Day: August 26, 2013
Serious is as serious does
John Kerry can be downright eloquent when he wants:
…our understanding of what has already happened in Syria is grounded in facts, informed by conscience and guided by common sense….
President Obama believes there must be accountability for those who would use the world’s most heinous weapons against the world’s most vulnerable people. Nothing today is more serious, and nothing is receiving more serious scrutiny.
His statement today is more than a red line that can be blurred depending on future circumstances. It is a clear pledge to do something serious about a red line already crossed.
The diplomatic fur is flying fast and furious, according to the Secretary’s account. That’s as it should be. The Administration needs to construct as wide an international and domestic consensus for what it wants to do as possible, including Congressional backing and a UN Security Council resolution if possible. Speed is not as important as developing momentum. If President Obama wants to be taken seriously, whatever befalls Bashar al Asad and his regime now must be sufficient to prevent him from ever again even contemplating use of chemical weapons.
That should not however be the only goal. Bashar’s depredations against civilians are occurring every day, even when chemical weapons are not used. Syrian artillery and aircraft are attacking population centers, hospitals, schools and other civilian facilities. Each and every one of these attacks is a war crime. Very few of the 100,000 Syrians killed in the last 2.5 years have been victims of chemical attacks. Are the lives of those maimed and killed in bombings and shelling less valuable than those who suffered so horrendously from nerve agent? Is the international prohibition of attacks on civilians not as important as the prohibition on use of CW?
I don’t imagine that Bashar al Asad can necessarily be gotten rid of with American air attacks, which are as far as the Administration is prepared to go. But I do think the goal of whatever we do should be broader than accountability for gassing civilians. The playing field has tilted in recent months in favor of the regime, due mainly to Iranian, Hizbollah and Russian support for the Syrian security forces. It needs to be tilted back in the other direction if there is to be any hope of the negotiated outcome to which John Kerry is committed. Whether that is done with air attacks or with weapons and intelligence supplied to the opposition, it needs to be done.
We’ve seen this scenario before: air attacks in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan helped indigenous forces on the ground to at least begin to win the day, resulting in negotiated outcomes in Bosnia and Kosovo and regime change in Afghanistan. None of these outcomes would, however, have been sustainable without boots on the ground, including substantial numbers of Americans. That is almost unthinkable in Syria and certainly not what Americans or their President want, though some Americans to guard and dismantle the chemical weapons stocks may be necessary. So the Administration would do well to consider what is to be done if intervention succeeds in bringing about a political solution. What then? Who will stabilize Syria and ensure that the post-Asad period is not even more violent than the current civil war?
The UN has some pledges of troops if there is a peace to keep. But they are far short of the numbers needed for a country of 21 million people (before more than a million of them became refugees) suffering severe ethnic and sectarian cleavages after a more than 40-year autocracy. Rallying troop-contributing countries is going to be the Secretary of State’s next Sisyphean task.
Serious is as serious does, not only in warfare but also in peacefare.
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Square one
Having written about nothing but Syria for the better part of a week, it is time to take a glance back at Egypt, where the wise-beyond-his-years Ahmed Maher is telling it like it is:
We view ourselves back at square one, because what is happening now could be more dangerous, more complicated than what was there before January 25, 2011
I fear he is right. The Egyptian army has taken back power and appears determined to repress the Muslim Brotherhood, whose leadership is to be prosecuted and whose membership is to be harassed to an even greater degree than under Hosni Mubarak. Guys like Ahmed, a leader of the April 6 movement that helped precipitate the revolution, aren’t safe either, because they speak up for the rights of Islamists and others.
Disappointed as I am by this turn of events, things are never quite the same as the first time around, as Ahmed implies. It’s a bit like turning up at “Go” in Monopoly. The board has changed a bit since last time you were there. It may be more dangerous and complicated, but there are also more people who have tasted something like basic freedoms and will be unwilling to let the savories disappear. I wish Ahmed well in forming a coalition that will harness that sentiment and push for a return to a democratic path.
That will take time and effort. One of the many shortcomings of the Egyptian revolution was that it failed to mobilize grass roots support for a clear roadmap to a democratic outcome. Instead it entrusted the country’s future first to the military, which failed to deliver, then to President Morsi, who failed to deliver, and now again to the military, which is likely to fail to deliver again.
With each failure, the Islamist/secularist divide in Egypt has widened, making it difficult at this point to imagine that the Muslim Brotherhood will participate in the referendum to approve a revised constitution and elections promised for early next year. Though they supported the July 3 coup, even Salafist participation is in doubt.
Breadth of participation matters, but apparently not to the Egyptian army, which is forging ahead with the expectation that its diktat will rule Egypt for the foreseeable future. General Sissi is definitely not the self-restrained George Washington of Egypt. It looks very much as if he is preparing for a long period in power.
What should the United States do in this situation? I really don’t see much point in cutting off military assistance, as the Saudis have vowed to replace whatever the Americans cut. We can of course still do it as a symbolic act, and there are many in Washington arguing that we have to in order not to be seen as complicit in restoring the Egyptian army to power. But the aid is tied to the peace treaty with Israel, at least in the minds of the Egyptians, which means the Israelis will be pressing us hard to maintain it.
If we do decide to cut off military aid, I hope we can do it in a way that sends a clear message in favor of a serious democratic outcome. I’d wait for some egregious act to which we could respond. More than likely, the Egyptian army will give us cause by committing another mass atrocity, conducting show trials, departing dramatically from the schedule for a new constitution and elections, or some other outrageous move.
In the meanwhile, we need to do what we can to protect people like Ahmed who are daring to speak out even under newly repressive conditions. We can’t want democracy for Egyptians more than they want it for themselves, but we can support those who are taking serious risks even as the country returns to square one.
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