The Syrian Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Etilaf) decided yesterday that it would go to a Geneva 2 diplomatic conference:
The G[eneral] A[ssembly] [of Etilaf] endorsed the Syrian Coalition’s readiness to participate in a Geneva conference based on the transfer of power to a transitional governing body (TGB). This body should include full executive powers including presidential powers with control over military and security apparatus. Furthermore, the Assad Regime and those associated with him will have no role in the transitional period and future Syria.
The Syrian Coalition stipulates that prior to the conference access for relief convoys, including the Red Cross and the Red Crescent IFRC and other international relief agencies, to all besieged areas must be ensured, and prisoners, especially women and children, must be released.
What this “based on” language does is to make Bashar al Asad’s removal from power not a precondition for talks as in the past but instead Etilaf‘s desired outcome in the future. Humanitarian access and release of prisoners are standard demands in situations such as this. Likely the Syrian regime will be prepared to offer half a loaf: a few humanitarian convoys and release of some women and children.
There really wasn’t much choice. Washington has been insisting that the Coalition agree to Geneva 2, posing the question as a choice between dealing either with Al Qaeda or with the regime. A refusal to go to Geneva 2 would have led to withdrawal of Western support. Perhaps even the Saudis were convinced to condition their assistance on a start to negotiations.
The truth is that the relatively moderate opposition will need to deal with both Al Qaeda and the regime, one way or the other.
Etilaf is not strong enough to do it with military force. Today’s news includes a regime offensive to retake Aleppo’s airport. Iranian and Russian military assistance to the regime is flowing unrestrained. Al Qaeda in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has become dominant in Raqqa, the one provincial capital in opposition hands and is strengthening across the north. The Supreme Military Council, the military affiliate of Etilaf and nominal coordinator of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) brigades, is less and less in evidence.
There is no sign it is strong enough to counter the regime and ISIS with politics either. Wisely, Etilaf is sending people into Syria to talk with opposition supporters in advance of Geneva 2. They will get an earful. Opposition activists are disappointed with Etilaf, which has been unable to deliver governance and services to liberated areas. Many people inside Syria lean more towards negotiating with the regime, as they hope it will end the military’s campaign against the population. But they have little trust in the mostly expatriate Etilaf to do it.
Etilaf, broadened with some representation of the FSA and opposition activists from inside Syria, may have no choice but to go to Geneva 2. But talks are unlikely to produce a political settlement any time soon. The regime sees no reason to allow itself to be decapitated. It will want Etilaf to agree to participate in the 2014 presidential elections, with Bashar al Asad as a candidate. Doing so would be fatal to the moderate opposition and leave Syria’s fate to a battle between extreme Islamists and the regime.
That is likely in any event. Power today in Syria grows from the barrel of a gun, supplemented by humanitarian assistance. Extremists are proving better at both than Etilaf, which has the additional disadvantage of fickle Western friends. As Syrians see it, the Americans not only backed off bombing of Syria’s chemical weapons facilities but are also now cozying up to Iran in an effort to reach a nuclear deal.
Whom would you back? You have a choice:
Geneva 2 is unlikely to produce a political settlement. But even if it does, the war will not end because the negotiators there won’t command the extremist fighters. Those who think things can’t get worse in Syria are in for a surprise.
Al Sharaa won't be able to decide, but his decisions will influence the outcome. Let's…
Transparently assembling all the material and technology needed for nuclear weapons might serve Iran well…
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria was swift. Now comes the hard part:…
Good luck and timing are important factors in diplomacy. It's possible Grenell will not fail…
There are big opportunities in Syria to make a better life for Syrians. Not to…
HTS-led forces have done a remarkable job in a short time. The risks of fragmentation…