Month: September 2013
Peace picks, September 9-13
Here are this week’s peace picks, courtesy of newly arrived Middle East Institute assistant Sarah Saleeb. We are still working out some kinks, so some links are missing in this posting. Be sure to register on the website of the sponsoring organization.
1. Pakistan Elections and Regional Stability: How Foreign Assistance Can Help
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Crisis breeds strange ideas
Secretary of State Kerry today floated the idea that has been kicking around: Bashar al Asad can avoid an American attack if he gives up his chemical weapons, within a week. The Secreatary was quick to add that he does not expect Asad to do this. Now the Russians are suggesting that Syria’s chemical weapons be put under international control.
Does the idea have virtue?
Not on the face of it. There are lots of chemical weapons and precursors in Syria, perhaps as much as 1000 tons according to French intelligence. Moving even one ton of such material securely in the conditions that prevail in Syria at the moment would be a challenge. Moving hundreds of tons would take months. Where would you move them to? A special facility would have to be built to destroy the material. I somehow doubt any of the neighbors is prepared to host it, and store the stuff until the facility can be built.
The Russian proposal focuses not on moving the material but putting it under some as yet undefined international control. I suppose that means international observers or inspectors to watch the chemical weapons stockpiles and report if they are used. The difficulties of doing this even in peacetime conditions are apparent from the difficult history of nuclear inspections in Iraq. How would anyone know that all the chemical weapons stocks had been reported? But doing it under wartime conditions seems truly impractical. I don’t think I’d want to be the international inspector embedded with Syrian forces protecting the chemical weapons stockpiles and trying to ensure they are not used.
German intelligence is suggesting that Bashar al Asad did not himself authorize the chemical attack on August 21. But that contradicts what Bashar al Asad has said to Charlie Rose: Bashar claimed that any such chemicals, if they existed, would be firmly in centralized control. That is surely true, as these weapons exist above all to protect the regime and to strike at Israel in a regime-threatening situation. If control of the chemical weapons has loosened to the point they can be used without the regime’s approval, things are worse in Syria than we had imagined. Intervention might be justified on that score alone, though it could not be limited to air attacks.
The main virtues of John Kerry’s floated idea, and the Russian proposal, are to delay further the prospect of an attack and to demonstrate that the Obama Administration is prepared to go the extra diplomatic mile to avoid military intervention. The time may well be needed to twist arms in the House of Representatives, which is playing its assigned role by reflecting the reluctance in the American population. The extra diplomatic mile is needed to show that there is no alternative to military action, or to provide a face-saving alternative if the Administration fails to get Congressional approval.
On the diplomatic front, the US needs to go, once again, to the UN Security Council to lay out its case and seek its concurrence in military action. The Russians and Chinese will not go along, but there is really no harm in demonstrating to Moscow and Beijing, and to the world, that they do not control the use of American power any more than we control the use of theirs, which Moscow has used against Georgia and Beijing uses often to assert its territorial claims against American allies in the East and South China Seas.
But going that route requires prior approval of military action in the US Congress. That seems a tall order at the moment. John Kerry is trying to convince us that the effort will be a small one:
We will be able to hold Bashar al-Assad accountable without engaging in troops on the ground or any other prolonged kind of effort in a very limited, very targeted, short-term effort that degrades his capacity to deliver chemical weapons without assuming responsibility for Syria’s civil war. That is exactly what we are talking about doing – unbelievably small, limited kind of effort.
The trouble with that argument is it is inconsistent with going to Congress for approval and with the notion that Syria’s use of chemical weapons puts American security at risk by breaking an international taboo. Nor is there any guarantee that things can be kept small. The enemy has a vote. If Bashar escalates, we’ll need to respond.
Bashar giving up his chemical weapons, putting them under international control, a small intervention to solve a big problem. Crisis breeds strange ideas.
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No evidence I used CW on my people
That’s Bashar al Asad’s defense, according to Charlie Rose:
The full interview will be broadcast tomorrow. All we’ve got so far is Charlie Rose’s account, in which he typically spends more time reciting what he asked than what Bashar al Asad said.
But the defense is worth parsing. It is not a categorical denial, which would have read something like this:
Neither I nor anyone under my command has used chemical weapons in Syria against anyone.
