Why Ken Pollack is wrong

Ken Pollack has written a highly readable but serious and in-depth book claiming that–contrary to US government policy, Congressional sentiment and popular preference–we can live with the “unthinkable”:  an Iranian nuclear bomb.  Containment, he claims, is not only possible but desirable when compared to war, which would have uncertain and unintended consequences.

He is wrong on two counts:  these are not the only options and containment is the least desirable of them.  Here’s why.

Ken looks at containment from the American perspective.  He worries about whether the Iranian regime is rational and produces ample evidence for Karim Sadjadpour’s judgment that it is homicidal but not suicidal. Deterrence then can work, with only some small and tolerable probability that it might fail, as during the Cold War.

He is lacking two vital perspectives:  Israeli and Iranian.

If Iran somehow gets nuclear weapons, Israel faces what it considers an existential threat.  What will it do in response to any indication that Tehran is preparing a nuclear attack?  Ken cites a Cold War example–the 1983 Able Archer incident–that brought the US and Soviet Union close to nuclear war when the Soviets misinterpreted an American exercise as preparation for a nuclear attack.  But the US and Soviet Union had good communications and significant transit time for their intercontinental ballistic missiles.  Launch on warning during the Cold War meant launch after the enemy’s launch but before the missiles struck their targets.

Israel, while it has a second strike capability aboard its submarines, cannot wait that long.  A second strike after your country has been obliterated is little satisfaction and even less deterrent.  Launch on warning for Israel will mean launch before Iran is able to launch.  The targeting would have to be comprehensive, against any installation from which Iran might retaliate.  With virtually zero communications between the two countries and a lot of mutual distrust, this makes a world in which Iran has nuclear weapons frighteningly close to Armageddon, for the region if not for the world.  Iran faces the risk of assured destruction at Israel’s initiative, with nothing mutual about it.

This is not however as apocalyptic as it sounds.  It gives Tehran, which has no second strike capability, a very good reason for stopping its nuclear program short of nuclear weapons and doing so in a way that is transparent, verifiable and irreversible.  Iranian President Rouhani has said clearly but generically that

Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran’s security and defense doctrine…

Why not?  I’d guess that this is because Iran will be less secure if it develops nuclear weapons, which could lead to an Israeli nuclear strike that would destroy not only the nuclear program but the entire country.

There is another reason for hope that diplomacy can stop Iran’s nuclear program short of making weapons.  Rouhani knows that sanctions relief, which he needs urgently to fulfill his electoral promises of improving Iran’s economy, will require US Congressional action.  The Congress will not lift sanctions unless it is certain that Iran cannot and will not develop nuclear weapons.  If Rouhani is serious about getting sanctions lifted, he must also understand what this entails for transparency, verifiability and irreversibility.

Of course there is a possibility that the Iranians aren’t serious at all but are just conducting a charm offensive to buy time while they proceed apace to develop nuclear weapons and even use them.  This  possibility argues for a deadline for nuclear negotiations with Iran.  The problem with a deadline is that it is a species of red line.  We would have to specify what comes if the deadline isn’t met.

I would suggest adding to Administration policy a soft deadline:  an expectation, publicly expressed, that we get a satisfactory agreement on Iran’s nuclear program within 2014.  What happens after that is all too clear from voting and discussions in the US Congress.  Restating it publicly only raises the ire and strength of anti-Rouhani forces in Iran.  The end of 2014 is about when Israeli patience is likely to run out anyway, raising the specter of a less than 100% effective conventional military attack that causes the Iranians to recommit and accelerate their effort to develop nuclear weapons.

But the key point is this:  if Iran gets nuclear weapons, the risk of a nuclear war in which it will suffer the worst consequences rises, not only because of Tehran’s decisions but because of Israel’s calculations.  It would be foolish to doubt Israel’s willingness to use nuclear weapons against a nuclear weapons state in order to ensure the Jewish state’s survival.  The Israelis are surely no less committed to survival than the Americans were when they faced the Soviets and were prepared to use nuclear weapons first.  It is still US policy to assure “no first use” only against non-nuclear states in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.  Once Iran has nuclear weapons, nuclear war can happen not only because of a real threat from Tehran but also from a misunderstanding (genuine or willful) in Washington or Jerusalem (Tel Aviv for those who prefer).

Containment is not a stable outcome, as it was in a situation where destruction was mutually assured.  For Tehran, it is perilous and to be avoided, preferably by diplomacy based on calculations of Iran’s real interests.  Israel will be justifiably hard to satisfy with a diplomatic outcome, but it would be far better and less precarious than containment.