Month: January 2014
Preparing to observe a referendum
I’m in Egypt, preparing to observe the January 14/15 constitutional referendum. This is more controversial than it sounds. Some have argued that observing risks giving the referendum legitimacy it does not deserve. No long-term observers are in place, one of the factors that caused the Carter Center not to send more than a technical mission.* Some Egyptian Islamist observers have been denied accreditation, and the government is conducting a vigorous propaganda campaign in favor of approval. Why would I lend my name to a process taking place in a country where nonviolent activists are jailed, the press is under serious constraints, the security forces are cracking down on secularist dissenters as well as the Muslim Brotherhood (declared a terrorist organization) and ample portions of the society are boycotting?
The answer is that I didn’t decide the referendum would be observed. The State Department did and AID** funded Democracy International (DI), a non-governmental organization, to implement the decision. A few other organizations, including the European Union, are also here, but DI’s 80-person team seems to be the largest. What I decided was to get some first-person exposure to the situation in Egypt at an important moment. If I were not here, someone else would be. If I thought I were doing harm, I’d have opted out, but I dare imagine that my sharp eyes and ears might even do some good for a mission conducted under less than ideal conditions. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Kosovo praying for democracy
Artan Haraqija, who did his master’s degree at Westminister University, sent his minidocumentary in response to my publication last week of Petrit Selimi’s interview on radical Islam in Kosovo:
Thank you, Artan!
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Inside Iran
Two experienced Iran hands debriefed recent trips there Thursday: David Ignatius of the Washington Post and Robin Wright, a joint fellow at the US Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson International Center. USIP’s Bill Taylor moderated.
Iran is entering a new era spearheaded by realists, Robin Wright pointed out. They are not out to transform Iran, but are willing to work within the system to initiate reforms. The tenor has changed, with realistic goals being set. Iran is also recalibrating its strategy, responding to events in the region like the rise of Al Qaeda franchises and the withdrawal of US from Iraq. Iran sees itself surrounded by Salafis and Sunnis. The US is no longer the enemy it once was. Followers of events in Iran too often forget about other factors, aside from US sanctions, that affect Iran’s decision-making. Rouhani is arguably more popular today than the day he was elected. In addition, he has hired savvy technocrats to solve the economic problems facing the country.
Observing that there is an appearance of political debate going on within Iran, David Ignatius said the US sanctions are often called “crippling.” Yet when one travels to Iran, it does not look like a country on its knees. Iranians are resourceful people. More than damage the current Iranian economy, US sanctions have crippled Iran’s future. This is an enormous opportunity cost that will prevent Iran from becoming a successful state until the sanctions are lifted. It will be very difficult to close a deal with Iran, but the best strategic move now would be to give Iran a taste of what the future might look like if there is a permanent nuclear agreement.
Wright agreed Iran seems to be thriving and is not crippled. It is important to be wary of assumptions about the effects of the US sanctions are on Iran. Wright described her visit to the former US embassy and how she met with one of the masterminds behind the 1979 takeover. He expressed support for reopening the embassy and a nuclear deal between the US and Iran. Realists would then be allowed to run for office more frequently and women’s rights would increase. Without gaining credibility by forging a successful deal with the US first, however, Rouhani will be unable to address other problems in Iran. There is a real sense of public support for nuclear deal.
Ignatius believes Iranian society is waiting to jump into the future and onto the world stage. He interpreted Kissinger’s famous quote “Is Iran a nation or a cause?” as meaning “Has Iran moved on from its revolution?” It seems not, at least for top-level officials. Iran is still carrying out destabilizing activities in the region. Wright concurred. Iran is one of the most nationalistic countries in the world. Iranians will continue to do whatever it takes to protect and further their national interests. However, there is a sense that Syria may not hold together while Assad is in power. Off the record, an Iranian official told her that Iran would be willing to chop off the head (Assad) in order to preserve the body (the Syrian Baath party) Iranian concern about Al Qaeda gains in Syria is real.
Ignatius believes that it is in the US interest to demonstrate how Iran could be a big player in the region if it curbs its nuclear program as well as its covert action in neighboring countries. Iran is adept at riding several horses at once. It can juggle relations with the US, Hezbollah, and Syria at the same time, demonstrating political mastery. The US would be wise to learn the same trick.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Religious radicalism threatens Kosovo
The Pristina daily Zëri has kindly given permission for republication in English of this interview with Petrit Selimi, Deputy Foreign Minister of Kosovo:
With 2013 behind us, can you make a list of accomplishments and commitments that have not been completed and that are to be fulfilled this year?
