Untying the Turkish knot

Mort Abramowitz and Eric Edelman published this week a super Bipartisan Policy Center report “From Rhetoric to Reality:  Reframing US Turkey Policy.”  Mort was US ambassador in Ankara 1989-91 and Eric 2003-5.  It doesn’t get much more knowledgeable when it comes to US policy on Turkey than these two.  Caveat emptor: Eric is a valued colleague at SAIS (his office is next door to mine) and Mort is a treasured regular lunch partner and occasional co-author.

They argue for something few sitting ambassadors would be keen on, though it seems likely that the current ambassador was at least forewarned if not approving.  They want to shift from rhetoric about shared objectives in the Middle East to frank talk (with an Ankara already resenting US policy on Syria, Iran, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and other issues) about Turkey’s domestic situation.

The aim is to keep Turkey moving in a democratic direction, restore its economic vitality, and encourage it to play a leadership role in the region consistent with US policy.  As diplomatic propositions go, this is pretty daring:

Practically, this means that Washington should be more open with Ankara about its concerns about issues like press freedom, freedom of assembly, rule of law, and the Turkish government’s increasing sectarianism.

Edelman and Abramowitz view such frank assessments as likely to produce good results and cite chapter and verse of Israel-related occasions on which American bluntness was productive.

The agenda they propose for Washington is an ample one:

1. Democratization
2. Stand up for civil and economic freedoms
3. Engage civil society
4. Encourage Turkey’s EU membership
5. Include Turkey in transatlantic free trade
6. Help Turkey with Syrian refugees
7. Set more realistic expectations for Turkish help, especially on Syria, Iraq, Israel and Iran
8. Encourage support for moderates in Syria
9. Cooperate on Iraq
10. Complete reconciliation with Israel
11. Engage Turkey on Iran
12. Reopen dialogue on Cyprus

This is hefty, though a good deal of it is already on the bilateral docket. To one degree or another, the US is pursuing 4-12, with the possible exception of 5 (since the EU may not be interested in giving Turkey a role in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership).  Washington has traditionally supported Turkey’s EU membership, we assisted Syrian refugees (but can and should do more, including the suggestion that we take more into the US), and no one would argue for unrealistic expectations on regional issues.  I can’t imagine we haven’t made it eminently clear we want Turkish support for the Syrian revolution limited to moderates, and we have cooperated a great deal with Ankara on Iraq.  Washington is wary of Turkey getting involved in the Iranian nuclear issue but has long advocated returning to dialogue on Cyprus, even if it has not renewed the special envoy for the subject (who hasn’t helped much in the past).

The real qualitative difference Abramowitz and Edelman are advocating is the inclusion of those three upfront items concerning Turkish internal affairs. There is no doubt  but that return of Turkey to internal stability and economic growth would be in the US interest, as they suggest.  A thriving, democratic and peaceful Turkey–as the standard State Department lingo likely says–is just what the region needs.  It happens to be what most Turks would like too.

The question is whether Prime Minister Erdogan is ready to hear what Edelman and Abramowitz want Washington to say.  They note in detail his authoritarian and sectarian shift.  The Gezi park protests and inept government reaction may have dashed his hopes of changing the constitution to strengthen the presidency, but he shows no sign of fading from power.  What would make a leader who faces serious domestic challenges but has enough support to stay in power indefinitely, one way or another, listen to advice from a putative ally that has been less than fully supportive on a wide range of issues Ankara regards as vital?  The Israel precedents they cite may not apply to domestic affairs, where Erdogan no doubt feels he knows better than the Americans how to handle things.

Don’t get me wrong:  I am not against trying this more “realistic” approach, which happens to have a good dose of idealism at its base.  I’d just like those knowledgeable about Turkey to tell me how Erdogan is likely to react and hear the effort cast in a way most likely to succeed.  I suppose Mort and Eric would say that is Ambassador Frank Ricciardone’s knot to untie.

A video is available of Eric and Mort presenting the report.  They argue there that the high level (president to prime minister) at which the bilateral relationship has been conducted is a hindrance, not a help.   They want to see a deeper, more institutionalized relationship between the two governments, which they think would encourage candor.

When moderator Guy Raz asks, neither author seems overly anxious to own the recommendation that Washington focus more on Turkish domestic issues.  Mort argues that it is important because domestic politics will condition Turkey’s foreign policy.  He adds that an effort to pursue domestic issues should be pursued “very carefully.”  Eric concurs, saying we won’t be able to avoid it.