What’s the point?

The diplomatic action yesterday and today on Syria is focused on getting the Asad regime to allow the UN inspection team, already in Damascus, to visit the nearby site of Tuesday’s horrific early morning massacre to ascertain whether chemical weapons were used.  Why so much effort when the regime is likely to deny access or allow it only after it has been able to clean up the site?

Let’s assume for the moment chemical weapons were in fact used, since the Syrian government would have allowed an immediate inspection had they not been.

It will seem to many that we are grasping at straws, that is insubstantial steps that really don’t have any potential for altering a situation that is going from really bad to much worse.  But that’s not how I see it.  Establishing some common ground between the United States and Russia is vital to ending the war in Syria.  If they manage to agree that chemical weapons were used–either because the regime denies the inspectors access or because the inspectors find evidence to that effect–that would help push ahead the search for a diplomatic resolution.

If allowed to visit the site, might the inspectors actually find something?  Yes, is the short answer.  Cleanup is difficult and the means of chemical detection are highly sensitive.  Autopsies might also produce relevant results.  If anything even approaching one thousand people were killed, there will be lots of bodies available and a lot of eye witnesses to their deaths.

Even if the inspectors find evidence, how can we be certain that the regime, not the rebels, were responsible? First, there is eye-witness testimony that the rockets came from regime-controlled areas.  Second, the rebels are hardly in a position to load and launch rockets with chemical weapons payloads, especially in the immediate environs of Damascus.  Third, we can hope that communications intercepts will demonstrate who was responsible.  The National Security Agency really does have an important role to play in cases like this one.

Most likely, the regime will stall and delay inspection of the site of the attack and the bodies until evidence has decayed beyond detection.  This represents the diplomatic equivalent of pleading nolo contendere, which would be reason enough for the international community to act.  The Americans have made no secret of preparations for military action.  But they will prefer a diplomatic course in cooperation with Moscow, so long as it includes deposing Bashar al Asad, since his presence in power is inconsistent with ending the violence.

President Obama, who yesterday was worrying about the cost to Americans of going to college, won’t welcome interruption of his focus on domestic issues.  But Syria needs decisions that only he can make.  Will the United States start down what General Dempsey sees as the slippery slope of more engagement by acting militarily to punish Bashar al Asad for crossing Obama’s red line?  Will it act even without UN Security Council authorization?  Or will Washington succeed in convincing Moscow to cooperate in a serious diplomatic effort to end Bashar al Asad’s rule?

It is difficult to predict the decisions of a single person, whether he be Barack Obama or Bashar al Asad.  Obama’s reluctance to do anything militar is palpable.  Bashar al Asad’s inclination to do everything in his power to kill his enemies is likewise palpable.

The priority American interest is in ending the war in Syria as soon as possible, to diminish the likelihood of its infecting the region and further empowering extremists both inside Syria and in the neighborhood.  Military action will need to be forceful if it is to compel Bashar to give up.  Diplomatic action will need to be much quicker than its pace so far if it is to produce the needed result.  The combination might be better than either alone.