Instead Bashar has left lots of loopholes:
- Someone under his command may have used them
- No evidence has been presented connecting him to their use
- The opposition might have done it
- They were used against terrorists, not loyal Syrians
Charlie Rose being the worst interviewer with a good name on TV, I don’t expect him to have explored any of these loopholes in the interview, but we’ll have to wait to be certain.
The purpose of this interview is to make it harder for President Obama to gather the votes needed in the House of Representatives in favor of a resolution approving the use of force. I don’t expect it to make things much harder than they are already proving to be. No one in the US really doubts the facts, or Bashar al Asad’s responsibility. Even if he did not know about this specific attack, he is the responsible commander.
The issue for Americans is not what happened but rather “why us?” Why do we have to take on a burden that more properly belongs to the international community as a whole, or to parts of its like the Arab League that have so far ducked taking action. It does little good for John Kerry to be coming out of meetings with the Arabs and announcing that he has support from the Saudis or others. It is time we heard directly and forcefully from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Jordan and others involved or threatened by what is going on in Syria. And our diplomats should be trying to get all of them to put skin in the game: don’t all those nice warplanes we’ve sold them deserve a test in battle?
Even if they say “yes,” the primary responsibility for any military intervention will rest with the US. We cannot be the world’s policeman, but we do have to be the world’s fireman. The conflagration in Syria threatens to spread throughout a good part of the Middle East. Present policy–humanitarian assistance in unprecedented quantities, arms to the rebels from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, pushing for greater unity and coherence among the moderate opposition, support to governance efforts in liberated areas–has proved insufficient. Not useless, but unequal to the goal of getting Syria to a negotiated political settlement.
That goal drops farther and farther out of reach with every attack and every death in Syria. The opposition, which at one time wanted the Syrian state preserved, is increasingly focused on destroying it. Sectarian and ethnic divisions are widening. Resentments are growing. Syria is becoming a collapsed state, even if the center of its capital remains, as Charlie Rose reports, relatively calm. Only kilometers away there are large portions of the countryside already under opposition control.
The longer this persists, the worse it gets. I would favor one more diplomatic effort in the UN Security Council, something I expect the House of Representatives will insist on. But the time is coming for the United States to try to put out the fire, with difficult to predict consequences, or allow it to continue to burn, with consequences that are all to easy to predict.
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All in, or not
Whether President Obama will get Congressional backing for strikes on Syria’s capability of using chemical weapons will be decided in the political arena, where the current is running strongly against. While he may win in the Senate, he faces a difficult uphill battle in the House, which is far more sensitive to public opinion.
Both Tea Party Republicans and more liberal Democrats are hearing from their constituents, who include members of my family, that they don’t see why the United States needs to take action. Why can’t the Arab Gulf states, whom we have armed to the teeth, do this job? What is at stake for America? What is happening in Syria is sad, even tragic, but why is it our responsibility? Why don’t we have stronger backing at the UN and elsewhere?
Samantha Power, now our ambassador at the UN, was busy yesterday in Washington trying to answer these questions. She cited as reasons for the United States to act destabilization of the region, growing recruitment of violent extremists, Israel’s security, and proliferation of chemical (and other mass destruction) weapons as well as American credibility in the effort to prevent it. She catalogued the international community’s carefully hedged verbal support. She reviewed our efforts to use nonmilitary means both at the UN and elsewhere. That’s all fine as far as it goes.
The disconnect, and it is an important one, is arguing that American national security is at risk but the President proposes a strictly limited intervention: short, high-flying and unmanned, no boots on the ground. Samantha says:
President Obama is seeking your support to employ limited military means to achieve very specific ends, to degrade Assad’s capacity to use these weapons again and deter others in the world who might follow suit. And the United States has the discipline as a country to maintain these limits.
Limited military action will not be designed to solve the entire Syria problem. Not even the most ardent proponents of military intervention in Syria believe that peace can be achieved through military means.
But this action should have the effect of reinforcing our larger strategy for addressing the crisis in Syria. By degrading Assad’s capacity to deliver chemical weapons, we will also degrade his ability to strike at civilian populations by conventional means.