I am happy with the work done during 2013. We started some interesting processes within my work portfolio in public diplomacy and these results were also recognized by the international community and partners of Kosovo diplomacy. Even in the field of interfaith dialogue as an element of public diplomacy as well as in the digital diplomacy we had a year with measurable results, receiving high praise from around the world. Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe development bank is also very important to the penetration of Kosovo’s multilateral diplomacy and its strategic objectives, although few commented on it. Recognitions of Kosovo’s statehood during 2013 are also important.
As regards the overall aspect of Kosovo, I believe that the dialogue and the agreement on normalization of relations and the local elections that were held successfully and also for the first time throughout the territory of the Republic of Kosovo, are among the most important results of the decade and the positive effects will be seen in the years to come. On the negative side, the failure of privatization of the PTK is regrettable and will have serious consequences on the image of Kosovo which aims to be a suitable territory for foreign investors.
How is the process of lobbying for recognition of the Republic of Kosovo proceeding and who could be the next state to recognize Kosovo, or, at least, which continent recognition could come next?
Minister Hoxhaj often says that “the geography of recognitions is global” and I believe that this will also be confirmed in future recognitions that are expected to come from three different continents. Next year, we expect to enter the territory of the comfortable majority of UN members that have recognized Kosovo.
A few days ago, the Foreign Minister has spoken out about the “Islam imported from the East” as a problem for Kosovo. During visits and conversations you have had in recent months with your counterparts around the world, journalists and various personalities, did you stress the radicalization of Islam as a problem for Kosovo?
Religious radicalism is problem number one and the greatest risk to the national interests in the long run. Corruption and organized crime present also great problems to all Balkan countries, but we have the additional element that is used as hostile propaganda against Kosovo – that supposedly we are a fertile territory for terrorism and religious radicalism.
I believe that those who speak today in absolutist terms about religion and who do not focus on diversity and tolerance – all of them add water to the mill of Serbian propaganda. Serbia, since the end of 1980s frightened Europe by claiming that Kosovo is part of the “green triangle” which also includes Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and part of Serbia. It is ironic that some Albanians become the biggest supporters of these theories.
Are these developments damaging the image of Kosovo as a secular state and which aspired to the West, not to the East?
They are not still very exposed, but if the actions of verbal hatred that are heard by some imams and so-called intellectuals escalate and turn into physical violence, then many European countries that have in their political landscape parties with rightist views, and antagonistic to political Islam, will simply refuse to approve further steps towards Kosovo’s European integration. Kosovans should never forget that EU membership necessitates the votes of MPs of the entire 28 EU states. We must be patient and tolerant and we must become masters of promoting peaceful agenda, dialogue and progress. There are some among us who ignore these risks, but it can turn into a boomerang.
Visa liberalization. It is already proved that the lack of free movement of citizens of Kosovo is emerging as a source of negative actions of our society, such as illegal border crossings, which has often lead to people losing their lives. How is this fact undermining Kosovo’s integration process?
Lack of free movement is one of the greatest sources of frustration for Kosovans. We have a disproportionally large diaspora which means that free movement is vital for us to keep in touch with family and friends. Inability to travel creates a gap between us and others in the Balkans and helps deepen the radical discourse, nationalist or religious-fascist. The Government of Kosovo has worked more than anything else in fulfilling the criteria and we hope that the political and technical evaluation will be fast enough as for the willingness of Kosovans to move freely.
In the rotating EU Council Summit, in March, do you think that Kosovo has any likelihood of getting any positive response regarding the visa liberalization process given the multiple criteria that are to be met?
We are approaching the months of March and I doubt that the final decision could come as soon. Minister Çitaku is working with her team, assisted by the competent ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to document the fulfilled criteria. For example, we have installed the visa system for citizens of third countries, with the assistance of Norway, three times faster than some neighboring states. Kosova was the last to receive the Roadmap list, which has been the longest, while Kosovo has worked hard to carry out its obligations successfully.
If in 2013 the desire was to reach 100 recognitions, which will be the greatest success of your ministry this year?
I believe that the application for membership in the Council of Europe and some UN agencies may present positive development. Recognition by any EU country from the famous Quint is also crucial. We have been very focused in these areas in the last two years, especially with the public diplomacy tools.
Kosovan artists and sportsmen are excelling increasingly in Europe. What is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs doing to use their names to influence the various lobbying circles? Do you communicate with these artists and athletes and can we expect organization of a special event with them?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the British Embassy, the Norwegian Embassy and the British Council has paid more than 500 plane tickets for artists, athletes and various activists who excelled during the past two years. From the Venice Biennale to various concerts, exhibitions, presentation, etc, have been in the focus of our assistance, in coordination with the Ministry of Culture.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What else we can do
The UN-led Syria peace talks known as Geneva 2 are scheduled to convene in Montreux January 22 for a public session and continue in Geneva with only the Syrian warring parties (regime and opposition), under the aegis of UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi. I’ve betrayed my lack of enthusiasm for Geneva 2, but it is legitimate to ask what else can be done, or what might be done at the talks that would be useful. Let’s assume direct US military action is out of the question, because it is unless Al Qaeda manages to set up a haven in Syria used to launch attacks against the US or its allies.
