Deal or no deal?
Einstein quipped, “politics is more difficult than physics.” As the deadline for a nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 approaches with a host of issues unresolved, this observation seems especially prophetic. The Wilson Center Tuesday assembled a panel to disentangle some of these questions: Jon Wolfsthal of the Monterey Institute; Robert Litwak of the Wilson Center; Daryl Kimball, of the Arms Control Association; and Stephen Hadley of USIP, who moderated.
There are many reasons to be skeptical that such a deal can be successfully concluded: Iran has a long history of noncompliance, and there is considerable opposition among hardliners in both countries. Furthermore, America’s track record for negotiating similar deals has not been stellar: in 2003, for instance, the six-party talks with North Korea broke down. Nonetheless, the panelists agreed that the circumstances surrounding the current round of negotiations warrant a measure of cautious optimism.
With regards to a timeline, Wolfsthal contended that only a long-term deal should be on the table. This would reduce Iran’s break-out capability, as well as provide space for confidence building measures that could further dissuade Tehran from seeking the bomb. Nonetheless, the US must remember that, unlike Iraq, Iran is not a vanquished state: negotiators therefore cannot impose permanent limits on the Iranian nuclear program. Even the Iraqi sanctions regime lasted seventeen years—that is, it was time-bound.
Kimball pointed out that Russia’s cooperation is crucial to the long-term success of any accord. They have agreed to supply Iran’s Bushehr reactor with fissile material until 2021; if the agreement is not renewed, Iran could be justified in their demands for expanding the number of centrifuges. In the longer run, if Iran can demonstrate a need for indigenously produced nuclear power, there might be an opening to phase out first generation centrifuges and replace them with a smaller number of more efficient IR-2M centrifuges.
Litwak noted that the challenges underlying the nuclear agreement speak to larger questions facing Iran. As Kissinger once asked, “Does Iran want to be a nation or a cause?” Hardliners in both countries remain one of the primary obstacles to the success of negotiations. Conservatives in Tehran want to develop Iran’s nuclear capacity in order to solidify their country’s standing as a regional power and ensure regime survival. By disarming, Iran might leave itself vulnerable to regime change.
It remains to be seen if President Rouhani is able to sell a deal to Tehran, as ultimately it is up to the Supreme Leader to weigh the cost of alienating hardliners in Tehran against the economic pain caused by sanctions. President Obama’s two-track strategy, combining pressure and outreach, only sharpens the choice. The cycle of reformist and reactionary presidents who have come to power over the years may reflect shifts in Khameini’s willingness to oppose hardliners in Tehran. Tellingly, in last few weeks, Khameini has openly tried to quell dissent over the nuclear deal.
There is also considerable opposition to a deal in the United States. Democrats and Republicans alike are demanding that sanctions relief be conditioned on Iran’s compliance on issues like human rights. The president must find leaders on both sides of the aisle who are willing to sell the deal to their respective parties. Negotiators, and Congress, must disentangle successive tranches of sanctions. Human rights issues will not go away even if nuclear issue is resolved.
Litwak emphasized that the Iranian nuclear program was not designed in response to a perceived existential threat, as is the case with Pakistan and Israel. Ultimately, Iran is not intent on building a nuclear weapon; they only want to demonstrate the ability to create a nuclear weapon. They are well aware that any move towards actual weaponization could lead to a regional and international conflagration.
Any agreement with broad international support will be distasteful to Israel, which will press its US ally for vigorous verification of compliance and other assurances. There must be mechanisms embedded within any agreement to ensure compliance, including snapback sanctions and even authorization of force if Iran does break-out.
The US doesn’t trust Iran or Russia, but is nonetheless able to conclude deals with them. In order for these negotiations to succeed, they must be based on verification, not trust. It is important to keep in mind what will happen in the absence of any deal at all: we will be unable to verify Iran’s enrichment capacity; enrichment could continue; and without additional inspections, Iran could expand its capacity in secret.
There is a crucial difference between the failed talks with North Korea and current negotiations: a large portion of Iranian society wants to rejoin the international community. This desire provides negotiators with levers that were unavailable with North Korea. Arriving at an agreement will not be easy. It will have to be flexible enough to allow for Iran’s growing energy needs and satisfy the country’s hardliners, yet tough enough to persuade a skeptical Congress that Iran’s break-out capacity has been eliminated.
Nonetheless, the panelists agreed, the best time for a nuclear deal is now. Rouhani’s election was a clear signal that Iranians are prepared to negotiate.
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