Month: November 2013
The real deal
While I’m posting intereviews, I’ll put this one up too. I did it for Marin Dushev, who writes for the Bulgarian weekly Capital, last week. But far better than reading me is reading Kurt Basseuner and Bodo Weber’s Not Yet a Done Deal: Kosovo and the Prishtina-Belgrade Agreement. They are right about many things, but most important of all that “normalization of relations” means mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors, which will have to occur before Serbia enters the European Union.
Q: Belgrade is considered to have been strongly interested in high turnout among Serbs in the North because of the expected beginning of negotiations with the EU in January. And it seems that the Serbian government was pretty active in persuading the local Serbs to vote. But still the turnout in the North seems to have been relatively low. How can we explain it? Did Belgrade use all its leverage in the North to convince or even pressure the people to vote or did they underestimate the strength of the opposition towards the agreement? Read more
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Bosnia in the slow lane
I did this interview earlier in the week for Bedrudin Brljavac of the Andalous Agency in Sarajevo. I gather it has caused a bit of a sensation in Bosnia, so I am publishing the English original here:
1. Recently some prominent Bosnian experts and scholars have argued that the US has started “process of distancing” from Bosnia since Bosnian politicians over the last years could not agree on a common future of the country. In your opinion, is the US distancing itself from Bosnia?
DPS: Yes. Washington regards Bosnia and Herzegovina as primarily the EU’s responsibility now. It also welcomes Turkish interest in Bosnia. The question of Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is still one Washington would get concerned about, if it were threatened.
2. If not, since Bosnian politicians over the last ten years or more could not agree on a common future of the country and necessary reforms regarding the country’s constitution. As some scholars argue, will now the US administration intervene in diplomatic sense and bring about changes in Bosnia’s constitution?
DPS: No. That’s up to the Bosnians now. The U.S. might try to help create favorable conditions for constitutional reform, but it won’t seek to impose changes.
3. Also, over the last two-three years some research and scholars as well stressed that there is a possibility of disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina due to years-long deadlock and ethnic tensions. Do you thing that such a state of affairs can happen in the future? Will the country move towards deeper integration or disintegration?
DPS: Washington won’t let Bosnia come apart. But deeper integration depends on the Bosnians themselves.
4. And would an international community allow disintegration of Bosnia since it would dramatically destabilize not only Bosnia but a whole region?
DPS: The international community would not allow disintegration.
5. Although Bosnian politicians are to a large extent responsible for the deadlock and political problems in the country still it is for sure that an international community is responsible as well. In your opinion, to what extent is international community, especially the US and EU, is guilty for the Bosnian political fatigue?
DPS: The international community gave Bosnia the Dayton constitution, which is certainly part of the problem. But that doesn’t mean we have to solve the problem, or even could if we wanted to. Americans certainly feel that they’ve given Bosnia its share of their time and attention. Today they have many more pressing problems.
That said, I think Washington, Berlin and Zagreb could together do a great deal of create conditions in which the Bosnians would be able to solve their problems. The EU accession process will play an important role in giving Bosnians the right incentives.
6. Since almost all the countries from the Western Balkans move forward on their path to the EU is it possible that Bosnia will in some foreseeable future stay isolated and on the margins of the EU?
DPS: Yes. There are no free passes to the EU. Bosnia will have to meet the membership criteria in order to get in. It is already far behind its neighbors in the regatta. Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia all have prospects to enter the EU before Bosnia. Even Kosovo might. If Bosnians are uncomfortable with that idea, they need to elect governments that will accelerate their own preparations for the EU.
7. In the aftermath of elections held in Kosovo, do you think that holding an elections was one new strategic step from Pristina on its path to genuine independence at a global arena?
DPS: Yes, the elections were an important step. But they do not complete the process. There is still a good deal of progress to be made in implementing the Belgrade/Pristina agreements and in normalizing their relations. That will require diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadors, which I hope will happen much sooner than most people think. It is really meaningless for Belgrade to continue to refuse recognition when it has accepted Kosovo’s constitutional framework as the foundation for law and law enforcement in the entire territory.
8. After years of international intervention in the Balkans now its seems like war and ethnic conflicts are behind us. Still, ethnic polarisation is widespread in many countries and inter-ethnic reconciliation and dialogue are rare occurences. Do you think that wars and conflicts can happen in the Balkans in the years ahead?
DPS: I don’t think anyone has either the capability or the desire to created the kind of mess the Balkans saw in the 1990s. Many countries have ethnic polarization and tension, including the US. Democracies learn to deal with these problems in the political arena. War does not work well as a solution.