First is to consider whether convening the talks on the date foreseen is a good idea. The situation on the ground in Syria is in flux. The regime and the opposition may have reached a kind of complex territorial equilibrium, in which neither side can gain much by further fighting. But within the anti-regime forces a lot is happening. The fog of war is still thick, but it appears more moderate Islamist and secular fighters are confronting and at least for the moment undoing the most extreme forces associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, sometimes ISIL for Levant), at the behest of the population in areas that ISIS has brutalized. This development could solve one of Washington’s biggest problems: it has hesitated to support the opposition with lethal assistance for fear it would fall into the hands of extremists, helping them to take control of a post-Asad Syria. But the outcome of the fight is by no means certain and it may presage greater instablity or even extremist strengthening.
Wisdom suggests awaiting the result before proceeding with peace talks on what might turn out to be false premises. Postponement for a month or so might be wise. Timing is vital in diplomacy. The situation on the ground–who holds power where–is a vital ingredient of any diplomatic resolution. Trying get a resolution before the situation is clear can be a big mistake.
In the meanwhile, one possibility is to try for local ceasefires, since a country-wide ceasefire is bound to be violated quickly by armed groups not at the negotiating table. Both sides of the fight are exhausted in Aleppo. It may be possible to arrange for all sides to suspend the fight, provided the regime doesn’t wreck the prospect by bombing or rocketing. The Russians would have to make it clear to Bashar that doing so would have consequences.
Another possibility is to insist that the regime demonstrably implement freedom of the press and association before it gains the legitimacy that necessarily derives from its presence in Montreux/Geneva. There are brave Syrians trying every day to exercise their rights. Enabling them to do so was an integral part of Kofi Annan’s plan, observed more in the breach. Moderate Syrians would pour into the streets if they thought they would be safe.
A third option would be to formally break diplomatic relations with Damascus and recognize the recently formed Syrian Opposition Coalition government as the legal representative of the Syrian state. Only one or two countries have done this so far. Washington could lead an effort in this direction, including a challenge to the Damascus’ credentials at the UN.
But if, as I suspect, no one at the State Department wants to go tell John Kerry that his hard-won initiative should be postponed, what can still be done constructively on January 22 and 23?
A step that would be much appreciated on both sides would be prisoner releases. If the opposition negotiators can come home from Geneva 2 having arranged for several hundred of their compatriots to return to their families, that would remove at least some of the stigma associated with attending an international conference that will disappoint most Syrians.
The United States can make it clear that it backs a strict interpretation of the Geneva 1 communique, which provides for a transitional governing body with full executive authority (TGBFEA). It won’t be possible to get that this month, but Washington should leave no one in any doubt that its strategic goal is removal of all power from Bashar al Asad, even if he nominally stays in office (which really isn’t possible once he loses control of the security apparatus). The current wishy washy line is that we are starting a peace process that is intended to lead eventually to a TGBFEA. That line undermines the opposition and encourages the regime.
The United States could put it bluntly to the Russians that they can’t support a peace process that leads to Bashar’s removal from power and arm the Syrian regime at the same time. They need to choose. If they choose to continue supplying weapons that are used against civilians, then the Americans should make it clear they will expand arming the opposition, trying of course to ensure that the weapons are not used against civilians. It would also be possible to offer the Russians something they value in exchange for their defenestration of Bashar. Some flexibility on anti-missile defense in Europe might go a long way.
Geneva 2 could also be an appropriate place to discuss humanitarian access, but the issue should be put clearly. The regime is blocking humanitarian access, not the revolutionaries. There should be no quid pro quo for allowing relief to reach civilians from all of Syria’s neighbors. Both sides have been attacking civilian populations. They should be told to stop, first in a communique from Geneva 2 but then in a vigorous UN Security Council resolution.
The predictable failure of Geneva 2 to move forward on creating the TGBFEA puts the opposition in a difficult spot. Only Bashar stepping aide or down would justify attendance in the eyes of most of the opposition, but the more moderate figures associated with the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Free Syrian Army will have no choice but to attend if they want to get continuing American support. One option is a walkout, coordinated with Washington (or at least foreshadowed to Washington). This could save face for those opposition moderates who feel compelled to attend in Geneva but worry about how it will weaken their standing inside Syria. Some lower-level officials might be left behind to deal with humanitarian issues, which could benefit from detailed coordination.
