Wait and see
This morning’s New York Times offers polls that suggest the able Ashraf Ghani and opposition leader Abdullah (aka Abdullah Abdullah, but only because Westerners expect two names even if Afghans sometimes have only one) are running strong in the presidential race, which culminates in an April 5 election. One of the polls also suggests that President Karzai’s much-anticipated endorsement of one of the candidates won’t have much impact, if it occurs. While Ghani is a sharp critic of foreign aid to Afghanistan and Abdullah has opposed Karzai since losing to him in 2009, Washington would certainly prefer either of them to several of the more dubious protagonists. They both rank as more sensible than the increasingly irascible Karzai.
By contrast, the Washington Post reports on a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that predicts
Afghanistan would likely descend into chaos quickly if Washington and Kabul don’t sign a security pact that would keep an international military contingent there beyond 2014 — a precondition for the delivery of billions of dollars in aid that the United States and its allies have pledged to spend in Afghanistan over the coming years.
The NIE appears to be gloomy about the situation even if the security pact is signed and aid maintained, though that conclusion is hidden in journalistic fog.
Both reports can be true. A successful election April 5 is a necessary but not sufficient condition to preclude a descent into chaos, because the countryside in Afghanistan is–as it has always been–largely disconnected from politics and governance in Kabul. The many well-intentioned efforts to fix this problem since the US invasion have been at best partly successful. The consequences for such fundamental issues as land tenure, which generates a good deal of local conflict in Afghanistan, are bad for Afghanistan’s poor and its economy.
Governance issues in Afghanistan are tightly linked to security. The country suffers from a classic syndrome: the state does not command a monopoly on the means of violence. Throughout much of Afghanistan, militias of various sorts hold local sway, including those we generally refer to as Taliban. Few Al Qaeda seem present–most may have made their way to Syria by now. The Afghan security forces have increased their capabilities and now hold their own in many situations, but they don’t control large areas of the country.
US, UK and other international fatalities declined sharply in 2012 and especially 2013. So few Americans are being injured these days that US army surgeons are being shipped home early (that bit is personal rumint). Security responsibilities are now primarily in Afghan hands. There is no need for American soldiers to join most fights.
NIE’s are often gloomy. The intelligence community is paid to anticipate problems, not paint rosy pictures. With Karzai playing chicken with the security agreement, it would be nothing short of miraculous if the intelligence community assessed the situation as stable or improving.
The die is cast. There is little we can do at this point to change what will happen in Afghanistan come spring. Wait and see: that’s what we need to do.
PS: I was wrong to ignore the economic situation in the above post. As Nader Nadery suggests it will be bad. But maybe the scarcity of resources will lead to a better allocation of them. In any event, nothing we do now will much affect the situation by spring, so my conclusion remains the same.
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