Moscow can deliver Damascus

Edward P. Joseph, my colleague here at SAIS and in the Center for Transatlantic Relations, offers:

US policy towards Syria rests on the premise that Russia can deliver the Assad regime to surrendering its chemical stockpile and to hoped-for talks in Geneva for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. While much has been said about Russia’s willingness to press Damascus, Moscow’s ability to bring its influence to bear has received less scrutiny.

While the subject is clouded in secrecy, there is every reason to believe — based on the dynamics of patron-client relationships — that Moscow does, in fact, command substantial, even decisive influence in Damascus.

Consider America’s own relationship with a Middle East client: Egypt. As was abundantly clear during the military’s ouster of then-President Morsi, Washington danced an awkward line, refraining from labeling the military action a “coup” because this would trigger a mandatory cut in substantial US foreign assistance to Egypt. Instead, Washington expressed its concern over Cairo’s anti-democratic direction in gingerly fashion, by delaying the delivery of four F-16.  This was a symbolic step, but hardly one that inflicted serious hardship on the military-led government. Egypt faces serious internal security issues, especially in the Sinai, none of which are amenable to attack by the latest fighter aircraft.

There was no mystery why Washington didn’t take a harder line. Had it cut foreign assistance, Cairo could plausibly have turned to Saudi Arabia for more assistance. The Saudis — animated by the departure of the despised Muslim Brotherhood — pledged to make up any cuts to Egypt by both the US and EU. Riyadh proved to be as good as its word, putting together a total aid package with other Gulf States topping $12 billion. In other words, the client, Egypt, held an (oil) barrel over the head of its American patron, thanks to the availability of an alternative, namely, Gulf states flush with cash.

Who can Damascus turn to if Moscow decides to amp up the pressure or ramp down support? Answer: no one, including Iran. Tehran is itself  attempting to emerge from international isolation and internal weakness.  Besides, it does not hold a permanent seat on the Security Council. Iran can continue to supply cash, personnel, materiel and regional support (directly through Hezbollah and indirectly through Baghdad), but in no way, shape or form can Tehran substitute for the support that Russia can provide. Russia provided Syria this spring with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, designed to complicate potential Western military action such as a no-fly zone. Russia is the ‘sole source protector’ of Syria at the strategic level; Iran operates mostly at the regional level.  

Cautious China has shown no willingness to overstep Moscow’s high-profile role on Syria, preferring to follow its lead in the Security Council.  Beijing shares Moscow’s allergy to military intervention, particularly where democratic uprisings are involved.  But Beijing does not share the array of compelling interests that make Syria a significant Russian client.

Therefore the regime in Damascus, which is locked in a fight for its life, must listen carefully to the directions of its Russian patron. Does that necessarily translate into absolute, instant remote control from Moscow? Of course not. Perhaps like President Karzai in Afghanistan, Assad understands that his patron’s interests are tethered to his or at least his regime’s survival. But unlike either Cairo or Kabul, Assad has in Moscow a patron far less encumbered than Washington. Vladimir Putin does not need to worry about congressional oversight or even public opinion in his dealings with a petty foreign client like Syria. Indeed, Putin has shown utter ruthlessness dealing with domestic opponents, so why would he suddenly find scruples in dealing with Assad?

Syria is a long-standing client of Russia’s. This means that Putin, who hails from the KGB, has penetrating insight into the dynamics within the regime and what they mean for Assad’s own internal vulnerabilities, facilitating the exercise of Russian influence.  Moscow can avoid clumsy threats in favor of a more precise pressure points. If we believe that Moscow has, in certain instances, been demonstrably unable to get the Assad regime to do what it wants, we should ask if and how it pressured him to do so.

To believe that Moscow cannot, in the end, have its way in Damascus is to call into question the whole rationale of partnering with the Russians in the first place. If Russia cannot deliver the Syrians, then we are engaged in a colossal waste of time and effort. Empirical evidence tells us that this is not so. Assad himself in the span of 24 hours went from evading the question of chemical weapons with Charlie Rose to accepting (nominally, at least) international control of his stockpile after an apparent snap Russian decision.

While we must remain ever vigilant about Russian intentions, we should presume — remaining open to well-founded evidence to the contrary — that Russia does indeed hold sway in Damascus. When it comes to Syria, the general rule should be that what counts is Russia’s will, not its ability, to direct its Syrian clients.