Month: October 2013
Spot on
This Macedonian “spot” won a prize in June at Cannes:
Its supporters are trying to gain recognition of October 18 as a national prayer day. I’m glad to add my voice to theirs.
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Trouble in the heart of Africa
Former student Matthias-Sönke Witt (@msbcw) offers a second post from his perch in Ituri:
The crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) has garnered increased media attention recently, following the adoption of a resolution by the UN Security Council and a widely quoted press statement this week by Doctors Without Borders (MSF). While the latter rightly directed attention to the unfolding humanitarian disaster in the country, caused by massive internal displacement, growing food insecurity, and the collapse of the already weak health care system, the former naturally focused on political and security aspects of the crisis. The UN resolution calls for extensive disarmament efforts, the preparation of new elections according to a roadmap decided upon during April peace talks, the promotion and protection of human rights, and security sector reform. Those are some ambitious demands, given the reality on the ground.
The situation is dire: since a coalition of multiple rebel groups threw out President François Bozizé in March 2013, the already weak state authority throughout the country has collapsed entirely. The rebel alliance, called “Seleka” after the Sango word for “union,” was a coalition of necessity, united in their goal of ousting Bozizé and taking over Bangui, the country’s capital.
Their military leader, an old foe of Bozizé’s named Michel Djotodia, was quickly recognized as the transitional head of state at a regional summit in neighboring Chad, but lost control and influence over most Seleka-affiliated groups as soon as he took up his governing duties. He is now the de jure leader of a state whose security apparatus has all but disappeared, resulting in widespread looting, extrajudicial killings, and a rapid rise in violence throughout the country.
Massive displacement, a consequence of escalating violence, has left fields unattended and food supply short. Aid agencies estimate the total number of internally displaced people s at over 300,000 – an overwhelming number, considering the country’s total population of approximately 4.5 million. Hospitals and health centers have been abandoned or destroyed.
An African Union peacekeeping mission, known as MICOPAX, has been expanded to over 1000 troops in recent months. It is difficult to see how this force can bring stability to the country, as it has been present since 2008 and failed to stand in the way of the most recent rebellion. It will most likely take decisive action from international actors in addition to the African Union if the downward spiral towards complete state failure is to be stopped anytime soon.
French President Hollande has been banging the drums for more international support to stabilize the country, warning of potential regional spillover should its plunge into anarchy not be averted any time soon. He has also announced an increase in the number of French troops, who presently have only a small contingent stationed in Bangui, securing the international airport and a few neighborhoods deemed essential to French interests in the country.
Hollande’s concerns are clear to regional observers. The Central African Republic has been linked to regional conflict throughout its troubled post-colonial past.
Former Congolese rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba is currently on trial at the International Criminal Court in The Hague for atrocities his troops committed in Centrafrique in 2002, when now-ousted François Bozizé tried to take power through a military coup for the first time. Rebel groups supported by Chad and Sudan have fought proxy wars on CAR territory during the height of the Darfur conflict not too long ago. Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has sought refuge in the southern CAR and northern Democratic Republic of the Congo since being ousted from northern Uganda. While US-trained Ugandan and Congolese troops are still actively uprooting LRA camps in the area, the current state of chaos and confusion in Centrafrique could help this dwindling rebel movement regain strength and momentum on CAR soil.
In addition, the stretch of Centrafrique bordering South Sudan and the DRC has seen regional tensions between migrating pastoralists and local communities even before the current escalation of violence. The increased presence of armed groups in the region could serve to further escalate an existing problem.
What Hollande is probably most afraid of, however, is the possibility of an anarchic safe-haven for terrorist rebel groups from West Africa and the Sahel region, a concern echoed by researchers from the International Crisis Group, who fear that Centrafrique might become a training ground for Nigerian Boko Haram.
While regional spillovers have not yet materialized, Hollande’s warning reflects France’s growing uneasiness over developments in central Africa as a whole. Whether his request for international support will be honored remains to be seen, but it is in nobody’s interest to see the CAR spiral further out of control than it already has. Neighboring countries as well as the African Union lack the necessary resources and political will, respectively. Long-term international commitment from beyond Africa to security sector reform and disarmament is needed sooner rather than later if total state failure is to be avoided.
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Smoke signals don’t count, guarantees do
The smoke signals from two days of P5 + 1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) talks with Iran are good: the Iranians proposed a solution to a crisis they claim is unnecessary, they met bilaterally with the Americans, they signed on to an optimistic statement with European Union High Representative Ashton, and new talks will convene in Geneva on November 7 and 8. The Iranians may even have given an interview to an Israeli radio station. This kind of open, cooperative and positive atmosphere marks a sharp improvement from the past.
But we need to be hardnosed. The Iranians are increasing their capacity to produce fissionable (bomb) materials rapidly, both by enriching uranium and by soon making plutonium. There is no reason to believe that they will back off recognition of what they term their “right” to enrich (and I imagine to reprocess). They are much closer to a nuclear weapons capability today than ever before.
