Month: October 2013

Peace picks, October 7-11

A wide array of interesting events this week (be aware of possible event cancellations due to the government shutdown):

1. A New Look at American Foreign Policy: The Third in a Series of Discussions

Monday October 7 | 12:00pm – 1:00pm

The Heritage Foundation, Lehrman Auditorium, 214 Massachusetts Avenue NW

REGISTER TO ATTEND

For decades, libertarians and conservatives have been at odds over American foreign policy. But perhaps a conversation is possible today between classical liberals and conservatives on the nature of American foreign policy. Some are trying to find a “middle way” that is less doctrinaire. At the same time the “neo” conservative phase of hyper military interventionism is a spent force in conservative circles. Therefore, the time may be ripe for an open and honest conversation among some libertarians and conservatives about the future of American foreign policy. It may be possible a new consensus could be found between Americans who consider themselves classical liberals and traditional conservatives on the purposes of American foreign policy.

Join us as Heritage continues the discussion regarding this question, what the dangers and opportunities are and whether they afford an opportunity to take a “new look” at American foreign policy.

For decades, libertarians and conservatives have been at odds over American foreign policy. But perhaps a conversation is possible today between classical liberals and conservatives on the nature of American foreign policy. Some are trying to find a “middle way” that is less doctrinaire. At the same time the “neo” conservative phase of hyper military interventionism is a spent force in conservative circles. Therefore, the time may be ripe for an open and honest conversation among some libertarians and conservatives about the future of American foreign policy. It may be possible a new consensus could be found between Americans who consider themselves classical liberals and traditional conservatives on the purposes of American foreign policy.

Join us as Heritage continues the discussion regarding this question, what the dangers and opportunities are and whether they afford an opportunity to take a “new look” at American foreign policy.

More About the Speakers

Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D.
Distinguished Fellow, The Heritage Foundation

Randy E. Barnett
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center

Marion Smith
Visiting Fellow, B. Kenneth Simon Center for Principles and Politics, The Heritage Foundation

Hosted By

Theodore R. Bromund, Ph.D.Theodore R. Bromund, Ph.D.Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American RelationsRead More

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Why Ken Pollack is wrong

Ken Pollack has written a highly readable but serious and in-depth book claiming that–contrary to US government policy, Congressional sentiment and popular preference–we can live with the “unthinkable”:  an Iranian nuclear bomb.  Containment, he claims, is not only possible but desirable when compared to war, which would have uncertain and unintended consequences.

He is wrong on two counts:  these are not the only options and containment is the least desirable of them.  Here’s why.

Ken looks at containment from the American perspective.  He worries about whether the Iranian regime is rational and produces ample evidence for Karim Sadjadpour’s judgment that it is homicidal but not suicidal. Deterrence then can work, with only some small and tolerable probability that it might fail, as during the Cold War.

He is lacking two vital perspectives:  Israeli and Iranian.

If Iran somehow gets nuclear weapons, Israel faces what it considers an existential threat.  What will it do in response to any indication that Tehran is preparing a nuclear attack?  Ken cites a Cold War example–the 1983 Able Archer incident–that brought the US and Soviet Union close to nuclear war when the Soviets misinterpreted an American exercise as preparation for a nuclear attack.  But the US and Soviet Union had good communications and significant transit time for their intercontinental ballistic missiles.  Launch on warning during the Cold War meant launch after the enemy’s launch but before the missiles struck their targets.

Israel, while it has a second strike capability aboard its submarines, cannot wait that long.  A second strike after your country has been obliterated is little satisfaction and even less deterrent.  Launch on warning for Israel will mean launch before Iran is able to launch.  The targeting would have to be comprehensive, against any installation from which Iran might retaliate.  With virtually zero communications between the two countries and a lot of mutual distrust, this makes a world in which Iran has nuclear weapons frighteningly close to Armageddon, for the region if not for the world.  Iran faces the risk of assured destruction at Israel’s initiative, with nothing mutual about it.

This is not however as apocalyptic as it sounds.  It gives Tehran, which has no second strike capability, a very good reason for stopping its nuclear program short of nuclear weapons and doing so in a way that is transparent, verifiable and irreversible.  Iranian President Rouhani has said clearly but generically that

Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran’s security and defense doctrine…

Why not?  I’d guess that this is because Iran will be less secure if it develops nuclear weapons, which could lead to an Israeli nuclear strike that would destroy not only the nuclear program but the entire country.