She may be correct that we’ll hit that sweet spot where we deter further use of chemical weapons and also help the opposition by degrading his conventional capabilities. But the odds are definitively against hitting such a small part of the spectrum of possible results. Unintended consequences are the rule, not the exception. US military action could also collapse the regime completely, with chaotic results or inimical ones like a takeover of Syria by Islamist extremists. Or it could be perceived by Bashar al Asad as nothing more than a pinprick, causing him to escalate the use of both conventional and chemical weapons to defeat a flagging opposition.
An honest adviser should be telling the President that the consequences of military action in Syria are likely to be long-lasting, one way or another taking us down the slippery slope he has so long tried to avoid. This could mean more military action and also burdensome civilian efforts. The real option is not a quick and limited strike, but a quick and limited strike followed by difficult to predict consequences that may well require more of us than we anticipate now. That’s the “all in” option.
Doing nothing, however, is also a decision. That too could lead in unintended directions, including collapse of the regime and takeover by Islamist extremists. After all, the last two years of doing little or nothing militarily have not moved us any farther away from those outcomes. It is arguable, and often argued, that had we done something two years ago things would be much easier to manage now.
The difference between “all in” and “not,” the option that ironically “All In”‘s Chris Hayes favors, is how much say the United States afterwards. A strike will bring clout with the opposition as well as the international community. It will mean a central role for the US in post-war Syria, something that may be as much burden as advantage. It could also increase the credibility of a military threat to the Iranian nuclear program.
Backing off now, or going ahead without Congressional approval, will weaken a president who is already having domestic difficulties. Domestically, “not” could put an early end to his second term. Can you see the Republicans compromising on the budget by October if the Tea Party beats him on Syria? Internationally, he will have a harder time convincing anyone that he is willing or able to strike the Iranian nuclear program, which will make a diplomatic solution even harder than it is already proving.
The Administration may be proposing a short-term effort, but the real alternative is between “all in” and “not.”
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Preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons
Sidney Balman, barely arrived Middle East Institute research assistant, reports:
While attention this week is focused mainly on Syria, nuclear talks with Iran are expected to reconvene this fall after a hiatus due to the Iranian presidential elections. President Rouhani, who this week shifted the lead negotiating role to Iran’s newly appointed Foreign Minister Zarif, has softened the harsh tone of his predecessor and sought to portray Iran as open to a negotiated solution. The next 12 to 18 months will prove crucial in the nuclear talks.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace yesterday hosted three of the leading experts on Iran’s nuclear program—Georgetown University’s Colin Kahl, the Institute for Science and International Security’s David Albright, and the Carnegie Endowment’s George Perkovich—to speak on the prospects for the nuclear negotiations. The Arms Control Association’s Daryl Kimball moderated
Under the previous Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the talks remained at a stalemate. But with Rouhani in office, the nuclear talks could take a positive turn. Rouhani campaigned in the June elections on a platform of reducing Iran’s international isolation, whereas former Ahmadinejad nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili campaigned on building up the nuclear program and refusing to compromise with the West. As Colin Kahl said, the election was essentially a referendum, with the Iranian people deciding their suffering economy is far more important than the nuclear program.
David Albright made it clear that a resolution in the diplomatic negotiations during this time is crucial before Iran reaches “critical capability,” which is the point when it has enriched enough uranium to make a mad dash to build a bomb. Therefore, it is important that both Iran and the P5+1 negotiators are prepared to approach the talks with a new and creative perspective.
While Kahl held that the probability of the current government suspending enrichment of uranium is zero, he stressed that it is important for the P5+1 to negotiate “big for big,” and not “small for small” or “more for small.” Moreover, it is vital that the Western negotiators provide the Iranians with a potential roadmap that details an endgame with phased implementations. Kahl’s proposal asks that Iran:
• Cap enrichments at 5 percent
• Limit the domestic stockpile of uranium to less than the amount needed for one bomb
• Restrict the number of centrifuges in its facilities
• Suspend all activity at the Arak heavy water facility, and
• Allow more intrusive inspections by the IAEA.
In return, the P5+1 should offer:
• Relief from economic sanctions
• The right to enrich uranium for energy production purposes
• Future peaceful relations with the West, and
• Possibly even offer Iran a long-term security agreement, which is something it has pursued in the past
If Iran has no intention of building a nuclear weapon, Kahl said, then this deal is optimal. But, if the Iranian government is secretly developing a nuclear weapons program, then this offer would essentially call its bluff.
