The Balkans in the EU

I can’t claim to have read all the progress reports the European Commission has published on its Balkans aspirants for membership, but I’ve had a look and can’t help but express admiration and pleasure with the level of candor and detail Brussels has reached.

The overall picture is not a surprise.  At least for now,  Kosovo and Serbia are looking good.  The incentives–a Stabilization and Association Agreement for Pristina and opening of membership negotiations for Belgrade–are strong.  The April agreement between them seems to have set up a virtuous spiral.  There is no internal political incentive for them to satisfy each other–in fact the rhetoric on both sides can get pretty harsh–but both are anxious to prove themselves worthy of moving ahead to the next level in progress towards the EU no slower than the adversary.  Competition is a form of flattery neither would admit to, but both indulge in.

Montenegro likewise gets a pretty good grade, even if Brussels views it as sharing with Kosovo and Serbia a lack of capacity to implement all that is required in the acquis communitaire, especially in the rule of law department.  This reflects not only the situation on the ground in the Balkans, but also EU priorities in the aftermath of the admission of Romania and Bulgaria.  Not to mention the general reluctance to open the EU membership door anytime soon, except possibly to Iceland (which however is now hesitating to knock).

The Commission’s unhappy noises concern mainly Bosnia_and_Herzegovina, where only a vicious spiral is evident:

The political representatives do not share a vision on the overall direction and future of the country or on how it should function. There is no thorough internal political dialogue on fundamental issues such as the EU integration process nor any priority-setting related to it.  The EU agenda has not been a priority for the political representatives of the country resulting in no progress in its European perspective.  Short-term party or ethnic interests have been prevailing over a future-oriented policy of anchoring Bosnia and Herzegovina in the EU. The political deadlock in the Federation, which has been ongoing for more than one year, has a negative impact on the governance both in the Federation and at the State level.  There is continued questioning by certain political players of the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single State.

This catalog of woes makes Brussels doubt that further pre-accession assistance will yield positive results, so the Commission is cutting back on funding and postponing negotiation of a new assistance, if I understand its bureaucratese correctly.

That’s refreshing, as is the Commission’s emphasis on a coordination mechanism that will enable Bosnia to speak with one voice in dealing with the EU.  It makes no sense for the EU to want accession more than the Bosnians want it, and it is downright dangerous for Brussels to deal on accession issues with parts of Bosnia rather than the whole.

A tougher stance on offering carrots, and using sticks, is precisely what is needed.  This will likely put Bosnia at the end of the Balkans queue for EU membership, but that is where it belongs if it isn’t willing to make relatively easy adjustments like enabling all of its citizens to run for president, regardless of which ethnicity they supposedly belong to.

Sadly, Bosnia may have some competition for last place from Macedonia, but not on the merits.  A candidate for membership since 2005, Skopje has made good progress in aligning its legislation and public administration with the EU.  It is laggard in the regatta for membership because the European Council has been unable to reach consensus on opening accession negotiations despite the positive recommendation of the Commission, starting in 2009.

The problem is its name.  Greece objects, claiming that Macedonia belongs exclusively to Greece.  I won’t regurgitate the arguments on both sides of this issue, as it is well known that I believe people should call themselves whatever they want.  Estados Unidos de México and the state of New Mexico, for example.  But not everyone agrees.  Here is the current Prime Minister of Greece, as Culture Minister in 2009, claiming that Macedonia has territorial designs on Greece even while foreseeing with pleasure disintegration of his neighbor in favor of Greater Albania and denying the existence of Albanians (Chams) in Greece:

Hard to beat this for Balkans thinking about identity and statehood, and it is already inside the EU!