The Americans meanwhile are under pressure not to allow in a negotiated settlement any enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of plutonium in Iran. That is almost surely not achievable. But lifting of sanctions in the U.S. Congress will require an airtight agreement that verifiably and irreversibly ensures Iran is not diverting nuclear material to a weapons project.
Common ground lies somewhere in the area of enrichment up to 5% inside Iran with shipment of higher enriched materials and plutonium out of Iran and tight, frequent and unannounced inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This would be significantly tighter than the arrangements Brazil, Argentina and many other potential proliferators have made with each other and the international community.
The military option, whether Israeli or American, is not attractive. It might set back the Iranian nuclear program by as much as five years, but Tehran would surely abandon its denials and redouble its efforts, precipitating a rush to nuclear weapons by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others. Repetition of military attacks with unintended and unpredictable consequences would be required at more and more frequent intervals. This is not a formula for a peaceful world.
Nor is containment of a nuclear Iran a good alternative. It would put nuclear war on a hair trigger: Israel would need to lanuch on warning against all of Iran’s nuclear assets if it wanted to survive, which it surely does. To imagine that Jerusalem and Tehran could reach the kind of modus vivendi that prevailed between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War is delusionary.
So we are on a good path, or at least a better one than the alternatives, but one that will not be easy to complete. The same split Congress that brought us budget crises will not roll over and play dead when President Obama brings it a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear threat. It will demand, as it should, ironclad guarantees that we haven’t been rolled and will not be tricked. But if the guarantees are good, the deal is one they should take. Smoke signals don’t count, but guarantees do.
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Syrian opposition and ending the conflict
The Conflict Management Program and the Center for Transatlantic Relations
at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University
cordially invite you to a presentation followed by Q and A with
Dr. Najib Ghadbian
Special Representative to the United States for the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces
“Syria’s Moderate Opposition: Challenges to Ending the Conflict“
Daniel Serwer,Moderator
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations,
and
Senior Research Professor of Conflict Management
Friday, October 18, 2013
11 am – 12:30 pm
Kenney Auditorium
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Please RSVP to itlong@jhu.edu
Dr. Najib Ghadbian is a Syrian pro-democracy activist and academic. He served on the Board of the Day After Project, a cooperative movement by members of the Syrian opposition to outline a plan to rebuild the country and end the Syrian conflict once Bashar al-Assad is ousted from power. An Associate Professor of Political Science and Middle East Studies at the University of Arkansas, he is the author of Democratization and the Islamists Challenge in the Arab World (English 1997 & Arabic 2002). His second Arabic book, The Second Assad Regime: Bashar of Lost Opportunities was published in 2006. He has contributed political commentaries to several US, European, and Middle East media outlets. Dr. Ghadbian’s research interests include democratization and leadership in the Arab world, Syrian politics, and US-Mideast relations. He serves as a Board member of the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies, and is a founding member of the Democratic Network in the Arab World. Dr. Ghadbian is a signatory to the Damascus Declaration (2005), and was a founding member of the Syrian National Council (SNC).
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Berlin in the Balkans
I’ve been distracted from the Balkans for more than a week, while traveling in France and New York. I was also distracted for a week before that by events in Syria. What do I find as I turn back to my favorite trouble spot?
Precious little real trouble. President Nikolic is congratulating himself on Serbia’s courageous leadership, while receiving plaudits from the American Ambassador. The Serbian Orthodox Church and other stalwarts of the Kosovo saga are urging Serbs to vote in the upcoming local elections. Serbia is expecting to start EU accession negotiations early next year.
It’s not that there is no trouble at all. There was the murder of an EU official last month, still unsolved to my knowledge. There was the bombing today of a moderate Serb politician’s apartment in North Mitrovica. Prime Minister Dacic still thinks it unreasonable for a Serbian citizen to say he might like the same treatment Serbs are getting Kosovo.
But the needle has moved. It now points clearly towards Serbia’s future EU prospects and away from its historical claims. I don’t expect Belgrade to forget about the Serbs in Kosovo, or its strong cultural and religious ties to its former province, but it clearly no longer wants to be held hostage by them. That, in my book, is progress.
I wish I could say as much for the other remaining legacy issues in the Balkans. Athens and Skopje still seem far from resolution of the “name” issue, which prevents Macedonia from joining NATO or getting a date to start EU accession talks. This is one of those disputes that revolve around issues that look pretty small to those not involved but in fact arouse passions because they challenge identities. I’d like to see Macedonia enter NATO as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as provided by the interim accord, but that won’t suffice for European Union membership.
Bosnia is the real nub. Its first census since before the war (1991), which is supposed to end today, has seemed at times to threaten stability, and some recounting will be needed, but it is also an opportunity for Bosnians to define who they think they are. The campaigns urging people to put themselves in this or that category carry much more political weight in Bosnia than they do in many other countries. If the “other” category were to reach its advocates’ fondest dreams and beat out the least numerous of the “constituent peoples” (presumably the Croats) that could have profound political implications. By the same token, if more than 50% of the country identifies as Bosniak, that too could have a big impact. Even small adjustments from the pre-war distribution may be viewed as redefining the basis for Bosnia’s polity.