As George Perkovich explained, it is important to remember that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, is an important factor. Although he does not follow the details of the nuclear program and the negotiations in depth, he is obsessed with fairness. Thus, in order for any deal to be taken seriously, the P5+1 negotiators have to ensure that the Iranians perceive any deal as fair and that they do not feel as if they are “picked on.” Otherwise, Khamenei will make sure that there are no significant developments in the negotiations during these critical 12 to 18 months.
With a key period of negotiations fast approaching, it is important that both sides take advantage of the opportunity for diplomacy. The P5+1 should infuse its offers with some newfound creativity in order to be successful. Perkovich said we should approach this situation with a Reagan-esque mentality, in that we should not “trust and verify” as former US President Ronald Reagan said, but we should “distrust and verify.” Both the P5+1 and Iran need to put everything on the table and come to a conclusion that satisfies both sides, while ending the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran.
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Too narrow broadens
The Syria war resolution approved in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee goes a long way to correcting the problems in the original draft. The too narrow definition of American goals has been broadened to include changing the momentum on the battlefield. It looks as if the Administration has the votes to get this version approved in the Senate, provided it is not filibustered.
The question will be whether the broader definition of American goals is just too much for the House, where the increasingly isolationist Tea Party is strong among Republicans and more liberal Democrats likewise oppose getting involved abroad. It is one of the ironies of this Administration that it is paying the cost of George W. Bush’s mistake in going to war in Iraq. The House Republican leadership, while supporting the resolution, will not impose party discipline to ensure its passage, leaving voting entirely up to individual members. Minority leader Nancy Pelosi, who has come out swinging for the resolution, faces a tough uphill battle to get an overwhelming majority of Democrats to support the resolution. That won’t be easy.
My guess is that the key to success or failure lies with, whether you like it or not, Israel. Some think the Israelis are ambivalent about removing Bashar al Asad. Their politicians may be. But their intelligence apparatus has concluded that Bashar has to go sooner rather than later, to better the odds of preventing an extremist takeover. The Israelis have been smart to keep their mouths shut in public, but they are no doubt lobbying hard in private for vigorous military action that would reinforce the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons as well as help to end the war. Failure of the US Congress to approve military action, or hesitation by the President to take it, would reduce the credibility of an American military threat against the Iranian nuclear program, as Secretary of State Kerry made eminently clear in his testimony in the Senate.
The President can take military action without Congressional approval, but failure of the Congress to act would make an already messy process incomprehensible to most of the world and further reduce the likelihood of finding support among friends and allies. The Arab League, while denouncing the use of chemical weapons, has so far not called for military action. With the United Kingdom restricted from participation by its parliament and Germany and Italy reluctant as usual about military action, European support essentially comes down to France and maybe a few smaller countries. Plus Turkey, whose interests clearly lie in the earliest possible end to the war in Syria.
Russia remains adamantly opposed to military action, even if President Putin is sounding Moscow’s usual meaningless grace notes about not necessarily standing forever with Bashar al Asad and wanting to discuss the matter with President Obama. Iran is in an tough spot. It is a diehard opponent of chemical weapons use, as Saddam Hussein gassed Iranian forces in the 1980s, during the Iraq/Iran war. But its high officials, echoed by Moscow, are still insisting the August 21 attack came from the Syrian opposition, not the regime. This creates an opening. If the Americans can present Russia and Iran with detailed, incontrovertible evidence that the regime was responsible, logic would dictate that they at least stop their extensive military support to Bashar al Asad and his Hizbollah allies. But of course logic doesn’t necessarily govern situations like this one.
The action this week will be first and foremost in the House and then in Saint Petersburg, where the world’s major economic powers will be meeting at the G20 Summit. If and when a resolution passes in the House, there will be a moment–likely less than a day–for a quick diplomatic maneuver by Russia and Iran to agree to a diplomatic conference that would remove Bashar and save Moscow and Tehran from the embarrassment of an American air attack like the ones in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan that altered the military balance on the ground. If the diplomacy fails at that point, it will have another chance, but only after whatever happens happens. The law of unanticipated consequences will then be in full force.
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