The Syrian opposition delegation at the UN-hosted Geneva 2 talks today tabled its Statement of Principles (for those who read Arabic, and now also in English).
The Coalition (Etilaf) office in Washington writes that this lays out
…its vision for the political solution in Syria. It emphasizes the priorities of peace, democratization, reconciliation, inclusivity, and reconstruction, among other important guiding principles of the transition and post-transition period. The government delegation did not demonstrate either the will or the mandate to discuss these principles.
Our delegation’s position is to pursue the negotiating process to implement in full the Geneva Communique, including the important principles of ending violence and combating terror, but in order to do so both legally and practically, the establishment of the transitional governing body, by mutual consent of both sides, is necessary and required. We believe the attached document serves not only the parties to these negotiations, but also the full interests and aspirations of all Syrians. The government must be prepared to implement in full the Geneva Communique, UN Security Council Resolution 2118, and this statement of principles, beginning with the establishment of the transitional governing body, in order to participate meaningfully in this process to begin to set the stage for a political solution in Syria.
But as the Coalition knows better than anyone else, the Syrian government has no intention of creating a transition governing body with full executive powers, including over security forces. Damascus continues to emphasize the fight against terrorism, by which it means pretty much anyone who opposes its rule.
Where does that leave the Geneva 2 talks? At a stand-still, so far as I can tell. UN/Arab League special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi has asked the Americans and Russians to move up by a day their scheduled attendance at the talks. He presumably wants to use the great powers to deliver their clients to some sort of agreement, likely on confidence-building measures like prisoner exchanges and ceasefires, since the transitional governing body is clearly a non-starter for Bashar al Asad. A ceasefire and evacuation of civilians from Homs over the weekend did not go well. Still unidentified forces fired on the UN/Syrian Arab Red Crescent convoy.
The most interesting thing about the talks so far is the performance of the opposition, which has not only stayed united but also attracted in this round representatives of some of the brigades fighting the government. That’s a good sign, as it suggests at least some of the fighters might cooperate if anything is agreed in Geneva. The opposition has also managed to maintain the initiative by never letting the transitional governing body fall off the agenda.
The Syrian government’s effort to keep the focus on terrorism helps it to claim that its security forces are trying to protect the Syrian people. The trouble is that a large portion of the country–many beyond the seven million or so already displaced from their homes–are not feeling protected. The devastation of Homs, Hama, Aleppo and other population centers belies the government’s claim. Syrians know it is protecting itself and Bashar al Asad’s hold on power, not the population.
Russian backing for the Syrian government is clearly producing effects the Russians will regret. Among the many extremists joining the fight in Syria are a significant number of Russian citizens from Chechnya and Dagestan. They will no doubt take their talents home when this is over, or maybe even earlier. Any hope that the Russians have for maintaining their interest in the port of Latakia and arms sales after Bashar al Asad is gone is evaporating. Moscow is leaving Washington with little choice but to beef up the arming and training of relatively moderate rebel forces, unless it wants to go even farther by destroying the Syrian government’s capacity to shell population centers. Even Russia’s desire to demonstrate its significance in the world might be better served by agreeing to a political transition in Syria rather than continuing to arm and finance Asad, whose violations of the laws of war will be long remembered.
Such a Russian change of heart could rescue Geneva 2. But it isn’t likely. Barack Obama needs to recalibrate.
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