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A potent symbol

Montenegro’s Prime Minister Djukanovic is in DC today (and yesterday) to plump for his country’s NATO membership.  His talking points were good (extrapolated from what he said):

• Montenegro has prepared well and meets the membership criteria, even if its population is still more or less evenly divided on the proposition;
• an invitation to NATO at the September Summit in Cardiff will have a positive impact on Balkans regional stability, including by encouraging Bosnia and Serbia to move in the same direction;
• the Alliance needs to send Russia a strong message about its willingness and ability to expand and defend its members in response to the Ukraine crisis.

The trouble of course is that Montenegro is tiny (Google says 621,081).  However meritorious its candidacy, it is hard to see Montenegrin membership in NATO as a serious response to Russian malfeasance or even to regional instability.

Cardiff requires a broader vision , with an invitation to Montenegro as one component.  How to frame this broader vision is the issue.  Here are some possibilities:

1. the Alliance could explicitly state its intention to invite, when they are ready, all the remaining Balkans non-members (Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia in addition to Montenegro) to join;
2. the intention could be broadened to all European democracies, including not only the Balkans but also Moldova, Sweden and Finland as well as Ukraine and Georgia;
3. it could even include some non-European democracies, like Colombia, which cooperates closely with the Alliance.

3. is a stretch.  2.  risks provoking further Russian reaction in what it regards as its “near abroad,” even if much of it has been said before.  It would also potentially saddle NATO with members whose defense would be difficult (especially Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia).  In this era of constrained resources and retrenchment, the Alliance should be looking for members whose net contributions will be positive, not negative.  I’d plunk for 1., which is neither a stretch nor likely to provoke the Russians, who will campaign against NATO membership for Serbia and Bosnia (as they are already doing in Montenegro) but can do little more than that.

The Balkans owe their current democratic institutions to NATO action.  Kosovo in particular sees things that way.  More than ninety percent of its population supports NATO membership, which isn’t possible right away because the six-year-old country is just now beginning to build its armed forces.  The Albanians of Macedonia are likewise heavily in favor of NATO membership, which they regard as a guarantee of Skopje’s continued adherence to democratic norms (and decent treatment of its Albanian citizens).  The ethnic Macedonians are not far behind.  The only thing that holds Macedonia back is Greek refusal to accept it as an Alliance member.  Bulgaria’s echo of Greek objections will fade quickly if Athens changes its mind.

Serbia and Bosnia are more equivocal.  NATO bombed Serbs in both countries–notably Bosnia towards the end of the war there and Serbia in the 1999 conflict over Kosovo.  Nevertheless, the current leadership in Belgrade seems to be ready to at least start down the path towards NATO.  Membership for Montenegro would encourage them to do so.  Once Serbia embarks, it will make no sense for the Serbs in Bosnia to hold back, especially as the Serb units of the Bosnian army are reputedly highly professional and won’t want to suffer exclusion from the club.

So far as I am aware, Montenegro and Macedonia are the only fully qualified NATO aspirants at the moment.  Macedonia would have to enter as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as provided for in a 1995 interim agreement between Athens and Skopje, whose applicability to NATO membership has been confirmed by a decision of the International Court of Justice.  The merits of the case aside, getting The FYROM into NATO will require some heavy political lifting by the United States and Germany, which will need to convince Athens to drop its objection.

In addition to stating its intentions, the Alliance should add substance to its vision by advancing each of the Balkans aspirants as far as possible along the path towards membership.  What this means for each country would vary, but the clever bureaucrats at NATO headquarters can figure it out.  If Sweden or Finland wants to take some additional steps towards membership, that would be icing on the cake.

A substantial Balkans/Scandinavian move towards NATO would shore up the Alliance’s flanks.  It would be a serious diplomatic blow to Moscow, one for which it has no ready diplomatic or military response.  All the countries involved would be net contributors to the Alliance.  The move would help stabilize the Balkans and give Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia hope for the future.  It would demonstrate that aggression in Ukraine has real costs and give contemporary substance to traditional US sloganeering about “Europe whole and free.”

Montenegro is tiny, but wrapped in the right package it could become a potent symbol of an alliance prepared to pursue its ideals, come what may.