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It’s Trayvon Martin’s fault

Murhaf Jouejati, a leading light of the Syrian opposition, complained on Twitter:

I watched ABC “Worldnews” tonight. Despite today’s killing of tens of Syrian civilians by the Assad regime, ABC reported nothing about Syria.

He added:

NBC also had nothing on Syria. Still wondering why American public opinion is so uninformed?

At least in the United States, the horrors of Homs and Aleppo seem to have been driven not only off the front pages but out of the press entirely, presumably because the trial of George Zimmerman for killing Trayvon Martin used up all the ink (and electrons).  The exception was this morning’s New York Times, which has a good overview of the Syrian regime’s recent military successes.

I confess to my own fascination with the trial, which is like a Rohrschach test:  if you see race as a factor, then the inkblot points toward conviction for something; if you don’t, you might agree with the jurors who acquitted someone who profiled, followed, quarreled with and shot an unarmed seventeen-year-old.  How the prosecutors failed to anticipate the racial factor is a mystery to me.  And why the press calls a self-appointed vigilante ready to use his firearm a “neighborhood watch volunteer” I cannot fathom.

Though far from our shores, the plight of Homs really is more heinous than this unsuccessful prosecution, which allowed a single sociopath to go free.  Those who are watching see mass murder of a civilian population, including even those trying to mediate.  In Aleppo, people are starving.  Sociopath Bashar al Asad is killing upwards of one hundred Travon Martins, or his parents, every day.  Asad’s mostly Alawite and Shia (including Hizbollah) collaborators are busy chasing the Sunni population north and presumably plan to fill in with Alawites and other minorities whenever conditions allow.

The shape of things in Syria is becoming all too clear.  The regime is seeking to establish a robust corridor linking Damascus to the relatively concentrated populations of Alawites in the west, which is conveniently adjacent to Lebanon’s Shia population (and Hizbollah fighters).  Asad seems intent on pushing north as far as he can:  first to Homs, then Aleppo if possible.  But his supply lines will be getting longer and help from Lebanon less convenient.  At some point the confrontation lines will likely stop moving north, at which point both opposition and regime will turn to their own rear areas and try to mop up any continuing resistance and ethnically cleansing as much as they think necessary.

The result will be de facto, partly sectarianized, partition, likely with opposition-controlled areas both south and north of the regime’s main axis from Damascus to Tartous and Latakia and extending in the east to Deir Azzour.  The opposition will have supply lines to Turkey in the north, Iraqi Kurdistan in the east and Jordan in the south.  The regime will continue to depend on Russian and Iranian supplies shipped mainly to Tartous.

This partition could persist for a long time.  It is now forgotten, but during the Bosnian war the confrontation lines moved little for 3.5 years.  Only with the American bombing did the Croat and Muslim forces tip the balance of war and begin to sweep through western Bosnia.  A soft partition with fairly clear confrontation lines could likewise last for years in Syria, provided both sides are able to maintain their international supply lines.

This kind of persistent stalemate would push both sides in more radical, sectarian directions.  The opposition, many of whose most aggressive fighters are militant Islamists, will likely move more in that direction.  Moderates do not fare well in polarized situations.  The regime will continue to claim the mantle of secularism and multiethnicity, but in fact its core is increasingly Alawite and Shia, with Christians, Druze and lots of Sunnis trying to duck, or sit on the fence, or whatever you want to call what people do when fear outweighs the desire for freedom.

The American jilting of the Syrian rebels may seem the easiest way out to an Administration that is taking retrenchment seriously.  But it isn’t going to be cheap.  US expenses for Syria, mostly humanitarian aid, are climbing close to $1 billion.  Next year could easily double that figure, especially if the other states (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq) in the Levant start to collapse.  You know:  a billion here and a billion there and pretty soon we are talking about real money.  I’d prefer we worry about the people, but if that doesn’t grab high-level attention maybe the expenditures will.