Moderate tones, but Iran needs the pressure

Newly inaugurated Iranian President Rouhani held his first press conference today.  The tone was moderate, even if the content was essentially unchanged:  Rouhani wants a negotiated solution to the nuclear impasse, one that includes lifting of sanctions as well as an end to threats and the “secret” American agenda (read “regime change”).

Rouhani was well aware that strict new sanctions on Iran had passed overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives last week, which he attributed to Israeli pressure:

so the interests of a foreign country are served and imposed on representatives in Congress so that even U.S. interests are not being considered…

Most of those hoping for a negotiated solution to end Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons bemoaned this hostile signal in the run-up to this weekend’s inauguration of a relatively moderate president.  The man hadn’t even finished naming his cabinet yet.  The sanctions vote could have increased pressures in favor of more conservative “principalists”  and undermined Rouhani in his declared intention of reaching a settlement that would relieve Iran of at least some of its economic burdens.

But that is not what happened.  In fact, Rouhani named a relatively moderate cabinet, despite the prospect of new sanctions.  He has indicated a willingness to continue negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program.  It would still be a mistake for Washington to adopt new sanctions before talking with the new government in Tehran, but it is not a mistake to make clear what the consequences of a failed negotiation will be. Diplomats will of course do that in private with their counterparts.  But the Iranians know the American political system.  A Congressional vote off 400 to 20 represents as unequivocal signal as you are likely to get out of a notoriously fractious Congress.  The Obama Administration’s silence on the vote suggests that the President thought the signal not only unstoppable but potentially helpful.

The House-approved sanctions will not come into force for some time yet, if ever.  The Senate will not take up the the proposal until after the summer recess, and even then the process may be a prolonged one.  While few on either side of the aisle in the Senate will want to vote against the sanctions, the majority Democrats can delay consideration until the time is ripe.  In the meanwhile, Iranian politicians will rail against the Great Satan’s threats and declare Tehran immune to sanctions, but that suggests the efficacy of the threat rather than its impotence.  The House bill makes it easier for President Rouhani to convince Supreme Leader Khamenei that without a negotiated solution Iran will suffer crippling consequences.

What would the new sanctions do?  They would seek to reduce Iranian oil exports virtually to zero and damage other business sectors by locking out firms that do business in Iran from business in the US.

Chinese cooperation would be needed to achieve the first goal, as Beijing is Iran’s biggest oil customer.  The Chinese have apparently been willing to reduce imports from Iran marginally this year, but there is little reason to believe they would go to zero next year, or anytime for that matter.   That portion of the new sanctions, which grabs the headlines in the US, will not be credible to the Iranians, who are past masters at evading oil sanctions.

The more serious threat is to non-oil sectors:  the automotive, mining, construction and engineering industries.  The Iranian economy is already a shambles, as Rouhani acknowledges.  The currency is devalued, inflation is rampant, unemployment is high, shortages are common.  While security arguments will generally trump economic ones, especially in a country that has made a lot of enemies, Iran is reaching the limit of what its parlous economy can endure.

The war in Syria is an additional strain on Tehran, which is providing troops (as well as funding not only to Bashar al Asad but also to Hizbollah for its participation).  Here, surprisingly, the Obama administration seems to be letting up on the pressure.  It has been slow to supply even the small arms it has promised to the Free Syrian Army.  Tehran’s allies are moving north into rebel-held territory that has not been seriously contested for months.  The opposition coalition has failed to name its prime minister and government.  One has to wonder whether someone in Washington is thinking that easing up on  Syria is useful as a signal to Rouhani and his new cabinet.

That would be a mistake.  The nuclear issue certainly has far higher priority for American interests than Syria, but a successful negotiated outcome–one that will convince the US Congress that Iran has stopped and will not restart its efforts to gain the technology and materials required for nuclear weapons–depends on maximizing pressure on Tehran.  Washington should certainly imitate Tehran’s moderate tone.  But only if there is no alternative, and a real prospect of obtaining sanctions relief, will Iran’s President and eventually its Supreme Leader be convinced to limit the nuclear program in a satisfactory and verifiable way.