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The Gulf still wants a hug
Even though John Kerry made his pilgrimage to Riyadh and the United Arab Emirates last week, the Gulf is still complaining. Israel gets more face time. Gulf complaints go unheard. The US isn’t sufficiently committed and steadfast. Abdullah al Shayji gripes:
The overture with Iran seems to be heading towards relaxing the crippling sanctions regime, which could embolden a beleaguered Iran. Moreover, the US is also making overtures to the sectarian government in Iraq as Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki was well received in the White House.
This is pretty rich. Easing of sanctions would only happen if Iran freezes its nuclear program. Would the Gulf really prefer war? Or containment of a nuclear Iran? Maliki may be sectarian, but the Gulf monarchies are not? He was so well received in the White House that many here thought he went home chastened and empty handed.
But those are not the real issues. As Professor Shayji puts it:
What worries the GCC states regarding the US Middle East policy is not only over Iran’s nuclear programme, but US lack of concern for GCC’s interests by limiting negotiations over the nuclear issue and not factoring in Iran’s meddling in the GCC affairs. The haste with which US tries to allay the Israelis fears and not the GCC’s is also disconcerting.
This too is pretty rich. Even if I think Prime Minister Netanyahu is way off base in demanding that Iran give up all enrichment, I’d have to regard Israeli fears as more profound and existential than the GCC’s. And anyone in the Gulf who hasn’t understood that Israeli security is first among Middle East issues when it comes to American diplomatic priorities must have slept through the last sixty-five years.
The GCC is right however to be concerned with Iran’s meddling. The US will have to deal with that as well as a host of other issues: support for terrorism in general and Hizbollah in particular, military engagement in Syria, and domestic human rights violations just to name a few. But the nuclear issue comes first because it is the one most threatening to US national security. I’d have expected the Gulf to agree with that priority, not join forces with Netanyahu in resisting any sort of nuclear agreement.
It is striking how comfortable the GCC has gotten with the umbrella of American hegemony. The US has sidelined Iran, the Arab Gulf’s historical antagonist, for decades. President Bush, not the current administration, gave Iran its biggest diplomatic break of modern times with the invasion of Iraq. President Obama has ratcheted up the sanctions in a way that the Gulf should appreciate.
But Iranian isolation is not the natural state of affairs, and it is not one that will persist forever. The Gulf needs to be thinking hard about how it will deal with Iran once it emerges from sanctions and begins to compete again for power, influence and oil market share. A few more pipelines circumnavigating Hormuz would be one attractive option, for example.
I’d have thought that the tens of billions in arms purchases the GCC have made would provide a modicum of self-confidence. If Iran can be prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons, it will be decades before it even comes close to matching the current level of GCC military power. But the GCC seems to wear its armaments like a thawb: more elegant and prestigious than practical.
If the Gulf wants a hug, the best way to get it from Washington today would be to demonstrate that its sympathy with the Syrian uprising can be turned into success both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. From a Washington perspective, that would mean Gulf countries should cut off support to Sunni extremists and instead strengthen the relative moderates prepared to run a democratic, non-sectarian Syria. That’s a tall order for the Sunni monarchies, but it would get a big hug. Complaining about an agreement that freezes Iran’s nuclear program will not.
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Yes, Syria can get worse
The Syrian Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Etilaf) decided yesterday that it would go to a Geneva 2 diplomatic conference:
The G[eneral] A[ssembly] [of Etilaf] endorsed the Syrian Coalition’s readiness to participate in a Geneva conference based on the transfer of power to a transitional governing body (TGB). This body should include full executive powers including presidential powers with control over military and security apparatus. Furthermore, the Assad Regime and those associated with him will have no role in the transitional period and future Syria.
The Syrian Coalition stipulates that prior to the conference access for relief convoys, including the Red Cross and the Red Crescent IFRC and other international relief agencies, to all besieged areas must be ensured, and prisoners, especially women and children, must be released.
What this “based on” language does is to make Bashar al Asad’s removal from power not a precondition for talks as in the past but instead Etilaf‘s desired outcome in the future. Humanitarian access and release of prisoners are standard demands in situations such as this. Likely the Syrian regime will be prepared to offer half a loaf: a few humanitarian convoys and release of some women and children.
There really wasn’t much choice. Washington has been insisting that the Coalition agree to Geneva 2, posing the question as a choice between dealing either with Al Qaeda or with the regime. A refusal to go to Geneva 2 would have led to withdrawal of Western support. Perhaps even the Saudis were convinced to condition their assistance on a start to negotiations.