The purpose of a meeting like Geneva 2 should not merely be negotiation, or to start a process. Washington needs to think hard about what can be achieved that will improve the situation. It needs clarity about its goals and the means it will bring to bear to achieve them.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The Geneva 2 Rohrschach
I spent yesterday listening to well-informed people talk (Las Vegas rules) about prospects for the January 22/23 Montreux/Geneva 2 peace talks. The UN faxed invitations Monday. The Syrian government has already named its delegation. The Russians are in. Iran is not invited to the multilateral opening day in Montreux, but John Kerry says it can hang around with everyone else while UN envoy Brahimi meets with the Syrian parties on the second day in Geneva. Faute de mieux, the Americans are committed to Geneva 2 and anxious that it begin a peace process, even if there is no hope it will conclude one. “What else can we do?” they ask plaintively.
The Syrian opposition doesn’t know if it is coming or going. Some portion of Etilaf, the Syrian Opposition Coalition that Washington and other capitals have accepted as the political representative of the Syrian people, is bound to give in to US pressure to attend, but no formal decision has been taken yet. The Syrian National Council component of Etilaf is against attending. So of course are the more extreme Islamists armed groups. Most moderate Islamist armed groups, organized now as the Islamic Front, are also opposed. The Free Syrian Army’s Supreme Military Council will have to go, since it gets a lot of assistance from the US.
Why would the opposition not want to attend? Let me count the reasons:
- There is no serious possibility of Geneva 2 implementing the Geneva 1 goal of a “transitional governing body with full executive authority,” since Bashar al Asad is clearly not prepared to step aside, down or up.
- Anyone from the opposition who attends will be regarded as a traitor by those who don’t, including armed groups with the capacity to do real harm.
- Even if the risks are not mortal, the political risk is significant.
- Attending will fragment the opposition even more and weaken it.
- The opposition does not trust the Americans and loathes the Russians.
- Whatever statement comes out of Geneva 2, it will have to be balanced between the Americans and Russians, which means it could imply support for the scheduled May elections, focus on fighting terrorism rather than ending Asad’s brutality towards the Syrian people and imply an obligation of those attending to cut off supplies of arms (thus obligating Saudi Arabia and Qatar but not Iran).
A ceasefire agreed at Geneva will be meaningless, as the extremist militias not present will violate it right away, with the regime responding in kind (if not pre-empting). The only real upside for the opposition at Geneva would be agreement on humanitarian access. But the opposition believes that could be agreed without negotiation between the warring parties, as it is a clear legal obligation for the government to allow relief to the civilian population.
One-third of Etilaf is already said to have resigned to protest against going to Geneva 2, which even the many fighters who want a political solution regard as an a snare and a delusion. Without changing the military balance on the ground, and without strong American backing, Geneva 2 will cause more fragmentation in the opposition. It will also weaken relative moderates within the opposition and strengthen extremists. The West is setting up the opposition for failure.
What will it do for the the regime, the Russians and the Iranians?
The regime looks to an international meeting like Geneva 2 for legitimacy, which it has never sought from the Syrian people. It will claim to have offered reforms and even amnesty, portray itself as a bulwark against extremism, denounce the international conspiracy against Asad and claim that what it has done on chemical weapons demonstrates its reliability. Disciplined and organized, it will present a clean face to the world in Montreux, even if barrel bombs are still falling on the civilian population of Aleppo.
Moscow’s main objective is to prevent chaos and the flow of extremists from Syria (where 5-600 Russian citizens are fighting against the regime), as well as to protect specific interests like port access and protection of orthodox Christians. It is difficult for Moscow to see how chaos can be avoided if the regime is removed. Russia doesn’t want to see Libyan-style chaos in Syria. In Moscow’s view, a majority of Syrians still supports Asad, who may well run for re-election in May. He is not creating the extremists, who would exist even if there were no war in Syria. The Sunni/Shia divide is exaggerated. It is strife within the Sunni community that is really important. Transitional justice in Moscow’s estimation should be postponed, as it has been in Cambodia. It claims to be ready for a peaceful transition to democracy, but there is no sign it is ready to cut off the weapons flow to the regime.
Nor is there sign Iran is ready to abandon Asad. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in particular the Quds Force, controls Iran’s policy on Syria, not President Rouhani. There is no open dissent from the official narrative: Israel, the US and Saudi Arabia are trying to remove Asad, so the “resistance front” (Hizbollah and the IRGC) needs to respond. They cannot be restrained without stopping the flow of extremists and Gulf financing to the opposition forces. Iran would like an invitation to Montreux, but not with conditions. It will not accept the Geneva 1 goal.
Tomorrow: I’ll attempt to answer that plaintive question: “what else can we do?”
RSS - Posts
