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The Syrian Coalition speaks

University of Arkansas Professor Najib Ghadbian, the Syrian Opposition Coalition representative to the United States, stopped by SAIS today for an all too rare public presentation, followed by Q and A.  I moderated, though I confess both speaker and audience distinguished themselves in moderation.  Revolutionaries should always be so reasonable.  The event should be up on C-Span soon.

Najib outlined the main problems the Coalition faces in its effort to create an inclusive, secular and free democracy:

1. The humanitarian catastrophe:  2.5 million Syrians are refugees, 5 million are internally displaced.  Opposition funding has gone predominantly to meet their needs.  Access is a major issue, as liberated areas are under frequent attack.  But the Coalition’s Assistance Coordination Unit is now functioning well after some initial difficulties.
2. Radicalization:  Regime killing and weak support from outside Syria for moderates has strengthened extremists, who have proven effective on the battlefield.  Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the former more Syrian and the latter more closely affiliated with Al Qaeda, are big and growing problems.  ISIS in particular is responsible for mass atrocities attributed to the opposition.
3. Governance:  In liberated areas, local revolutionary councils are trying to fill the vacuum left by withdrawal of state institutions, some more successfully than others.  The Coalition is expected to form and approve an interim government at its next meeting in Istanbul in early November.  This will be a technocratic stopgap until the transitional government called for in the June 2012 Geneva communique is formed.
4. Ending the conflict:  The Coalition favors a political end to the conflict, but it must be one that leads to a democratic outcome.  This is not possible with Bashar al Asad still in the presidency.  The idea of his conducting elections next year is completely unacceptable.  In order to go to a Geneva 2 conference next month or whenever it is scheduled, the Coalition will need the support not only of the US but also Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  The Coalition will also want to see the withdrawal of Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, both of which are fighting inside Syria.

The Coalition needs to meet these challenges by providing humanitarian assistance, isolating and countering extremists, delivering government services and uniting to negotiate an end to the conflict.  It is unlikely any negotiation can be successful unless there is a change in the military situation on the ground.  The Coalition-linked Supreme Military Council needs increased resources, training and professionalization.  Funding to extremists should be blocked.  The Coalition will not try to expand in their direction.

Asked about protection for minorities, in particular Alawites, after Bashar al Asad is gone, Najib suggested that international peacekeepers or some form of elite units might be required.  In any event, it is clear that the Asad regime is not protecting Alawites so much as it is putting them at risk.  There are prominent Alawites within the opposition.  Security sector reform, including consolidation of Syria’s 16 existing security agencies into a single internal and a single external service, will be a priority.  The Day After report and ongoing project will be helpful, especially on security sector reform and rule of law.

Syria is not nearly as divided ethnically (or in sectarian terms) as Bosnia at the end of its war.  Most Kurds are with the opposition.  Administrative decentralization will be important in the post-Asad era, but federalization of the Iraqi variety is not in the cards because the Kurdish population is not as concentrated in one geographic area.

From the United States, the Coalition is looking for strong and more consistent support.  While the Coalition supports US/Russia agreement, Washington made a mistake to embark on dismantling the regime’s chemical weapons capability without also doing something about Asad’s ferocious use of the Syrian air force against liberated areas.  Conventional weapons have killed many more Syrians than chemical weapons.  The military training being conducted in Jordan for the opposition should not be secret.  It should be taken over by the Defense Department and enlarged to a much grander scale.  US leadership and coordination is needed to ensure that the disparate supporters of the Coalition are all working in the same direction, as recommended in the recent International Crisis Group report.

I spent a summer in Damascus not too many years ago studying Arabic.  The desire of ordinary Syrians, and even those close the regime, for freedom and democracy was palpable.  The people I talked with would be pleased to hear what the Coalition representative had to say.  But they would ask how much longer the killing will last.