The truth is that the relatively moderate opposition will need to deal with both Al Qaeda and the regime, one way or the other.
Etilaf is not strong enough to do it with military force. Today’s news includes a regime offensive to retake Aleppo’s airport. Iranian and Russian military assistance to the regime is flowing unrestrained. Al Qaeda in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has become dominant in Raqqa, the one provincial capital in opposition hands and is strengthening across the north. The Supreme Military Council, the military affiliate of Etilaf and nominal coordinator of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) brigades, is less and less in evidence.
There is no sign it is strong enough to counter the regime and ISIS with politics either. Wisely, Etilaf is sending people into Syria to talk with opposition supporters in advance of Geneva 2. They will get an earful. Opposition activists are disappointed with Etilaf, which has been unable to deliver governance and services to liberated areas. Many people inside Syria lean more towards negotiating with the regime, as they hope it will end the military’s campaign against the population. But they have little trust in the mostly expatriate Etilaf to do it.
Etilaf, broadened with some representation of the FSA and opposition activists from inside Syria, may have no choice but to go to Geneva 2. But talks are unlikely to produce a political settlement any time soon. The regime sees no reason to allow itself to be decapitated. It will want Etilaf to agree to participate in the 2014 presidential elections, with Bashar al Asad as a candidate. Doing so would be fatal to the moderate opposition and leave Syria’s fate to a battle between extreme Islamists and the regime.
That is likely in any event. Power today in Syria grows from the barrel of a gun, supplemented by humanitarian assistance. Extremists are proving better at both than Etilaf, which has the additional disadvantage of fickle Western friends. As Syrians see it, the Americans not only backed off bombing of Syria’s chemical weapons facilities but are also now cozying up to Iran in an effort to reach a nuclear deal.
Whom would you back? You have a choice:
- the guys with long beards inside Syria capable of protecting you against the regime and feeding you, even if their methods are brutal and their religious practices oppressive, or
- the closer-shaven ones who meet outside the country, command no army and can’t even convince the internationals to bring their humanitarian assistance in from Turkey and Jordan.
Geneva 2 is unlikely to produce a political settlement. But even if it does, the war will not end because the negotiators there won’t command the extremist fighters. Those who think things can’t get worse in Syria are in for a surprise.
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Peace picks, November 11-15
The Federal government is closed Monday for Veterans Day but the rest of the week has lots of peace and war events. The Middle East Institute Conference (last item) is not to be missed:
1. How to Turn Russia Against Assad
Tuesday, November 12th, 2013
6:00pm
Rome Building, Room 806
1619 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20037
Samuel Charap
Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, IISS
Jeremy Shapiro
Visiting Fellow in the Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution
Chair: Dana Allin
Editor of Survival and Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs, IISS
A light reception will follow
No RSVP Required
For More Information, Contact SAISEES@jhu.edu or events-washington@iiss.org
Samuel Charap is the Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in the IISS–US in Washington, DC. Prior to joining the Institute, Samuel was a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow at the US Department of State, serving as Senior Advisor to the Acting Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security and on the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff.
Jeremy Shapiro is a visiting fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. Prior to re-joining Brookings, he was a member of the U.S. State Department’s policy planning staff, where he advised the secretary of state on U.S. policy in North Africa and the Levant. He was also the senior advisor to Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon, providing strategic guidance on a wide variety of U.S.-European foreign policy issues. Read more
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Giving pause
Nuclear talks in Geneva with Iran ended without an agreement and will reconvene November 20. The P5+1 (that’s US, UK, France, China, Russia+Germany) are mostly exuding confidence that an agreement can be reached. The talks did not break down, they paused. What blocked agreement? Reuters reports:
Diplomats said the main stumbling blocks included the status of Iran’s Arak heavy-water reactor of potential use in making bomb-grade plutonium, the fate of Iran’s stockpile of higher-enriched uranium – both acute issues for France – and the extent of relief from trade sanctions demanded by Tehran.
The first two are critical issues for the P5+1. Their purpose is to prevent Iran from accumulating all the material (either highly enriched uranium or plutonium) it needs for a quick or undetected sprint to build nuclear weapons. The third is Iran’s main concern. It desperately needs sanctions relief for its battered economy.
Criticizing from the sidelines is Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu, who wants Iran’s ability to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium destroyed completely and sanctions lifted only when that ambition is fulfilled. His hostility to an agreement that delivers anything less appears to have motivated France’s hard line in Geneva. While the press is treating this intransigence as a surprise, French President Francois Hollande is on the record saying: Read more
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