We are not there yet

Word from Geneva this morning suggests that the Syria peace talks are deadlocked over the issue of forming a transitional government with full executive powers, which is the key goal set in a June 2012 UN communique’.  This is no surprise.  Bashar al Asad shows no sign of stepping down, aside or out.  His Iranian and Russian supporters, while claiming they are not wedded to him, are still not prepared to compel him, or even provide incentives.  They continue to provide ample military and financial support.

The opposition is no readier to make peace.  Its negotiators went to Geneva 2, as these talks are known, in parlous shape.  The regime has been pressing its military advantages near Damascus and in Homs.  The opposition military forces are fragmented and fighting each other.  The negotiators representing the opposition in Geneva have precious little control over the armed revolutionaries, who are fragmented and fighting with each other.  There was also a significant political minority within the Syrian Opposition Coalition, which leads the delegation in Geneva, that opposed going to the talks.

Given these disadvantages, it is remarkable that things have gone pretty well for the opposition in Geneva.  Unforced regime errors are part of the explanation.  Its chief negotiator, Foreign Minister Moallem, came out of his corner overly aggressive, not only against the opposition but also against UN Secretary General Ban.  Beating on the referee is not a good way to win a boxing match.  Moallem essentially rejected the notion that the talks aim at forming a transitional government.  The regime prefers to forge ahead with spring elections at which Bashar al Asad is guaranteed victory.

The opposition has kept the focus on formation of the transitional government.  Other issues have to be discussed.  Prisoner exchanges and humanitarian access cannot be ignored.  The international community will want some “confidence-building” measures agreed, even if they build little confidence.  But the opposition has succeeded in preserving as the keystone of these negotiations the highly unlikely formation of a government that excludes Bashar al Asad.  Even if there is progress on other issues, it is clear that the purposes of Geneva 2 won’t be fulfilled without a political settlement that is anathema to the regime.

It is hard to see how that can happen without two other things happening, in some combination or another:  improved military performance on the part of the opposition and decreased willingness of Iran and Russia to bankroll and supply the regime.  Improved opposition military performance requires consolidation of its fragmented forces and stronger foreign backing.  Lessened Iranian and Russian commitment to Bashar al Asad requires a strong diplomatic effort not only by the United States but also by the Gulf supporters of the opposition.

The key issue for Tehran is whether it will be able to continue to rely on Syria as an ally willing to supply and support Hizbollah, whose forces in Lebanon are an important part of Iran’s deterrence against Israel.  In principle, there is no reason why a successor regime in Damascus would not maintain its role in helping Hizbollah, at least until Israel returns the Golan Heights.  In practice, the longer Hizbollah continues to support the regime, the less likely it will get help once Bashar is gone.

For Moscow, the key issue is whether continued support for Bashar will increase or decrease the threat of jihadis inside Russia.   Hundreds of Chechens and Dagestanis are thougt to be fighting already in Syria.  They will no doubt want to take their jihad home when they are finished, or maybe even before they are finished, making a mess in Syria.  The odds of influencing Moscow seem to me better than the odds of restraining Tehran, especially at a time when Washington hopes for Iranian cooperation on nuclear issues and won’t want to press too hard on Syria issues.  Only if a nuclear agreement initiates a more general rapprochement between Washington and Tehran will that change.

Some hope for a ceasefire at Geneva 2 as a prelude to a negotiated settlement, one imposed by the key supporters of both the regime and its opponents.  This would be a truce in the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  It may well happen some day, but the time does not appear ripe yet.  Both Riyadh and Tehran seem willing to fight on through their surrogates.  And it is difficult to picture how, with opposition and regime forces still so intertwined, a cease fire could be monitored and maintained.  It is far more likely that local ceasefires will be announced and broken, even repeatedly.  This can go on for years until a “mutually hurting stalemate” is achieved and the parties decide they can improve their lot better by talking than fighting.  We are not there yet.