The quickest way out of the Balkans

It doesn’t rank high in the annals of Balkan history, but the apparent Greek suggestion that Macedonia be renamed “Slavo-Albanian Macedonia” is certainly one of the more offensive and revealing maneuvers of recent times.  Greeks know that Macedonians don’t like to be characterized as Slavs, even though their language is a Slavic one.  It’s a bit like the term “redskins”:  offensive despite the veneer of descriptiveness.

The proposal is also calculated to cause trouble between Macedonians and Albanians, the two most populous ethnic groups in the country.  Never mind the other minorities the country counts among its citizens, including Turks, Roma, Serbs and Vlachs.  They won’t be pleased either.  There is a reason the French call a fruit salad une macédoine.

The Greek suggestion is calculated to irritate Skopje, but it ought also to annoy the international community, which has been hoping for two decades that Macedonia and Greece would come to a compromise solution on the “name” issue.  Greece has simply confirmed what should have been obvious:  there will be no solution based on the free will of Athens and Skopje.  Greek Prime Minister Samaras has wanted the collapse of his northern neighbor.  Better to increase the chances of that than solve the problem.  Conversely, Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski sees no possibility of a negotiated solution better than the one he already has:  the entire world calls Macedonia Macedonia, except for Greece.  He is not blameless in the failure to reach a negotiated solution.

No one outside Greece (and Bulgaria, which is not above the occasional troublemaking with a neighbor whose territory it once would have claimed) would give a hoot about this problem, except that it keeps Macedonia out of NATO, where Greece blocks consensus, and it tends to increase frictions between the two largest ethnic groups in Macedonia.  The Albanians haven’t generally minded the country being called Macedonia, but they would be more inclined to compromise than the Macedonians.  They are also more concerned about NATO membership, which they regard as an important guarantee of their security.

The solution to this part of the problem is simple.  Skopje and Athens agreed in 1995 that the country could be called “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (aka The FYROM) for purposes of entry into international organizations.  That is its name in the UN, for example.  But Greece has violated this agreement and been found to have done so in binding ruling by the International Court of Justice.  There is no question about who is in the wrong here:  it is Athens.

All that is needed to fix the NATO problem is a serious commitment by the United States (or Germany) that The FYROM (along with Montenegro) should become members at the 2014 NATO summit in the United Kingdom.  That would only be fitting, as the Macedonian Army has fought in Afghanistan, from which NATO will be drawing down by the end of 2014, and has even guarded NATO headquarters there.  Athens may play hard ball with Skopje, but it won’t defy a clear, high-level decision from Washington or Berlin to get The FYROM into NATO in line with the Interim Accord, as the ICJ decision obligates Athens to do.

Such a signal would be an appropriate response to the provocation and Samaras’ long-standing effort to irritate the Macedonians and Albanians.  It might even provoke Athens to reach a negotiated settlement, which would be a good thing.

Samaras’ effort to destabilize the Balkans won’t likely succeed, but it could cause unnecessary trouble and expense.  The quickest route out of the Balkans for Washington is to get all the former Yugoslav republics into NATO, where Slovenia, Croatia and Albania are already making contributions.

As best I understand the situation, Montenegro and Macedonia have already met the membership requirements.  Kosovo, which is now planning for its future security forces, will want to get in as soon as possible.  Serbia is not quite ready to apply, but a birdie tells me it won’t be more than a couple of years before it breaks the taboo, especially if Kosovo makes any progress in that direction.  Bosnia will likely be laggard in pursuing NATO membership, as in so many other things.  Still, we could well see all of the Balkans in NATO before 2020.  That would be a very good outcome, a fitting end to the wars that started almost 30 years earlier.