Deal, or no deal?

The nuclear talks with Iran are officially with the P5+1 (that’s the US, UK, France, Russia and China).  But they are increasingly looking like a negotiation (at a distance) between Israel and Iran, with the P5+1 acting as mediators and looking for a mutually acceptable compromise.   What are the odds of finding one?  It depends on what we all call leverage.  That comes from being able to walk away, because you’ve got a “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA) that you prefer over the agreement on offer.

Iran’s BATNA is clear:  it can continue its nuclear program, which entails continuing also to endure increasingly tight sanctions as well as the risk an Israeli or American attack.  President Rouhani doesn’t like this option, because he has promised Iranians relief from sanctions, improved relations with the rest of the world, and an improved economy.  Iranians are not interested in going to war.  But Supreme Leader Khamenei can still veto any proposed agreement.  There is every reason to believe he would do so if somehow his negotiators dared to bring home an agreement that completely dismantled Iran’s nuclear program, blocking it from any future enrichment (or reprocessing).

That is what Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu wants:  a permanent prohibition on Iran’s ability to enrich or reprocess.  He distrusts Iran and fears another holocaust.  What is his leverage?  Israel’s BATNA is not so clear.  It can attack and seek to destroy as much of the Iranian nuclear program as possible.  But even in the best of all possible worlds the result would be a few years of delay and a redoubling of Iranian efforts to produce nuclear weapons.  The military effort would have to be repeated ad infinitum, with decreasing impact on Iran’s nuclear capabilities and horrendous consequences for Israeli, and American, relations with the Muslim world.

Netanyahu, though hawkish in word, has never taken Israel to war, much less to a perpetual one.  He would in any event need 100% American backing, as Israel depends heavily on Washington’s willingness to provide weapons, spare parts, and technology.  That isn’t likely to be forthcoming.

Israel’s BATNA might also include goading the Americans into attacking Iran.  That is the real purpose behind Netanyahu’s current effort to get new sanctions passed in the US Congress.  He knows doing that would scuttle the P5+1 negotiations, leaving President Obama with no way to fulfill his pledge that Iran will not be allowed to get nuclear weapons except for war.

The Iranians don’t want Netanyahu to succeed in getting President Obama to attack.  Tehran has already slowed its accumulation of 20% enriched uranium that can be readily enriched further.  It has also reached an agreement for inspections with the International Atomic Energy Agency.  Obama is apparently easing sanctions enforcement.

These presumably unilateral confidence-building measures are intended to improve the odds of reaching an agreement.  The Congress won’t pass new sanctions before the next P5+1 nuclear talks tomorrow.  If it does pass new sanctions, it might be convinced to delay their application for a few months, allowing time for negotiations to succeed.

That would be wise.  Many countries have given up nuclear weapons ambitions.  You can’t really use them and your rivals are likely to respond by getting their own.  Most people who know Saudi Arabia well think they would try if Iran succeeds.  Egypt and Turkey for different reasons are in no position to do so right away, but both might eventually want to match Iran.  Brazil and Argentina negotiated a mutual stand down from a nuclear race that threatened them both.  India and Pakistan are no better off than they would have been without nuclear weapons. South Africa is not regretting its decision to back off.

Those who do have nuclear weapons–I include Israel in that category–find their only real use is deterrence.  Iran would no doubt like them for that purpose, including deterrence of American efforts at regime change.  But getting nuclear weapons is wrecking Iran’s economy and increasing its risk of being attacked.  President Obama has publicly foresworn regime change.  The Iranians want a deal, albeit one that leaves them with enrichment and reprocessing technology.

Netanyahu may not like the idea of a nuclear deal that merely freezes the Iranian program, providing time for a more permanent solution.  He worries that no permanent solution will be forthcoming and the temporary deal will become the permanent one.  But he isn’t going to attack if Tehran reaches an agreement with the P5+1.

All around, a deal that really and verifiably freezes the Iranian program and keeps the main sanctions in place while allowing Iran some financial relief is better than no deal.

PS:  The Iranians put out this video of its Foreign Minister today.  They apparently think it will convince an English-speaking audience that they are reasonable.  It makes me wonder if they are serious about a nuclear agreement: