peacefare.net

Twisting arms won’t work

My friends at Etilaf, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, have specified their conditions for going to Geneva 2, the UN/Arab League-sponsored followup of a June 2012 US/Russian agreement on the future course in Syria.  Here is the 11-point bill of particulars:

1. Releasing prisoners.
2. Lifting the siege from besieged areas and allowing the entry of relief items.
3. Halting all use of ballistic missiles, cluster bombs, and fighter jets on civilian areas.
4. The exit of Hezbollah’s forces and Iranian Revolutionary Guard troops from Syria.
5. Renewing Syrian passports outside Syria without conditions.
6. A public announcement from Assad about his commitment to the implementation of the Geneva 1 provisions.
7. A declaration by the regime to accept a transition of power to an interim government body with executive powers, including presidential powers, written in the constitution including the legislative and executive branches.
8. All sides agree that the transitional government body is the only source of legitimate laws in Syria and any future elections should be organized by the transitional government body.
9. Any agreement must be enforceable with a guarantee from the Security Council  and with a decision facilitated under Chapter VII.
10. There must be a specific time frame for the political transition process.
11. Officials and those responsible for war crimes against humanity should be removed from power and held accountable.

Note they are not asking for a ceasefire, which would have to be mutual.  That is still a formidable shopping list, but my guess is it should be understood mainly as a list of negotiating objectives rather than preconditions.

The real preconditions are 7 and 8 (which are restatements in more explicit terms of 6), concerning the transition to a transitional government body with full executive powers, including the authority to organize elections.  They amount to a decision by Bashar al Asad to step aside and surrender power to others, to be chosen by the regime and the opposition (each with a veto).

It seems highly unlikely that these two conditions will be met any time soon.

The opposition is weak and fractured, with increasing tension and violence between Islamists and non-Islamists.  A good slice of the armed groups appear to have left the umbrella of the Supreme Military Council, which is the military affiliate of Etilaf, in favor of affiliating with groups that Washington considers extremist.  Governance in liberated areas is in tatters, due in large part to frequent regime attacks.  Health risks are emerging, including supposedly polio.  The citizenry isn’t going to like that.

For the moment, Bashar hardly seems in danger.  That could change at any moment if the opposition were to get lucky, but for the moment Bashar is feeling strong.  Denying the rumor that a date (November 23-24) has been set for Geneva 2, he told an interviewer in recent days, when asked about the scheduled 2014 election:

Personally, I don’t see any obstacles to being nominated to run in the next presidential elections.

But of course he is presuming that he, not some transitional government, would preside over organization of those elections.

Only the kind of forceful Russian intervention that made Bashar accept the removal of his chemical weapons would have any chance at all of getting him to accept 6 and 7.   Moscow succeeded in that case largely because the chemical weapons agreement helped Bashar to stay in power.  It isn’t going to be possible to convince him that stepping aside is a way to do anything but save his skin, which for the moment isn’t much at risk.

So it looks as if we are headed for more fighting in Syria while President Obama continues his hands off attitude towards everything but chemical weapons and humanitarian relief.  That in my view does not exhaust American interests in Syria.  Islamist extremists and breakup of the state could threaten the entire region and eventually also the US, including its interest in maintaining stable oil markets if Iraq is affected.  But our president, for whom I campaigned, seems determined not to get involved.

I imagine this means that he will twist Etilaf‘s arm hard to get them to Geneva 2.  But he can’t twist too hard, since the Syrian National Council, which represents a big slice of Etilaf, could fall of the wagon.  Nor will it do much good to get Etilaf political leaders to Geneva 2 if there are no followers, including a good slice of the armed opposition.  Twisting an arm won’t work if there is a risk it might fall off.