Supercharge the EU

As Kosovo and Serbia are proceeding with implementation of their April agreement on northern Kosovo, it is time to look at the other remaining war and peace problem in the Balkans:  Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The country is at a standstill, its institutions inadequate to qualifying for European Union membership, its people annoyed and frustrated, its economy declining, its youth departing if they can, much of its society sharply divided along ethnic lines, and the international community puzzled as to what to do.

The best that can be said is that war seems unlikely, not least because no one cares enough.  The peace is not a warm one.

I’ve been inclined to think that there is nothing much that should be done about this.  Bosnia has a clear prospect for EU membership.  If it stews in its own juices for a while, its people should be able to figure out that the current crop of political leaders is not moving in the right direction.  Certainly the enigmatically named “baby revolution,” a protest movement precipitated by the government’s inability to solve even simple problems, and the parallel Prvi Mart effort to encourage voter registration across entity lines, suggest that the country’s more or less open society has potential for pressuring the leadership in the right direction.

In the meanwhile, a weak European military force (EUFOR) pretends to maintain a safe and secure environment while the civilian international community “high representative” created by the Dayton accords, pretends to preside (but no longer rules) over a dysfunctional state and its two entities, Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation.  The RS leadership alternately defies and manipulates the EU, the Federation ignores it and the state government can do little to influence either one.

The trouble with the “hands off” approach is that things might evolve in a less salutary direction, as Kurt Bassuener has amply documented.  The European Commission, frustrated by the inability of the Sarajevo government to come to decisions, is dealing increasingly with the RS, the Serb-controlled 49% of Bosnia, ignoring the 51% (Croat and Bosniak-controlled) Federation.  It is natural for bureaucrats to deal with bureaucrats who can get something done, but the net result is that the EU is de facto helping Republika Srpska qualify for EU membership independently of the rest of Bosnia.  That has even been proposed as EU policy.

The EU thus risks precipitating the breakup of Bosnia.  That is not what it wants to do.  In its progress report at the end of last year, the EU commission made clear that it wants to negotiate membership with the government in Sarajevo:

The need for an effective coordination mechanism between various levels of government for the transposition, implementation and enforcement of EU laws remains to be addressed as a matter of priority, so that the country can speak with one voice on EU matters and make an effective use of the EU’s pre-accession assistance.

But actions speak louder than words.

What is to be done?  The successful EU mediation on northern Kosovo between Belgrade and Pristina shows a possible way.  By insisting on elimination of Belgrade’s parallel structures in Kosovo as a condition for giving Serbia a date to begin negotiations on EU accession, Germany gave EU High Representative Catherine Ashton enormous leverage with a Serbian government whose protagonists had little domestic support for flexibility on Kosovo.  Americans often complain that EU consensus decisionmaking leads to least common denominator outcomes.  But in this case Berlin showed that consensus decisionmaking can lead to a tough, even uncompromising, EU stance, so long as at least one member holds firm.

The EU could apply this lesson learned in Bosnia.  The best bet would be a coordinated maneuver by Berlin and Zagreb, whose July 1 entry into the EU makes it a power player vis-a-vis its southeastern neighbor.  Germany has long been a strong supporter of a united, democratic and multiethnic Bosnia.  Croatia’s interest in preventing Bosnia’s breakup is clear:  it does not want a rump Islamic state on its borders.  That is why even its nationalist first president Franjo Tudjman backed the Bosnian Federation (and wanted it confederated with Croatia).  Strengthening Bosnia’s insitutions and accelerating its entrance into the EU would protect the interests of both Bosnian Croats and Croatia.

Bosnia’s problems are above all constitutional, as its constitution establishes group rights and institutional constraints that render the Sarajevo “state” government dysfunctional.  The reforms needed have been known for almost a decade, at least since the Venice Commission outlined them with admirable clarity in 2005.

The EU Commission is loathe to make constitutional reform a condition for EU membership.  But EU member states can do it, as their approval will be needed for Bosnia’s candidacy and eventual accession.  If, in addition, Germany and Croatia insist that the state government in Bosnia must have all the authority needed to negotiate and implement the EU’s acquis communitaire, wholehearted implementation would solve 90% of what makes Bosnia dysfunctional.

The Europeans have been anxious to eliminate the American-invented (but always European-manned) civilian “high representative” responsible for implementation of the Dayton agreements (and armed in theory with dictatorial, aka “Bonn,” powers).  The Americans have balked.  They want to be certain Europe will do the right thing and not allow Bosnia to come apart.

If the Americans were certain that at least Zagreb and Berlin were unequivocally committed to constitutional reform and a sufficiently strong state government in Bosnia to negotiate and implement EU obligations, they would have far less motive to hold on to the high representative and his “Bonn” powers, who at the very least could be moved offshore and reduced to the role of ultimate guarantor rather than constant watchdog.  Once the needed constitutional changes are made, there would no longer be any reason for a Dayton-focused “high representative.”

Europe has done well with Serbia and Kosovo.  It can do well on Bosnia as well.  But a lowest common denominator consensus at of 28 members will not work.  Zagreb and Berlin, working in close consultation with Washington, could supercharge the EU and make good things happen.