peacefare.net

There is more thankless work to be done

Lakhtar Brahimi, the UN special envoy for Syria during the better part of the last two years, resigned yesterday, with appropriate apologies to the Syrian people.  In many obvious senses, the UN has been a colossal failure in Syria:

• it has failed to bring about a political settlement between the regime and its opposition,
• it has not prevented 150,000 deaths and millions of people displaced,
• it hasn’t even managed more than local ceasefires,
• it delivers humanitarian aid mostly behind regime lines, and
• it has been unable to get concerted regional or great power action to end the war.

But looked at from a different angle it has also managed to do quite well:  even before Brahimi’s appointment, it put forward a plan for an end to the fighting, it deployed international monitors, it withdrew them when it became apparent they weren’t doing any good, it managed two Geneva conferences (the first in 2012 at least produced a joint US/Russian plan and the second got the warring parties to the same table), it has helped managed the process of eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons, it has documented human rights abuses, and it has provided absolutely vital humanitarian assistance to large numbers of vulnerable civilians.

The UN is only as good as its member states allow it to be.  It is not a miracle worker.  But it is also not finished yet, even if Brahimi deservedly wants to withdraw.

So what should it do next?  Given the failure of the Geneva 2 talks, and the apparent fruitlessness of further efforts along those lines, what should the UN and its specialized agencies do to alleviate suffering, protect civilians, increase the odds of an eventual political settlement (or hasten its arrival) and reduce the likelihood of a burdgeoning conflict that engulfs Lebanon, Iraq and maybe even Turkey and Jordan?

There are several options, not mutually exclusive:

1. Deliver 360 degree aid:  The bulk of UN humanitarian assistance has gone people in need in regime-controlled territory.  The UN agencies could join many nongovernmental organizations in providing ample humanitarian assistance across borders from Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, thus enabling it to deliver more to rebel-held areas.
2. Facilitate regional dialogue:  While they have embassies in each others’ capitals, the Saudis and Iranians are barely on speaking terms and conducting a proxy war in Syria; refocusing them on common interests like countering violent extremists and maintaining state structures in the Levant could improve the situation.  It is a good sign that the Saudis yesterday invited the Iranian foreign minister for a visit.
3. Begin planning for post-war reconstruction and transition:  When the war ends, as it inevitably will, the UN will be called upon to support reconstruction; it should be thinking about that now, helping to negotiate local ceasefires where possible and to build the local governing structures and civil society that can support the reconstruction process.  Efforts of this sort are vital to improving the prospects for a democratic transition in Syria.
4. Provide a moral compass:  the UN could do more to publicize war crimes and crimes against humanity, it could take a strong position against the presidential “election” Assad is planning to conduct under thoroughly unfair and unfree conditions June 3, it could insist more loudly on protection of civilians and humanitarian access, it could get religious leaders to insist on observance of the laws of war.
5. Cut off regime and terrorist financing: The sanctions on the Syrian regime are not nearly as tight as they might be, and terrorist organizations like ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) as well as Jabhat al Nusra are still receiving international funds as well as arms and other assistance from abroad.  A more concerted effort to reduce the availability of resources could help de-escalate the conflict and reduce the harm to civilians.

There are arguments against all these propositions.  The UN generally requires the permission of the host country to deliver aid from any direction.  The regime could conceivably boot the UN from Damascus if it tries without permission.  It is not easy for the UN to get the Saudis talking, as they tend to be both secretive and hierarchical.  Local level reconstruction efforts to establish a minimum of governance and civil society require a capillary international presence in rebel-held areas, where security is dicey.  He who holds a moral compass will not always be welcomed by those–on both sides of the war–who don’t.

But the UN is a reflection of ourselves.  If we want these things done, the organization will find at least some people and means to get them done.  The soft-spoken and precise Brahimi, well-suited to the high political level he has been dealing at, would not have necessarily been the best person for these tasks.   The US needs to lead an effort to ensure that Brahimi’s departure does not end the UN’s focus on Syria.  There is more thankless work to be done.