This is awkward
British parliament disapproval of participation in a military attack on Syria leaves the US with only France and Turkey as seemingly willing allies in punishing Bashar al Asad’s regime for the use of chemical weapons. The rest of the world seems content to sit back and watch, commenting all the while and reserving the option to hiss and boo if things go badly and to applaud if they go well.
At the same time, there is a growing view in the commentariat that military intervention will have little positive impact, and may even cause Asad to escalate his chemical attacks, or lash out in with terrorist attacks. Narrowly targeted military action to deter use of chemical weapons in the absence of a broader political strategy is likely to be ineffective at best, counter-productive at worst. Even if it deters further use of chemical weapons, the regime has ample alternative means with which to kill Syrians, as it has demonstrated for more than two years.
The UN chemical weapons inspection team is returning from Damascus and will need to prepare a report on its findings. These will presumably demonstrate unequivocally that chemical weapons were used but likely not who used them, as that was never part of the inspectors’ mandate. The Administration therefore needs to clarify for the American public, which is thoroughly unconvinced of the need for the US to take military action, and the international community, including the UN Security Council, why it thinks the regime was responsible. I personally don’t have any doubt, but others do and are entitled to answers from a government that has proved unreliable, even untrustworthy, more than once (read “Gulf of Tonkin,” “WMD in Iraq”).
It will be early next week before a case can be made in the serious way the situation requires. At that point it makes more sense to wait until after Presidents Obama and Putin have a chance to discuss the issues on the margins of the G20 Summit (September 5-6) in Saint Petersburg. An American-led attack on Syria will be a serious embarrassment for Moscow, which will squeal loudly about the horrendous consequences for the Middle East and world peace but will mostly be chagrined that it has once again failed to block the Americans. If Moscow will agree to push Bashar al Asad aside, that would be reason enough to hesitate more.
My colleagues Ed Joseph and Elizabeth O’Bagy have tried to sketch what a serious diplomatic initiative might look like, putting the emphasis quite rightly on security. But they wave their magic wand and create UN peacekeepers who are nowhere on the horizon in the truly vast numbers that would be required (100k at a minimum). They also rightly (if regrettably) suggest some degree of sectarian and ethnic separation, which is occurring in any event. The trouble is that the confrontation lines in many parts of Syria are still intertwined and contorted. It will take a lot more violence to straighten them out. Doing it at the negotiating table will be an even lengthier process.
President Obama is an awkward spot. Damned if he does, damned if he doesn’t. It sure would be nice to find a diplomatic way out.
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2 thoughts on “This is awkward”
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I think you are a bit wrong about Russia’s position. A U.S.-led military intervention in Syria could well work to Moscow’s benefit by potentially drawing Washington into yet another exhausting conflict in the Muslim world and Middle East. Also, the Kremlin would be in a position to once again publicly condemn the United States as “the evil and arrogant global policeman”, thereby additionally strengthening an already strong anti-American sentiment among many Russians.
More important, as much as the Russians view Bashar Al Assad as an ally, they understand that he is extremely unlikely to remain in power once the war is over, whether there is going to be a foreign military intervention or not; in fact, Al Assad has already ceased to be the effective ruler of Syria as a whole, and has instead become just one of many local warlords, albeit a relatively powerful one.
Now, while Moscow’s and Washington’s respective positions differ on Al Assad himself, neither side would like to see radical Sunni islamists taking control of post-al Assad Syria. Bashar Al Assad may be an enemy of the United States (and Israel), but he is at least a predictable one (“The devil you know…”). In other words, the Americans may very much dislike Al Assad, but they still dislike him less than they do some of his potential successors from the Syrian opposition.
And that’s exactly where the Russian (plus Iranian) interests converge with those of the United States when it comes to Syria, making a joint effort at negotiated settlement quite possible. Of course, the Russians and Iranians would prefer Al Assad’s conclusive victory in the civil war, but they are fully aware it is not going to happen; the Americans, on the other hand, would opt for a stable, clearly pro-Western – and preferably (albeit not necessarily) democratic and secular – Syrian government, but that’s likewise a rather unlikely outcome. Among more or less realistic scenarios, for both the Russians and Iranians on one side, and the Americans on the other, the most acceptable one would be a sort of inclusive post-war government, certainly without Bashar Al Assad and his family clan but still including some others from his regime. Such an option would enable Moscow and Tehran to retain a degree of influence over Syrian politics, while preventing the country from plunging into total chaos that Washington fears the most.
But again, the greatest obstacle to solving the Syrian crisis are not so much the differences between Al Assad’s foreign allies and adversaries as it is the disunity among rebel factions themselves.
The Danes are in, if asked. (Scratch a Dane and find a Viking?)
Fortunately, France’s most recent military exploit in Mali appears to have gone well, so their morale has not been completely destroyed.
The previous administration just about destroyed America’s credibility on such matters in the world, along with its government’s finances, but someone in Syria seems to be developing the habit of using chemical weapons against its people, and this really can’t be allowed to continue. For the 1st Gulf War, Bush Senior was able to assemble a coalition of 31 countries (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalition_of_the_Gulf_War), now it’s the French and the Danes.
Whether it’s possible to accomplish anything more than preventing the further use of one type of weapon is certainly debatable – like the religious wars in Europe, the passion in the Islamic world may simply have to burn itself out. (The Thirty Years’ War – a generation. That now seems an optimistic estimate.)