I continue to think that only a decisive European intervention, fully backed by the Americans, will resolve the Macedonia’s name problem and Bosnia’s identity problem. I wish it weren’t thus. Skopje and Athens should be able to recognize the greater good in coming to terms on an issue that is holding up Macedonia’s Euroatlantic integration and threatening to destabilize its interethnic relations, as the Albanians care a good deal less about the name issue than do Macedonians.
Likewise Bosnia should be able to resolve its own problems, if only to because there is no longer serious will or means to fight it out. But the international community is partly responsible for the mess, as it pressed the Dayton solution and made it hard to change. A bit of tough love from Germany would make a big difference in Bosnia, especially if coordinated closely with the Croatians and the Americans. Wishy washy coaxing from the EU bureaucracy is all too clearly not going to be sufficient.
The world has much bigger problems than the Balkans these days. Germany, while burdened with Europe’s financial crisis, is not playing much of a role outside the EU, unless you count its formidable exports. Chancellor Merkel worked her magic in Kosovo and Serbia, where the progress is very largely due to her vigorous intervention against the “parallel structures” in North Mitrovica. More Berlin leadership in the Balkans is not too much to ask.
PS: I wish I’d known about Bosnia’s qualification for the World Cup when I wrote this piece. Here’s Sarajevo in celebration (no it was nothing like this during the war), courtesy of @TransferSources:
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Splitting the difference
The Obama Administration this week moved to delay delivery to Egypt of more major weapons systems, in order to encourage its military-backed government to move towards more inclusive democracy. The State Department’s explanation is a model of clarity and sobriety:
The United States will work with the interim Egyptian government and Congress to continue to provide support that directly benefits the Egyptian people in areas like health, education, and private sector development. We will continue assistance to help secure Egypt’s borders, counter terrorism and proliferation, and ensure security in the Sinai. We will continue to provide parts for U.S.-origin military equipment as well as military training and education. We will, however, continue to hold the delivery of certain large-scale military systems and cash assistance to the government pending credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian government through free and fair elections.
I love the way even changes in policy are presented as continuing what was already happening.
The amount of money involved–more than $260 million–is not small, but it is still only a fraction of the approximately $1.1 billion the US provides yearly. Security assistance required to counter terrorism, maintain border security, pursue non-proliferation and sustain the peace treaty with Israel is excluded from the cut. A lot of what is affected are Apache helicopters, Abrams tanks and F16s that Egypt already possesses in excess and has no real need of right now.
So this is not a decision to reorder priorities in US assistance to Egypt, as some have urged. Nor is it business as usual, upsetting those who see Egypt’s military-backed takeover and repression of the Muslim Brotherhood as popular, necessary and desirable. The Administration is trying to send a pro-democracy signal even as it maintains the priority given to American security needs. Above all, it wouldn’t want to do anything that undermines the Israel/Egypt peace treaty.
This splitting the difference is unlikely to have much immediate impact. The Egyptian military doesn’t really need the big ticket items that are to be postponed and Gulf financial contributions will presumably replace the budgetary support being withdrawn, even if they can’t replace the hardware. For the moment, the Egyptian powers that be are far more concerned to wrap up their struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood than to put a few more tanks in their storage depots or in any way disrupt the peace with Israel. They are determined to put the Muslim Brotherhood out of business. The full panoply of courts, police, army, security services and media is seeking more radical repression of the Brotherhood than under Mubarak, when it was illegal but tolerated to a degree.
The repression isn’t likely to eradicate the Brotherhood, which has deep social roots and decades of successful organizational resistance. But it could turn at least part of the organization into a more radical, and violent, path. Some fear an Algeria-type internal war against the Islamists, which would be a truly bad outcome.
Military repression is also directed at non-Islamists, in particular the secular liberals who have objected to the crackdown on the Brotherhood on human rights grounds. They are more vulnerable, as they lack both deep roots and organizational capacity. They merit strong American support, but Washington’s continuing emphasis on security is not likely to leave much room for it. I like to think the yearning for freedom that flowered in 2011 and 2012 can’t be entirely repressed, but it is certainly again becoming dangerous to say things like that in Egypt. The hope that some see at the grassroots might get trampled.
The real impact of the aid suspension is likely to come months and even years down the pike, when the Egyptians come looking for the money and the Americans tell them what conditions they need to meet in order to get it back. That’s assuming of course that the Americans will be interested in anteing up again, something that likely depends more on the needs of the American companies involved than on Egyptian military requirements.
Splitting the difference may be all Washington feels it can do at the moment, but it isn’t much and isn’t going to have much impact.
PS: Former student Tarek Radwan does a fine job on the issues in this interview for Voice of America:
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