Upside down to right side up
Serbia has been governed for the better part of two years by an increasingly awkward coalition of Prime (and Interior) Minister Ivica Dačić’s Socialists with Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić’s Progressives. The Socialists weren’t socialists and the Progressives weren’t progressives. Both have deep roots in Milosevic’s avowedly ethnic-nationalist autocracy.
This was an upside down coalition. The Progressives had more seats in parliament as well as the presidency. Vučić’s anti-corruption campaign made him the most powerful political figure in the government, overshadowing Dačić, who merits the lion’s share of credit for reaching agreements with Kosovo that have enabled the European Union to open accession negotiations with Belgrade.
The time has apparently come to turn things right side up. Calling early elections for March 16, President Nikolić explicitly intends to see Vučić take his rightful place as prime minister, atop a coalition still to be decided. The Progressives are expected to do well, at the least remaining the largest party in parliament. The main opposition, the Democratic Party, seems to be coming apart at the seams, with former President Tadić leading defections to some still unspecified destination. If needed, any number of smaller parties will scramble to join the Progressives in the majority.
The economy will be the main issue in the election campaign. Serbia’s rapid post-Milosevic growth slowed markedly after the 2008 global financial crisis hit, dipping into recession in 2009 and again in 2012. Growth has been anemic since, leaving GDP per capita stalled and the national budget hard-pressed even as the society ages rapidly.
Kosovo will likely play little role in the campaign. Even before this spring’s agreement on reintegration of the Serb-majority north of Kosovo with the rest, two-thirds of Serbs in Serbia were ready to acknowledge that Kosovo is independent, though the government continues to claim to sovereignty over all of it. Kosovo for most Serbs inside Serbia is neither important nor an open question, so long as Serbs in Kosovo are reasonably well treated.
Vučić is rated the most trusted “politician and statesman” in Serbia. Once upon a time not so long ago, he was an extreme nationalist and a youthful minister of information busily fining journalists. He has renounced what the BBC calls his “misspent youth.” One of Vučić’s strong suits today is his reputation as a serious and committed anti-corruption campaigner. While Freedom House in 2013 detected little overall change in corruption and Serbs in 2012 thought it had gotten worse rather than better, a number of high-profile judicial cases have redounded to the deputy prime minister’s political benefit.
Vučić is backing peaceful, negotiated solutions in Kosovo and downplaying the sovereignty claim, trying to share credit with Dačić for the successful EU-sponsored negotiations that opened the door to accession talks. The Serbian government has asked for pretrial release of Oliver Ivanovic, a Serb leader and mayoral candidate arrested recently in Kosovo based on an investigation of alleged war crimes by the EU rule of law mission. To his credit, the accused turned himself in to the authorities and will presumably stand trial in Kosovo.
All of this is remarkably normal. It lacks the Sturm und Drang that once characterized Milosevic’s Serbia and Serbian relations with Kosovo. The dramatic contests of seemingly dyed in the wool nationalists vs. supposed democrats are gone. Corrupt tycoons are standing trial rather than lording it over ordinary Serbs. The government is worrying about the economy rather than fining journalists.
What we’ve got in Serbia is a country embarking on a real transition under the unlikely auspices of former nationalists anxious to keep moving along the path to EU accession. They are proving more courageous in this respect than their democratic predecessors, as they have no viable competitors on the nationalist side of the political spectrum. Nixon to China and all that.
This is a clear illustration of the EU’s soft power, which is working in Kosovo as well, though Kosovo lags significantly behind Serbia on the accession path. Bosnia is still the real laggard in the Balkans. Let’s hope that Serbia’s real progress drags it along in the right direction.
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