).
The actual provision is more equivocal than Leahy:
Except as provided in sections 2753 and 2799aa–1 of this title, the second section 620J [1] of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by Public Law 110–161) [22 U.S.C. 2378d], and any provision of an Act making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs that restricts assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree, and except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, amounts authorized to be made available to carry out paragraph (2) for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 are authorized to be made available notwithstanding any other provision of law.
I’m not a lawyer and will not try to parse this except to say that exceptions are possible. In practice, similar provisions restricting assistance to human rights violators have been largely ineffectual. The executive branch has ways and means to ensure that national security concerns are met.
The net effect will nevertheless be to make the United States press for quick return to democratically elected government. There is nothing wrong with that in principle. In practice, it will be some time before Egypt can revise its constitution, prepare a new electoral law and proceed with presidential and parliamentary elections. If the constitution is rewritten in the open, participatory way that is today regarded as best practice, it could easily be a year or more under the presidency of Adly Mansour, who swore this morning:
I vow to safeguard the republican system and to respect the law and constitution and to look after the interests of the people and to preserve the independence of the homeland and its safety.
He also pledged to uphold the values of the revolution.
What are those? My friends at the April 6 movement said this morning:
We hope that all parties recognize the need for cooperation and collaboration for the sake of this nation and that they prevent the near and distant past mistakes of exclusion, decision making dictatorship and the isolation from the people’s voice and demands. We will not forget, at this moment to emphasize the need for the continuation of peaceful demonstrations of support and opposition, and to be careful to avoid bloodshed or incite it. As we can only commend the keenness of the military institution on the unity and synergy of the nation and to avoid the division black hole that the nation almost fell into. We also commend the eagerness to keep away from interfering in the political life, and its willingness to protect the democratic experiment in Egypt.
I’d say from this the revolutionary values include nonviolence, inclusion, national unity, and responsiveness to the voice of the people, as expressed by street demonstrations. Notably missing are rule of law, individual rights and freedom of expression. These lacunae have consequences: there is no protest in this statement against the arrest of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership and the closure of its media outlets.
Egypt has a long way to go if what it wants is liberal democracy. I doubt American influence will have much to do with whether it gets there or not. A society of nearly 85 million souls has its own internal dynamics. Withholding aid at this point would clearly be counterproductive, as it would alienate what looks to be a substantial majority of Egyptians who are today celebrating the military coup. We do best to wait and see how this new phase of the Egyptian revolution evolves. If the army has learned its lessons well, it will allow the civilians to redesign Egypt’s governance and bring the Muslim Brotherhood back into the political arena. There is time enough to lower the boom if instead Chief of Staff Sissi decides to exercise power directly.
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I don’t think we could consider this to have been a classic coup, simply because the military has never actually ceased to be the ultimate arbiter of power in Egypt since the formation of the modern Egyptian republic. Which, taking everything into account, is rather good than bad in my view, even if it is not quite democratic (at least in a fundamental sense of the word).
But something else is interesting – or, rather, ironic – here: namely, the fact that among the protesters who celebrated the forced deposition of Mr. Morsi, many consider themselves “liberal democrats” that support the Western-style constitutional democracy. Why is this ironic? Well, because Morsi has been the first ever democratically elected president of Egypt. One may dislike him as a politician or as a person, but if you are a true democrat, then you should respect that simple truth. Interference of an army in civilian government is no doubt an undemocratic act, regardless of anyone’s political preferences.
And most important, whoever succeeds Morsi and his government after the next elections will have to face the same political and, especially, socio-economic challenges that the Morsi administration did, and it is a huge question if the successors will be more successful than the predecessors in addressing those issues.
The excerpt in the article by Daniel Serwer is 22 USC §8422 (b)(3). It applies only in the context of Pakistan. The complex wording is saying that the section does not apply if some other provision of the law prohibits aid to a civilian government that has been replaced by military coup or decree. General restrictions on aid contained in 22 USC §2370 does not include a military coup as a restriction on aid. There are two sections that actually restrict aid because of a military coup, but each of these sections applies only to a specific country (El Salvador and Pakistan).
There is a section that specifically allows the President to increase aid to a country in transition to democracy that encounters a crisis (President must give a report to Congress explaining increased aid). There is another section that specifically exempts Egypt from the general requirement that the President must obtain specific Congressional approval for military aid to an individual country in excess of $100 million.
The quote by Senator Leahy that the US does not give aid to countries that undergo military coups is not an actual requirement in law. Although the US has a history of restricting aid to military governments, that history has been in the context of specific restrictions imposed by Congress on specific countries.
That history compels the US President and the US Congress to consider what effect the military coup in Egypt has on the US billion dollar military aid program that supports the military in Egypt.
The United States is generally held responsible for the coup. Nobody believes that General Sisi acted without some discussion with US diplomats. The coup has had some ill effects. The United States is blamed for those ill effects.
Certain parties in the United States and in Israel would be happy to see a repressive military government in Egypt decimate the Muslim Brotherhood. However, that will not happen. Egypt is a majority Muslim nation and the Muslim Brotherhood reflects the majority of the population. Attempts to repress the Brotherhood will only make it stronger.
The Muslim Brotherhood and the various secular interests failed to find solutions to Egypt’s economic problems. As elected government, blame falls on the Brotherhood. Blame for this failure can also be pointed at the unwillingness of the secular interests to compromise, and at the unwillingness of the military to accept direction from the elected government. The imposed military/unelected government will likely do no better at solving economic problems. Also likely, the Muslim Brotherhood will gain even greater popular support. Had they remained in power, they might have lost in the next election. But they will now grow more popular. They will win any fair election in which they are allowed to participate.
Best course for the United States is to suspend all military aid to Egypt while continuing with aid for education, health, agriculture, and human rights. This will force a quick return to some kind of election/democracy. An unnecessary postponement of an election will increase hatred of the United States and will make it more likely that the Muslim Brotherhood will win an even stronger mandate. Taking time to rewrite the constitution again is a very bad idea. Egyptians need a civilian government free from military threat that will address the economic problems in Egypt. Egyptians do not need to witness further power struggle between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood.
I’m grateful for the corrections and clarifications.
Further note: The law considered by Senator Leahy is from the Consolidated Appropriation Act 2012. Section 7008 restricts funds approved under titles III through VI of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012. A similar section appears in the draft 2013 Act.
“Sec. 7008. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’etat or decree, or a coup d’etat or decree that is supported by the military: Provided, That assistance may be resumed to such government if the President determines and certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that subsequent to the termination of assistance a democratically elected government has taken office: Provided further, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes: Provided further, That funds made available pursuant to the previous provisos shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.”
Title III contains $250 million in economic aid for Egypt. Title IV contains $1.3 billion in military aid for Egypt.
Military aid to Egypt contains further restriction that – “prior to the obligation of funds appropriated under this heading [foreign military financing] for assistance for Egypt, the Secretary of State shall certify to the Committees on Appropriations that the Governments of the United States and Egypt have agreed upon the specific uses of such funds, that such funds further the national interests of the United States in Egypt and the region, and that the Government of Egypt has held free and fair elections and is implementing policies to protect the rights of journalists, due process, and freedoms of expression and association”
There is little scope for interpretation here. The portion of the $1.55 billion earmarked for Egypt in fiscal year 2012 that were not expended before the coup are now frozen. However, the military aid portion has already been transferred in full., In particular, funds appropriated under this heading [foreign military financing] estimated to be outlayed for Egypt during fiscal year 2012 may be transferred to an interest bearing account for Egypt in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York within 30 days of enactment of this Act” Only the $250 million in economic aid is at risk.