Syria: bad to worse

What do you do about the killers when the war is over?

It’s not easy to summarize the discussions I was privileged to participate in the week before last with Syrian opposition folks assembled in Istanbul by the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (with support from the Public International Law and Policy Group) to discuss institutional reform aspects of transitional justice after the fall of Bashar al Asad. The group, which included activists as well as a few fighters and  several minorities but no vigorous Islamists, viewed transitional justice as a kind of compromise, second-best justice, adequate and even necessary for straitened post-war circumstances should the opposition win and intended to promote security and reconciliation, but far from ideal.

The Syrians also were at pains to say that reality on the ground inside Syria has little or nothing to do with Western concepts.  Sectarian tensions are increasing, as is the power of extremist groups, especially Jabhat al Nusra.  Men with guns are the ones administering justice today in liberated areas.  It is not even clear what law they should apply.  What they are doing has more to do with authority than transition or justice.

Authority is fragmented among armed groups, so justice is also.  It often resembles revenge, with retaliation the rule rather than the exception.  “Sharia” can mean little more than asking the accused whether he can recite from memory two chapters of the Quran, which in some circumstances gets you set free.  In other cases, people are quite satisfied with the Sharia courts, which have expanded from dealing with marriage and divorce to theft and civil disputes.  That is not always a bad thing.

Sectarian tensions are increasing dramatically.  A blood bath in the future is more likely than anything resembling transitional justice.  Syria is moving from an organized dictatorship to fragmented and chaotic dictatorships.

Lots of abuses are being documented inside Syria, but only superficially with video, emails and social media.  There is no system, so a lot of documentation will be unusable.  Forensic capabilities are virtually nonexistent.  It is important to document not only human rights abuses but also economic crimes like the theft of oil resources.  It can’t be stopped given the strength of the armed groups doing it, but it can be documented for purposes of future accountability.

Looking to the future, these Syrians were clear about what they want three years hence:

• professionally-run institutions well-prepared to serve citizens and improve the economy
• respect for equal rights, especially for women, and freedom of expression
• politically neutral education that informs citizens of their rights
• a simplified and unified legal system under a new constitution
• elimination of the ministry of information and security courts as well as restructuring of the security services

How to get to these goals was a lot less clear.  The state, most but not all agreed, should have an army, but it should be small and professional, without the units that are fighting against the people now.  The Syrian army has little record of protecting the nation and a long tradition of serving political purposes.  High-ranking officers should be held accountable for what the army is doing.  The police should be local with greatly enhanced forensic capabilities.

The militia supporting the regime are a big problem.  Sectarianism will make integration into the police or army difficult.  Syrian minorities (like the Alawites), some thought, are spoiled.  It is the (Sunni) majority that is oppressed.  Some thought the Shabiha should be disbanded, even compensated, but not incorporated into the army or the police.  Others thought they need retraining and rehabilitation.  Some of their cadres can be expected to retreat to organized crime.  Others will continue to fight as an insurgency against an opposition victory.  None of the regime forces will disarm voluntarily, though some opposition forces have done so in liberated areas.

The question of the internal security forces of the regime roused the Syrians to fever pitch.  These are the officials responsible for torturing and murdering the opposition.  Opposition outreach efforts to the security services and paramilitaries have been fruitless, which means that either they will retreat to regime-controlled areas in western Syria or be killed once the opposition gains control of their territory.

Syrians will not accept international community peacekeeping forces, most thought.  The best the internationals can do after this is over is to end the financing to various militias, especially Jabhat al Nusra.  The international community has been a colossal disappointment, leaving Syrians to fend for themselves against brutal repression.

Discussions of transitional justice like the one we engaged in for two days seem to many Syrians theoretical and impractical with respect to the realities on the ground, where both justice and reconciliation are far off.  Many Syrians will seek revenge for the harm done to them by the regime, whose officials will defend themselves preemptively, making further escalation of violence inevitable.  Things in Syria, where central Homs is now under siege, are going from bad to worse.