There is another reason for hope that diplomacy can stop Iran’s nuclear program short of making weapons.  Rouhani knows that sanctions relief, which he needs urgently to fulfill his electoral promises of improving Iran’s economy, will require US Congressional action.  The Congress will not lift sanctions unless it is certain that Iran cannot and will not develop nuclear weapons.  If Rouhani is serious about getting sanctions lifted, he must also understand what this entails for transparency, verifiability and irreversibility.

Of course there is a possibility that the Iranians aren’t serious at all but are just conducting a charm offensive to buy time while they proceed apace to develop nuclear weapons and even use them.  This  possibility argues for a deadline for nuclear negotiations with Iran.  The problem with a deadline is that it is a species of red line.  We would have to specify what comes if the deadline isn’t met.

I would suggest adding to Administration policy a soft deadline:  an expectation, publicly expressed, that we get a satisfactory agreement on Iran’s nuclear program within 2014.  What happens after that is all too clear from voting and discussions in the US Congress.  Restating it publicly only raises the ire and strength of anti-Rouhani forces in Iran.  The end of 2014 is about when Israeli patience is likely to run out anyway, raising the specter of a less than 100% effective conventional military attack that causes the Iranians to recommit and accelerate their effort to develop nuclear weapons.

But the key point is this:  if Iran gets nuclear weapons, the risk of a nuclear war in which it will suffer the worst consequences rises, not only because of Tehran’s decisions but because of Israel’s calculations.  It would be foolish to doubt Israel’s willingness to use nuclear weapons against a nuclear weapons state in order to ensure the Jewish state’s survival.  The Israelis are surely no less committed to survival than the Americans were when they faced the Soviets and were prepared to use nuclear weapons first.  It is still US policy to assure “no first use” only against non-nuclear states in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.  Once Iran has nuclear weapons, nuclear war can happen not only because of a real threat from Tehran but also from a misunderstanding (genuine or willful) in Washington or Jerusalem (Tel Aviv for those who prefer).

Containment is not a stable outcome, as it was in a situation where destruction was mutually assured.  For Tehran, it is perilous and to be avoided, preferably by diplomacy based on calculations of Iran’s real interests.  Israel will be justifiably hard to satisfy with a diplomatic outcome, but it would be far better and less precarious than containment.

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Timbuktu or bust

The Festival au Désert will return to Timbuktu January 9-11.  If you already have what I call Foreign Legionnaire’s disease, that will be enough to get you booking your ticket to Mali.  But if not, watch (and listen) to this:

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Russia redux, at Syrian expense

This morning’s breakfast discussion at the Atlantic Council of prospects for a political settlement in Syria focused mainly on whether the US/Russia agreement on chemical weapons could be expanded to broader issues, and on Russia’s role in both the political negotiations and in supporting the Asad regime.  With Atlantic Council Executive Vice President Damon Wilson moderating, former US Syria negotiator Fred Hof, former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson tried to find a way forward. 

Describing the situation on the ground as appalling, Hof suggested Syria is headed for state failure and terrorist safe haven.  While the regime is consolidating its position in the west, Kurds are dominating the north and east while the center and south are in chaos.  The regime war on civilian populations, attenuated in late August and early September after the chemical weapons incident, has resumed.  Islamist fighters and organizations are leaving the Coalition (Etilaf) in favor of joining the jihadists. Read more

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Diplomats v. intelligence analysts

It will take me more time and energy than I can spare from the Middle East these days to plow through all the 300 documents the Clinton library has decided to publish on “Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency.”  I gather that the spin that accompanies this material is how effective the CIA Balkans Task Force was.  I’m in no position to give an overall evaluation of that proposition, but let me take a hard look at its November 22, 1994 memo on the Bosnian Federation.

The gist of the memo is this: Read more

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Yes, Virginia, there is a Syrian opposition

A colleague writes in reaction to the news of Syrian rebel groups abandoning the exile Syrian Coalition in favor an alliance with Islamist extremists:

Can it get any worse for the opposition?  Can anyone provide a serious, authoritative read out on the opposition?  Is there any ‘there there’?

Authoritative, no, but I’ve met with quite a few Syrian opposition people over the past couple of years.  And I’ve supervised an effort to begin mapping Syrian civil society, which is varied, sincere and energetic if not robust.

There is a there there.  Secular Syrian civil activists started the rebellion against Bashar al Asad and they have continued it, even as violence engulfs them.  They have thought long and hard about the “day after.” They have examined options for governing Syria.  They have formed political parties, councils and coalitions.  They have lobbied for stronger US and other Western support.  They have formed a Supreme Military Council and a political Coalition. Read more

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