Protecting long-term US interests in Syria
Whatever you think of President Obama and his decisions, he knows what his job is:
We have to think through strategically what’s going to be in our long-term national interests, even as we work cooperatively internationally to do everything we can to put pressure on those who would kill innocent civilians.
So what are America’s long-term interests in Syria, where innocent civilians are being killed in increasing numbers every day?
Three things:
- Preserving the unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian state, as well as its neighbors;
- Preventing either Sunni extremists or Iranian allies from using Syria as a platform for international terrorism.
- Maintaining an effective prohibition on the use of chemical weapons.
It is all too apparent that continuation of the civil war will do damage to all three:
Sectarian divisions and the risk they pose to territorial integrity become more dramatic with every passing day. Many Alawites, convinced that the fall of Bashar al Asad will lead to mass slaughter comparable if not worse than what the regime is already doing to Sunnis, are concentrating themselves in the west and in certain neighborhood in Damascus. Christians and Druze are trying to duck and avoid direct engagement, but both groups have good reason to fear either regime survival or an opposition win. Kurds are looking for an opportunity to create their own federal unit, if not an independent state. Ethnic and sectarian cleansing and self-cleansing are separating Syria’s once mixed population in ways that will be difficult if not impossible to reverse, leading to a real risk of state collapse. Refugees threaten to destabilize Syria’s neighbors. Al Qaeda in Iraq and Syria is aiming explicitly at destroying the state structure in the Levant.
Sunni extremists are increasingly present among the stronger fighting forces of the Syrian opposition. They are more experienced and better equipped and financed than the relative moderates of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). They are facing off against regime forces backed by Iran and Hizbollah that for the moment seem to have the upper hand around Homs and are fighting to loosen the opposition ring around Damascus. The longer this goes on, the less room there will be for the FSA, which depends on unreliable financing and supplies, mainly from Saudi Arabia but presumably by now also from the US. Continued fighting will strengthen Tehran’s hold on Damascus. A win by either Sunni extremists or the regime with support from Iran and Hizbollah will make Syria terrorism central.
If President Obama allows the red line he drew on use of chemical weapons to be crossed without consequences, the international prohibition may come to be seen as toothless. Bashar al Asad won’t be the only one to draw the conclusion that they may be used with impunity.
So ending the fighting quickly should be on the President’s mind, as continuation will be inimical to long-term American interests. How can the fighting be brought to a quicker end?
The short answer is anything that will end Asad regime advances and create a “mutually hurting stalemate” favorable to a negotiated solution, when both regime and opposition conclude they will be better off with a negotiated outcome than continuing the fighting. There is no guarantee that any particular intervention will create a mutually hurting stalemate, but it is clear enough that allowing the fighting to continue without intervention will be irreversibly inimical to long-term US interests.
What is needed is an intervention that changes Bashar al Asad’s calculation that he can stay in power because no one is going to do anything substantial to prevent it. There are two ways of achieving this: convince the Russians to end their military and financial support for him, or intervene militarily in favor of the opposition. The two options are linked: threat of the latter might well increase the probability of the Russians abandoning Bashar. And it is difficult to imagine they will stick with him if there is a successful American military intervention.
What kind of military intervention? Here the art of the possible enters into the calculation. America clearly has no stomach for another ground war in the Middle East, or even a weeks-long intervention like the NATO attack on Muammar Qaddafi’s forces in Libya. This rules out a no-fly zone as well as humanitarian corridors and safe areas, which would have to be enforced. The NFZ over northern Iraq cost many millions over more 11 years of implementation. Even vigorous intervention advocates agree there should be no American boots on the ground.
So the preferable military option, in addition to continued diplomatic effort with the Russians, is a stand-off attack with cruise missiles and smart bombs focused on Syrian missiles, artillery and air force as well as their command and control. I don’t really know how you measure proportionality to the apparent chemical attack that killed over one thousand people, many of them women and children, but a few days of well-targeted destruction would send a strong message.
The big question is whether to do something like this without UN Security Council authorization. President Obama is hesitant but does not rule it out:
…if the U.S. goes in and attacks another country without a U.N. mandate and without clear evidence that can be presented, then there are questions in terms of whether international law supports it, do we have the coalition to make it work, and, you know, those are considerations that we have to take into account.
Even the threat of intervention without UNSC authorization might bring the Russians around to restraint in their support for Asad, but he would be likely to stay in place and continue the fight for some time. An early end to this may depend on military intervention without UNSC authorization. I hope the lawyers are working on their briefs and the diplomats on the coalition needed “to make it work.”
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” The NFZ over northern Iraq cost many millions over more 11 years of implementation. …”
“Many millions” is chickenfeed – the one-month bombing in Libya ran 1 billion, and even the Republicans said the amount was trivial (for a war – I can’t imagine the same people saying that about many domestic programs). And in Iraq, the time gave the Kurds time to organize themselves. It might not be the worst outcome in Syria, but I’m glad it’s not my call.