Understanding doesn’t mean liking

Meir Javedanfar, one of Israel’s keenest Iran-watchers, advises wisely that we need to watch Iran’s domestic politics closely if we want to know what is going to happen in the nuclear talks:

Iran’s foreign policy in 2014 is likely to be more chaotic than it was this year.

The reason is that Iran’s domestic politics is likely to be more chaotic in 2014, and in Iran, like in many other countries, foreign policy is an extension of what happens at home.

Iranian President Rouhani walks a tightrope stretched between Supreme Leader Khamanei and various conservative factions, especially those associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.  A good shake from either end could leave Rouhani off balance and unable to conclude either implementation of the existing six-month agreement or negotiation of a more permanent arrangement governing Iran’s nuclear program.

President Obama is walking a tightrope of his own, one stretched between Democrats and Republicans in the Congress, where pressure for increased sanctions from some people in both parties on Iran is strong.  But the Iranians have a detailed understanding of our politics and likely have understood that any new sanctions are not likely in a six-month time frame.  Beyond that is anyone’s guess.

One of the reasons the Iranians understand our politics well is that they have been present in the US continuously since the termination of diplomatic relations in 1979.  Their UN mission in New York–headed for many years by the current Foreign Minister–keeps good tabs on us.

We do not have the equivalent capability in Tehran.  The “virtual” American embassy established in 2011 is not a listening post but rather a telling post.  It is supposed to inform Iranians about America and American policy, not inform Americans about Iran and Iranian policy.  We have diplomats who do that too, but they are in Dubai and other remote locations.  The consequences were quite apparent during the last Iranian presidential election, when virtually all American experts were astonished that Rouhani won, not to mention that he won in the first round.

Arguably one of the best sources on Iran for the last year or two has been Princeton research scholar Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former diplomat who served with Rouhani at the Iranian National Security Council.  There are dozens of similarly well-placed Iranians who might be good sources for understanding politics in Tehran, but few make it to the United States, much less to Princeton for a couple of years.  One of the critical jobs an embassy performs is to talk to such people in order to gain a good understanding of the local political dynamics.  Our diplomats do it well, as wikileaks demonstrates.

Our problem is we don’t have an embassy in Tehran.  We are represented there by an “interests section” within the Swiss Embassy.  Switzerland no doubt does an excellent job passing messages back and forth.  Likely many allies (and non-allies) with embassies in Tehran share political intelligence and analysis with us on a more or less regular basis.  The Brits will be first among equals in this respect, but the Saudis, French, Iraqis and many others may have good reason to want to help the Americans understand what’s going on in Tehran.

Such third party material comes with spin.  The Saudis won’t be reporting any indications that Iran is serious about curtailing its nuclear ambitions.  The Iraqis will.  So complete dependence on third party material is not a good idea.  If there is any good reason for the United States maintaining 294 fixed embassies, consulates and other diplomatic missions around the world, exclusive political and economic reporting by well-trained people with a sharp eye for US interests is one of them (the other main one is service to American citizens).

It is coming time for the United States to broaden its contacts with Iran beyond the few officials involved in the nuclear talks.  There would be obvious virtues in direct contacts, properly organized, between the Congress and the Iranian majlis.  There are also obvious virtues in increasing citizen-to-citizen contacts, including for thinktankers and Iran experts who haven’t been there for many years.  And as things proceed in the nuclear negotiations and beyond we will need much deeper political and economic reporting.

This cannot be done without Americans on the ground in Tehran.  I doubt we are about to open an embassy, though I would welcome that.  But any American administration will want to be absolutely certain its people will be treated properly before flying the flag in Tehran again.  We could however begin to make the necessary arrangements to have American officials in the Swiss embassy interests section, as we do in Havana for example.  Or, we might want to empower much more ample reporting from Tehran by organizations like the International Crisis Group.  Or place more professors at Iranian universities to develop a stronger understanding of the local scene.

It is going to be hard, absent an American presence on the ground in Iran, to develop the kind of mutual understanding and eventually trust (with verification) required to pull off something as important as curtailment of Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, never mind a broader normalization of relations.   It is time we begin to remedy the situation by  developing a more detailed and nuanced understanding of a regime none of us like.  Understanding doesn’t mean liking.