peacefare.net

Booooogus

The Administration and its surrogates are trying hard to assure all concerned that its pivot to the Asia Pacific will not reduce attention to the Middle East.  They are also trying to minimize the impact of Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine maneuvers.  Meanwhile Bashar al Asad intends to hold an “election” June 3 and photographs have confirmed the Russian origin of supposed pro-Russian demonstrators in Ukraine.  Presidents may try to set their own agenda, but circumstances in the world don’t always comply.

The prospect of an election in Syria under current circumstances is bozotic.  While Asad will no doubt find some supposed “opposition” figure to contest him, the whole thing will be what the car guys call “booooogus.”  A good part of the Syrian population is living in areas outside government control, one-third or more of the population is displaced or refugees, violence threatens even more, and election observation is impossible.  Unfree and unfair is the best that could be said about an election occurring under these conditions.

The protesters taking over government buildings in eastern and southern Ukraine are no less bogus.  Russia inspires, equips and leads them to disrupt Kiev’s efforts to exert control.  Most may be Ukrainians, but that makes little difference.  For the Russian foreign minister to complain about Kiev’s failure to rein them in adds insult to injury.  Provoking unrest and then complaining about is downright evil.

The question is what the United States can and should do about such reprobate behavior. 

In Syria, only an effort to rebalance the battlefield will have a serious impact at this point.  That is apparently happening, with the shipment of anti-tank weapons to a selected few trained members of the opposition.  Hesitancy and reluctance still characterize the effort more than boldness and resolution.  Even with greater resolve, arming will not suffice.  There are other requirements:  strengthening the opposition politically by connecting the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) with the fighters on the ground, enabling the SOC-connected administrations to govern more effectively in liberated areas, and convincing the Iranians that their assistance to Asad is damaging to their regional ambitions.

I wouldn’t waste any more breath on the Russians, who appear to have decided to support Asad to the bitter end.  Iranians I heard from recently show much more concern about the damage being done in Syria, not  least because sectarian warfare and the growing strength of Sunni extremists are seen as real threats in Tehran.  Asad’s use of chemical weapons and the increasingly serious attrition of Hizbollah forces also give Iran pause.  Tehran has more to worry about if Asad falls without a political arrangement for what comes next than Moscow does.

In Ukraine, the United States can do little more than insist on implementation of last week’s agreement to deescalate.  If this includes requiring the demonstrators in Kiev’s Maidan to disperse, as quid pro quo for an end to the occupation of government buildings in the south and east, so be it.  The key thing is to create the conditions for a decent election at the end of May, or soon thereafter, to legitimize a government in Kiev with democratic blessing.  The demonstrators in the east and south will try to prevent that, not least because the Russian annexation of Crimea has eliminated any chance the country’s Russophiles can win it.  They will be condemned to the opposition.  Their best hope for them to avoid such an election is to make Ukraine as chaotic as Syria.

Russia is relying on bogus protestors in Ukraine and a bogus election in Syria.  The best response right now would be a decent election in Ukraine and more serious support to a more unified opposition in Syria.  Neither will repair all the harm that has been done in both places, but the President’s prospects for convincing allies in Asia this week and next that they can rely on Washington depends on what he achieves in the places he would like to leave behind.