TGBWFEABMC

That’s a “transitional governing body with full executive authority by mutual consent.”  It’s the codeword Washington says you have to give in order to get invited to Geneva 2, the UN-mediated conference at which the US hopes to arrange a political end to the Syrian conflict.  What it means is President Bashar al Asad has to step aside, if not down, and allow a transition to a democratic regime to begin.

He isn’t prepared to do that, and neither Iran nor Russia appears willing to make him do it.  I don’t doubt their capacity.  The alacrity with which Bashar agreed to the destruction of his chemical weapons capability showed Moscow’s clout.  Withdrawal of Tehran’s support would quickly put him at serious risk on the battlefield, as Iranian revolutionary guards and Hizbollah forces fighting in Syria are vital to the regime.  But why would Moscow or Tehran withdraw support?

The regime is doing reasonably well on the many military fronts.  It seems to have secured for now the vital axis from Damascus to the Mediterranean coast.  The opposition is in a shambles, not least because the Al-Qaeda linked Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is riding roughshod over more moderate forces in northern and eastern Syria.  The Americans are pleased that the Kurds have joined the Syrian Opposition Coalition (Etilaf), but seem to have forgotten how many times that has been announced in the past.

The chemical weapons agreement has helped the regime to shore up its hold on power.  Bashar is indispensable to its implementation.  He is trying to appear timely and reliable.  He may have squirreled away some chemical munitions, but whether true or not the rumor redounds to his advantage.  The internationals could spend months looking for them, needing his protection for their inspectors in the meanwhile.

This leaves Etilaf,  which will meet November 9 to consider its options, in a quandary.  It had outlined 11 conditions for going to Geneva 2.  The Americans are telling them it is down to one:  TGBWFEABMC.  That would be all right if it is real.  But it is hard to picture a regime that is winning militarily and still holds the support of its main international allies giving in.  There may be no way in which the regime can regain control over all of Syria, and John Kerry may be right when he insists there is no military solution.  But Bashar al Asad has made it clear he intends to remain in Damascus and do everything he can to stymie his opposition.

Continuation of the fighting will of course accelerate the radicalization of the opposition, whose main fighting units are increasingly under the command of Islamist extremists.  But if Etilaf agrees to go to Geneva 2, that might also strengthen the radicals, who are sworn enemies of the Coalition.  So we could get a UN-sponsored meeting based on a TGBWFEABMC that would not end the fighting but rather intensify it, giving Bashar all the excuse he needs not to implement the TGBWFEABMC.

I’m all for a negotiated end to this conflict.  I regard the opposition’s turn to violence in 2011 as the original sin, as their largely nonviolent uprising had much better chances of success.  But it is hard to see now how there can be a decent negotiated outcome without a shift in the military balance both between the regime and the opposition and within the opposition.

The Saudis and other Gulf states are rumbling that they will give arms to pretty much anyone who will do in Bashar.  That is likely to strengthen the extremists even more, reducing again the prospects for a negotiated outcome.  The Americans will try to rein in the Gulfies, but they haven’t succeeded at that in the past and are unlikely to find it easy now that relations with Washington have deteriorated.

The picture is gloomy.  I won’t even cite the latest statistics on deaths, wounded, displaced people, refugees, and people in need.  Bashar’s fight against his population can’t be won, but it can cause a colossal amount of damage to civilians, even more than we’ve seen so far.  We can still hope for TGBWFEABMC, but hope is not a policy.