Blast from the past

Revisiting peacemaking in history, Professor Bill Quandt yesterday discussed the Camp David peace process at American University.

Quandt opened his remarks on the Egypt-Israeli peace by offering a timeless key to peacemaking. In order to have a successful peacemaking process, there must be more peacemaking and less process. The parties involved should see change that would convince them that the old ways and tensions can be put away and new ways adopted. It is not enough to have parties come to the negotiation table.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is often seen as an insoluble conflict, one that cannot be addressed by diplomacy. But there is one aspect of the conflict that was resolved with diplomacy, between Egypt and Israel. Egypt and Israel fought four wars that gave Israel the military upper hand. But how come diplomacy ultimately worked?

Quandt attributes the success of the 1978 Camp David Accords to four things:

Change of leadership in Egypt. When Anwar Sadat succeeded Gamal Abdel Nasser, he was determined to try a different path. He wanted to shift his international relationship from the Soviet Union to the US and knew that he would not be able to do that without making peace with Israel. Sadat began sending costly signals to the US by expelling Soviet advisers in Egypt and using backchannel messages to Nixon. Because Sadat saw no movement towards peace talks, he launched the 1973 war with Israel in order to break the status quo. Thus, it was not simply Sadat coming to power that changed things; rather, there was a gradual change over a few years. Sadat’s constant signaling, and his willingness to travel to Tel Aviv, made him able to change the course of Egyptian-Israeli relations.

Global context. This was a period of détente between the US and Soviet Union. It looked as if the US and Soviet Union could resolve some of their issues. This was no longer an international environment in which one superpower or the other was giving unconditional support to countries such as Israel and Egypt. Quandt sees a parallel to the present day global context, in which the US and Russia were able to work together in order to come to a chemical weapons deal with Syria.

Role of the mediator. Sadat asked the US to be the mediator between Egypt and Israel in the peace negotiations. Israel could explain to its public that the US pressured it into signing a peace treaty.  The US could guarantee Egypt that Israel would return land in exchange for peace. President Carter was important to the ultimate success of the Camp David Accords.  As mediator, he invited Sadat and Begin to Camp David for the summit. When the meeting started poorly, he presented the US plan for peace between the two countries and discussed it separately with both parties. The US maintained control of the drafting process. Carter’s personal relationship with Sadat was important in convincing Sadat to carry on with the negotiations.

Clear and mutual understanding of the end game. Israel and Egypt understood what they wanted and what the other country wanted. Israel wanted peace and was willing to return Sinai to Egypt for a guarantee of that peace.

Ultimately, Sadat got peace with Israel, the Sinai Peninsula back and a relationship with US. Begin was able to achieve peace with Egypt without making concessions on the Palestinian issue. The US gained strategic position in the region.

Quandt does not see these same factors present in the current Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. In order for these talks to be more serious, Secretary Kerry needs to do more of the “heavy lifting.”  There is also currently no common point between the Israelis and Palestinians.  That needs to be established in order to have a starting point for negotiations.